Protecting an Industrial AC Drive Application against Cyber Sabotage by Pentzin, Erno
Erno Pentzin
Protecting an Industrial AC Drive
Application against Cyber Sabotage
School of Electrical Engineering
Thesis submitted for examination for the degree of Master of
Science in Technology.
Espoo 2013-01-28
Thesis supervisor:
Asst. Prof. Marko Hinkkanen
Thesis instructor:
M.Sc. (Tech.) Mika J. Ka¨rna¨
A’’ Aalto UniversitySchool of ElectricalEngineering
aalto university
school of electrical engineering
abstract of the
master’s thesis
Author: Erno Pentzin
Title: Protecting an Industrial AC Drive Application against Cyber Sabotage
Date: 2013-01-28 Language: English Number of pages:15+119
Department of Electrical Engineering
Professorship: Electric Drives Code: S3016
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Marko Hinkkanen
Instructor: M.Sc. (Tech.) Mika J. Ka¨rna¨
Discovered in 2010, the highly advanced computer virus called Stuxnet, also de-
scribed as the first weapon of cyber warfare, reportedly destroyed at least 1,000
gas centrifuges enriching uranium in Iran. This kind of act of cyber sabotage was
conducted by compromising the industrial control system, disabling protection
functions of AC drives running the centrifuges, and making them spin at such
high speeds that centrifugal forces caused their rotors to rupture.
Decanters are another type of centrifuges used to separate solids from liquids
in many industries including water treatment and mining for example. Also known
as solid-bowl, scroll-discharge centrifuges, decanters are commonly powered by
induction motors and AC drives. Assuming havoc similar to the Stuxnet case
can be prevented with suitable safety systems, a review was conducted on the
protection methods for decanter centrifuges based on literature and the current
security and safety features of the following modern AC drives with Ethernet-
based fieldbus connectivity: ABB ACS880-01, Rockwell Allen-Bradley PowerFlex
755, and Siemens SINAMICS S110.
As a result of the limited assessment, the worst vulnerability related to
cybersecurity of the AC drives is typical to many automation devices using field-
buses: total configuration is possible remotely without any authentication by de-
fault. However, the functional safety configuration can be protected by means of
a password, therefore allowing a standardized safety function called safely-limited
speed (SLS) to become a viable solution for protecting the decanter centrifuge
against cyber sabotage. By following the supplied checklist, it is possible to con-
figure AC drives used with decanters optimally in terms of cybersecurity.
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Vuonna 2010 havaittua, eritta¨in kehittynytta¨ tietokonevirusta nimelta¨ Stuxnet
on kuvailtu myo¨s ensimma¨iseksi kybersodan aseeksi, koska eri la¨hteiden mu-
kaan se tuhosi va¨hinta¨a¨n 1 000 uraania rikastavaa kaasusentrifugia Iranissa.
Ta¨ma¨ kybersabotaasi suoritettiin tunkeutumalla teolliseen ohjausja¨rjestelma¨a¨n,
kytkema¨lla¨ sentrifugeja ohjaavien taajuusmuuttajien suojatoiminnot pois pa¨a¨lta¨ ja
pyo¨ritta¨ma¨lla¨ niita¨ niin suurilla nopeuksilla, etta¨ keskipakoisvoimat aiheuttivat
roottoreiden repea¨misen.
Dekantterit ovat toisenlaisia sentrifugeja, joita ka¨yteta¨a¨n erottamaan
kiintea¨t aineet nestema¨isista¨ useilla eri teollisuudenaloilla, kuten esimerkiksi
vedenka¨sittelyssa¨ ja kaivostoiminnassa. Dekantterisentrifugit, eli tarkemmin
kiintea¨rumpuiset, ruuvipurkuiset lingot, ka¨yva¨t usein epa¨tahtikoneilla ja taajuus-
muuttajilla. Olettaen, etta¨ Stuxnet-tapauksen kaltainen tuho voidaan esta¨a¨ so-
pivilla turvaja¨rjestelmilla¨, toimenpiteita¨ dekantterilingon suojelemiseksi tutkittiin
ka¨ytta¨en kirjallisuutta ja nykyista¨ tietoturva- ja henkilo¨turvaominaisuustarjon-
taa seuraavilta uudenaikaisilta taajuusmuuttajilta, joissa on Ethernet-pohjainen
kentta¨va¨yla¨yhteys: ABB ACS880-01, Rockwell Allen-Bradley PowerFlex 755 ja
Siemens SINAMICS S110.
Rajoitetun arvioinnin tuloksena taajuusmuuttajien pahin kyberturvallisuu-
teen liittyva¨ haavoittuvuus on tyypillinen monille kentta¨va¨ylia¨ ka¨ytta¨ville au-
tomaatiolaitteille: ta¨ysivaltainen asetusten muutos on mahdollista oletusarvoi-
sesti ilman minka¨a¨nlaista ka¨ytta¨ja¨hallintaa. Kuitenkin toiminnallisen turvalli-
suuden asetukset voidaan suojata salasanalla, joten standardoitu turvafunktio
nimelta¨ turvallisesti rajoitettu nopeus on toteuttamiskelpoinen ratkaisu dekant-
terilingon suojelemiseksi kybersabotaasilta. Liitteena¨ olevaa tarkistuslistaa seu-
raamalla dekanttereissa ka¨ytetta¨va¨t taajuusmuuttajat voidaan konfiguroida mah-
dollisimman hyvin kyberturvallisuuden kannalta.
Avainsanat: teollinen, taajuusmuuttaja, kyber, sabotaasi, kybersabotaasi,
dekantteri, sentrifugi, linko, turvallisuus, tietoturva, kyberturval-
lisuus, automaatio, kentta¨va¨yla¨, toiminnallinen turvallisuus
iv
Preface
This thesis was made for the ABB Drives Helsinki factory (FIDRI) during the time
period between July, 2012, and January, 2013. It would not have been possible
without the support of certain individuals, for who I wish to express my gratitude
now.
Firstly, I would like to thank Mr. Janne Henttonen and Mr. Tuomo Ho¨ysniemi
of LAC R&D for arranging prosperous working conditions for me. Without their
support, I could have not been able to work to my fullest extent on my thesis.
Secondly, I have greatly appreciated the most valuable support of my instructor
Mr. Mika J. Ka¨rna¨ of ABB Drives, and supervisor Mr. Marko Hinkkanen of Depart-
ment of Electrical Engineering of Aalto University. I want to express my gratitude
to those two gentlemen for their time spent reading my drafts and the excellent
feedback provided.
Thirdly, my thanks to Mrs. Marjukka Patrakka and Mr. Janne Vuori of Depart-
ment of Materials Science and Engineering of Aalto University for co-operation in
providing a highly important source material for me. Without it, my knowledge of
decanter centrifuges would be substantially less. Also the following persons made
crucial contributions for which I am grateful: From ABB Drives, Mr. Timo Holt-
tinen for providing his valuable decanter expertise, Mr. Petteri A¨mma¨la¨ and Mr.
Petri Torniainen for product expertise, and Mr. Mikko Ristolainen for functional
safety resources. And from PLABB, Mr. Dawid Piech and Mr. Janusz Maruszczyk
for standards resources.
Then, my thanks to the following co-workers from ABB Drives in no particular
order: Juho for organizing Tmnttrst events regularly for the benefit of employee
satisfaction, Pasi for participating these events regularly for good company, Heikki
for daily lunch plans and testing support, Lauri K. for coffee break reminders and
fitness exercise company, Olli A. and Olli V. for LATEX support, Ville for providing
practical tips about thesis making, Vassili for fruitful conversations, Jyri for lunch
company, Jarmo T., Markku S., Micke, Matti V., Petri M., and Markku J. for
interesting aisle conversations, and for all other ABB colleagues who I forgot to
mention. Special acknowledgment goes to Hard Test Cafe´ regular crew for providing
answers to any question imaginable by mankind.
I would also like to thank Mrs. Pa¨ivi Palm and others from Helsinki Polytechnic
(Stadia) who encouraged me to continue my studies. Remembering my time in that
school brings the following quote to my mind:
“you can’t connect the dots looking forward;
you can only connect them looking backwards.” —Steve Jobs (2005)
My studies have taken time, but some wise person has once said that the journey is
more important than the destination. I could not agree more.
In addition, I would like to thank the individuals, teams, organizations, and cor-
porations behind the following free tools and applications I have used for making
this thesis: Firstly, the most important tools, my cross-platform “trusted trio” con-
sisting of LATEX2ε, TeXstudio, and JabRef. Then, in no specific order: MiKTeX,
vMacTeX, Dropbox, Workrave, Dia, and a bunch of LATEX packages. Those tools
have enabled me to work as efficiently as I have could.
Also, the following websites have been a big help for me: The Purdue University
Online Writing Lab (http://owl.english.purdue.edu/) for helping me navigate
through the English grammar, and TEXample.net for LATEX example code.
And while speaking of things which have helped me, I must mention music as a
major contributor (and sometimes even enabler with ambient noise reducing head-
phones). Thanks to Aphex Twin (Richard David James) for his spectacular Selected
Ambient Works 85-92 album which has helped me in the creation process of this
thesis. Also a big help in sinking into the state of flow has been GetWorkDoneMu-
sic.com, introduced to me by Lifehacker (www.lifehacker.com). And Electronic
Architecture 2 album by Solarstone (Richard Mowatt), D. Trance 6 album by Gary
D. (Gerald Malke), and many others.
I’ve enjoyed working on this thesis combining power electronics, electric drives,
cybersecurity, and even nuclear physics and world politics. During this time which
I have spent studying all these wonderful things, I have had the same of kind of
feeling as in this next quote:
“For the world is changing:
I feel it in the water,
I feel it in the earth,
and I smell it in the air.”
—Treebeard / J. R. R. Tolkien: The Return of the King (1997)
Finally, I want to thank my beloved wife Mimmi for each day I have had the
privilege to spent with her. This thesis is dedicated to our first child, whose quickly
forthcoming due date has been the greatest motivator for me.
Helsinki, January 28, 2013
Erno Pentzin
vi
Contents
Abstract ii
Abstract (in Finnish) iii
Preface iv
Contents vi
Symbols and Abbreviations x
1 Introduction 1
2 Cybersecurity 4
2.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Cyber Threats and Selected Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 Computer Viruses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2 Hackers and Crackers—Case GMail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.3 Insider Threat—Case Maroochy Shire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.4 Advanced Persistent Threat—Case RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Case Stuxnet 9
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 Source Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2 Threat Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.3 Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.4 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.5 Programmable Logic Controller Infection . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.6 The Target and Damage Inflicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.7 Consequences and Creators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Uranium Enrichment Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1 Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.2 Centrifuge Cascades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 Gas Centrifuge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.1 Operating Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.2 Construction of the Zippe-Type Gas Centrifuge . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.3 Hysteresis Motor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Factors Ultimately Contributing to the Physical Destruction . . . . . 19
3.4.1 AC Drive Protection Functions Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.2 Normal Controller Execution Halted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.3 Response of Other Safety Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.4 Destructive Centrifugal Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
vii
4 Industrial AC Drive Application 21
4.1 Hardware Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Decanter Centrifuge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.1 Terminology and Source Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.2 Operating Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.3 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.4 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.5 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.6 Decanter Plant and Remote Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.7 Instrumentation and Controllers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Induction Motor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3.1 Operating Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3.2 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3.3 Dimensioning an Induction Motor for a Decanter . . . . . . . 30
4.3.4 Vulnerabilities in Variable Speed Drive Applications . . . . . . 31
4.4 AC Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.1 Terminology and Source Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.2 Energy Savings and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4.3 Operating Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4.4 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4.5 Performance Challenges in Decanter Applications . . . . . . . 34
4.4.6 Reference Chain, Limits, and Protections . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4.7 Control Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5 System Security and Machinery Safety 38
5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1.1 Source Material and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1.2 Risk Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1.3 Moving Target of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1.4 The Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1.5 Defense-in-Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.2 Industrial Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2.1 Ethernet and Internet Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.2.2 Internet Protocol Version 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2.3 Industrial Network Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.5 Overview of Cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.3 Field Devices and Fieldbus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3.1 Automation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3.2 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.3.3 EtherNet/Industrial Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3.4 Process Field Network—PROFINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.4 Machinery and Process Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.4.1 About Safety Instrumented Systems in General . . . . . . . . 51
5.4.2 Functional Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
viii
5.4.3 Speed Feedback for Safety Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.4.4 Common Safety Requirements for Centrifuges . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4.5 Safety-Related Parts of Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6 Selected AC Drives and Software Tools 56
6.1 AC Drives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.1 Drive Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.2 Hardware Test Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.1.3 ABB ACS880-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.1.4 Rockwell Allen-Bradley PowerFlex 755 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.1.5 Siemens SINAMICS S110 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.2 Software for Drives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2.1 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2.2 Drive Composer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.2.3 DriveExplorer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.2.4 STARTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3 Vulnerability Assessment Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3.1 VirtualBox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3.2 BackTrack Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3.3 Metasploit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.3.4 Armitage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.3.5 Nmap—Network Mapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.3.6 Wireshark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.3.7 The Hacker’s Choice-Hydra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7 Comparison of Security Features of Different AC Drives 67
7.1 Commissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.2 Parameter Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.2.1 Access Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.2.2 Reset of Parameters to Factory Defaults . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3 Functional Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3.1 Speed Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3.2 Safety Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.3.3 Safety Licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.3.4 Safely-Limited Speed Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.3.5 Password Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3.6 Safety Password Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.4 PC Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.4.1 Communication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.4.2 Communication Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.5 Ethernet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.5.1 Internet Protocol Address Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.5.2 Web Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.5.3 Parameter Writes and Memory Wear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.5.4 Vulnerability to Common Exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
ix
7.6 Firmware Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.7 Miscellaneous Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.7.1 Factory Seal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.7.2 Critical Speeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.7.3 Write Masks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8 Results 80
8.1 AC Drive Security Related Feature Comparison Summary . . . . . . 80
8.2 Recommendations for Securing the Decanter Application . . . . . . . 81
8.2.1 Protecting Decanter Centrifuge Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . 81
8.2.2 Air-gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.2.3 Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.2.4 The Human Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8.2.5 Application Whitelisting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8.3 Overspeed Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.3.1 Speed Limit Parameters of AC Drives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.3.2 Functional Safety and Safely-Limited Speed . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.3.3 Completely Isolated Safety Instrumented System . . . . . . . 84
8.3.4 Cybersecurity Checklist for AC Drives in Decanters . . . . . . 84
8.4 Recommendations for Improvement of Security of AC Drives . . . . . 85
8.4.1 Ethernet Vulnerabilities of AC Drives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8.4.2 Safety Password Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8.4.3 Parameter Modification Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.4.4 Access Control for Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.4.5 Configuration of Network Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.4.6 Access Control for Web Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.4.7 Firmware Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.4.8 Logging of Security Related Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.5.1 Significance of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.5.2 Reliability of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.5.3 Further Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
9 Summary 91
References 93
A Safety Functions 115
B Version Information of the Compared AC Drives 116
C Security Checklist for AC Drives for Decanters 118
xSymbols and Abbreviations
Symbols
Latin Letters
a Acceleration
D Diffusion coefficient
f Frequency of the line voltage
fN Nominal frequency of an electric machine
g Gravity on Earth (≈ 9.81 m/s2)
gc Ratio of centrifugal acceleration to the gravity (g-level)
Imax Maximum output current of a drive
IN Nominal current of a drive or an electric machine
l Length
mGB Gearbox ratio
∆M Molecular weight difference
n Asynchronous speed
nbowl Bowl speed
nd Differential speed (of the conveyor)
nN Nominal speed of an electric machine
np Gearbox pinion speed
ns Synchronous speed
O Solids recovery
p Number of pole pairs
PM Power on the motor shaft
PN Nominal power of an electric machine
Qf Flow rate of the feed
Ql Flow rate of liquids
r Radius
R Universal gas constant (≈ 8.3 J/mol K)
s Slip of an induction motor
T Temperature
Tc Conveyor torque
TN Nominal torque of a motor
Tp Pinion torque
UN Nominal voltage of an electric machine
v Velocity
va Peripheral velocity
∆W Separative work unit (SWU)
xf Fraction of solids in the feed
xl Fraction of solids in the centrate (liquids)
xi
Greek Letters
cosϕ Cosine of the angle between current and voltage, i.e. percentage of apparent
power S used as active power P
ηB Efficiency of a belt coupling
ηF Efficiency of a fluid coupling
ρ Density
ρf Density of the feed
ρl Density of the centrate (liquids)
ω Angular velocity
ωm Electrical angular velocity of the rotor
Abbreviations
3G 3rd Generation
AB Allen-Bradley (or AktieBolag, Swedish for incorporated com-
pany, Inc.)
AC Alternating Current
AG AktienGesellschaft (German for incorporated company, Inc.)
AM Asynchronous Machine
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
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1 Introduction
An alternating current (AC) drive is a place where cyberspace meets the physical
world. Digital control signals, sent from far reaches of interconnected computer
networks, are translated to electric energy by power electronics inside an AC drive.
This electric energy is transformed to mechanical energy in electric motors driving
heavy machinery. But what happens to the machinery if the control signals are not
what they are supposed to be?
The results of the probably most notorious example of cyber sabotage can be read
from reports like the one by Albright et al. [2010]: The machinery was physically
damaged and had to be replaced, causing disruptions to the production process,
not to mention replacement costs. That damaged machinery were hundreds of gas
centrifuges, enriching uranium at the Natanz enrichment plant in Iran.
And what caused the Iranian gas centrifuges to fail with devastating conse-
quences? According to Albright et al. [2011], the reason was excessive rotational
speed and destructive centrifugal forces with it. The gas centrifuges were not in
control of the plant operators anymore, but instead they were attacked by a weapon
of cyberwar called Stuxnet.
This master’s thesis is about securing an industrial AC drive application. The
goal is to find a solution to secure the drive application in such a way that damage
is not inflicted upon the equipment or people, in case the control system has been
compromised. Possible solutions will be presented as guidelines for the design of the
AC drive application, potentially including drive features and configuration options.
The initial hypothesis is that any control systems can not be trusted, i.e. assumed
secure, and the drive application must be protected by some kind of safety/protection
system. It must be possible to prevent physical destruction somehow, at all times.
Due to the vast of amount of different industrial AC drive applications, the scope
of this thesis is limited to one specific application: the decanter centrifuge, also
known as a solid-bowl, scroll-discharge centrifuge. The security practices presented
for this one application might be applicable to other AC drive applications also.
The decanter centrifuge was chosen as the target application, because it bears
similarities with the machinery attacked by Stuxnet, gas centrifuges, being another
type of centrifuge. In addition, AC drives for some decanters are known to be
equipped with Ethernet-based fieldbuses and safety features, which both are within
the scope of this thesis. And finally, the decanter centrifuge is an industrial appli-
cation only, which also fits into the scope.
Usually, when discussing about AC drives, cybersecurity is not among the top
issues on the agenda. AC drives are used in all sorts of applications, ranging from
industrial decanter centrifuges to domestic appliances, such as washing machines.
Applications are so numerous that it is practically impossible to know them all. The
application subject was chosen industrial, because virtually all industrial facilities
have one or more AC drives. Thus, the industrial sector is a huge market for AC
drives.
The industrial environment examined in this thesis is also limited. Security
breaches in the manufacturing process of an AC drive and related equipment are not
2taken into consideration. So it will be assumed that every AC drive, programmable
logic controller (PLC), and other piece of equipment delivered to the end-user is
not compromised, without any (intentionally) malicious code running on it. The
production plant and the supply chain will be considered secure in that way. Any
possible security breaches are assumed to be happening at the end-user’s premises,
at the site of the decanter centrifuge.
However, in reality, production plants of component manufacturers can be even
more vulnerable to external and internal threats, compared to facilities of end-
users. It is also possible that a manufacturer intentionally delivers equipment with
“backdoors”, e.g. for espionage purposes, like some Chinese companies have been
accused by the United States (U.S.) congress recently [Rogers and Ruppersberger,
2012, Schmidt et al., 2012].
Furthermore, it will be assumed that the decanter centrifuge is physically secure,
i.e. a potential attacker has no physical access to conduct sabotage. Usually that
is the case, as decanters are used in industrial facilities with locked doors, burglar
alarms, and security guards. Additionally, AC drives are often located in locked
electric cabinets. Thus, the only way for a cyber attacker to reach the decanter
application and the AC drives is through a medium introduced to the network (e.g.
a laptop) or a device connected to the AC drives (e.g. a PLC).
Unlike most of the publications about security of industrial control systems
(ICS’s), the subject is examined as the AC drive as the central piece of equipment.
Usually in other studies, logically upper control systems (e.g. PLC and networks)
are considered as the central element, and their security is analyzed. However,
modern premium AC drives include many of the functionalities that external PLC
equipment have, such as user programmable (firmware) applications with extensive
function block sets, and multiple different fieldbus connection possibilities. In some
applications and configurations, these services offered by individual AC drives are
enough, making any additional PLCs redundant.
The first major, wide-scale incident against ICS’s was due to the malware named
Stuxnet, which also has received a lot of media coverage. There have been other
cyber attacks against industrial facilities in the past, but they have been mainly con-
strained to single facilities, unlike Stuxnet which spread to many countries (although
probably unintentionally) [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 7].
This thesis is not about cyber weapons or cyber warfare in general. Although
Stuxnet, which can be categorized as a cyber weapon, is analyzed, it is only done
for background research purposes and the main focus is on protecting the decanter
centrifuge from whatever cyber threats.
It is a general principle in the field of cybersecurity that to assess vulnerabilities
of a system, one must think like an attacker. This principle is borne in mind while the
components of the decanter centrifuge are inspected later in this thesis. A possible
related scenario imagined for that is a terrorist group with substantial resources,
wanting to demonstrate their cyberwar abilities by wreaking havoc in some water
treatment facility, before targeting a nation’s energy supply by disrupting production
of an uranium mine. This scenario is totally fictitious without any reference to real
life incidents.
3The benefit this thesis seeks to bring is to widen the knowledge of cybersecurity
issues among the automation industry, see how well AC drives can be secured, and
improve their security and safety. Target audience are manufacturers of AC drives,
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and system integrators (SIs) operating
in the machinery and automation industry.
For starters in this thesis, a brief primer about cybersecurity, traditionally known
as computer security or computer network security, is presented in Section 2. After
the reader is familiarized with the basic concepts, the Stuxnet case will be dissected
in Section 3, to find out how physical destruction was ultimately possible. The
results of that thorough study shall be utilized in further analysis with the decanter
centrifuge application in Section 4, as the vulnerabilities associated with its different
components are examined.
Next, theories of security and safety in industrial applications are described in
Section 5, along with the latest guidelines. This section is mostly based on literature
review, providing the methods for the goal of this thesis.
As a prologue to the experimental part, the AC drives selected for comparison
and the software tools to be used are introduced in Section 6. Included among those
is the BackTrack Linux distribution, which shall be the main “toolbox” for assess-
ing security vulnerabilities. BackTrack is widely acclaimed in the computer security
industry, and is actively developed and maintained. It includes many open source
applications for vulnerability assessment of wireless local area networks (WLANs),
operating systems (OS’s), and industrial control systems (such as Wireshark, Metas-
ploit, and many more).
Comparison of security related features of different AC drive models is detailed in
Section 7. The safety and security features of different AC drives shall be studied, to
get a view of those features among different manufacturers. In addition to studying
the features, vulnerabilities shall be examined with penetration testing tools. The
vulnerability assessment of fieldbus communications shall be limited to those of
Ethernet. Ethernet is becoming more and more common interface for drives in
industrial environment, and new AC drive models often have it as built-in.
Finally, overall results and guidelines for securing the decanter centrifuge are
given in Section 8. That along with Section 7 mostly describes the author’s original
work and conclusions. Vulnerabilities shall be disclosed to some extent. This thesis
ends with the summary in Section 9.
42 Cybersecurity
This section introduces the basic concepts and background information related to
the subject of the thesis. It is based on literature review and other publicly available
information.
For starters, some selected events from history related to cybersecurity are pre-
sented as a brief background on how the security situation has evolved. But first,
the related terminology used in this thesis is explained.
2.1 Terminology
Gollmann [2011, p. xvii] writes that computer security industry is “a fashion in-
dustry”, which profits from well-timed “buzzwords”. Evidently, cyber and related
compounds are current buzzwords, which are used even by the President of the
United States [Obama, 2009]. Related terms along with their definitions are pre-
sented below.
Cyber is derived from the term “cyberspace” which refers to a network of comput-
ers and other electronic devices, usually on a global scale [Andress and Win-
terfield, 2011, p. 2]. (Originally from cybernetics, which in turn was derived
from the Greek noun kybernetes (steersman), according to Langner [2011a,
p. 15].)
Cybersecurity “aims at securing the cyber environment”, where cyber environ-
ment means devices and systems, among others, “that can be connected di-
rectly or indirectly to networks.” [International Telecommunication Union,
2008, p. 2–7]
Cyberwar (cyber warfare) means acts of war, i.e. use of force against an opponent,
happening in cyberspace, i.e. against the computer systems maintained by the
opponent [Andress and Winterfield, 2011, p. 2–4]. Stuxnet is a prime example
of this [Knapp, 2011, p. 37]. According to F-Secure Corporation [2012a, p. 4]:
“It’s important to understand that cyber warfare does not necessarily have
anything to do with the Internet.”
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT, not to be confused with the Advanced Pack-
aging Tool used in Linux) “refers to a class of cyber threat designed to in-
filtrate a network, [and] remain persistent through evasion and propagation
techniques”. APT is not an act of sabotage, but of espionage, i.e. information
theft. Cyberwar may follow an APT. [Knapp, 2011, p. 43, 45, 313]
Cyber threat means a threat to cybersecurity.
Cyber sabotage can generally, in popular media, mean any kind of cyber attack,
including deletion of data [Walker, 2012], but in this thesis cyber sabotage
specifically means physical damage to concrete equipment/machinery as a re-
sult of a cyber attack (also known as a cyber-physical attack [Hawrylak et al.,
2012, Langner, 2012]).
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are described, because it is assumed that the reader is not an expert in IS and is
more likely involved in industrial automation engineering. Most of the definitions
are from the Jargon File, which has been spread around the hacker community since
the 1970s and is nowadays maintained by Eric S. Raymond [2004b], the author of
the New Hacker’s Dictionary. Another main source is the online glossary of the
Finnish F-Secure Corporation [2011], which has been in the IS business since 1988.
The general concepts used throughout this thesis are:
Virus is a malicious computer program which infects (integrates into) files on the
host computer during execution, initiated by the user.
Worm is a self-replicating computer program which propagates over a network
without infecting any files on the hosts [Andress and Winterfield, 2011, F-
Secure Corporation, 2012b, Raymond, 2004a].
Trojan (Trojan Horse) is a program which appears benign but silently performs
another action without the user’s knowledge.
Malware is a combination of the words malicious and software, the general term
encompassing viruses, worms, trojans, etc. [F-Secure Corporation, 2012b].
Payload is “an action, program or code delivered to a system by a malware” [F-
Secure Corporation, 2012b].
Rootkit means “a kit for maintaining root” [Raymond, 2004a] (and root meaning
the (super-) user account with the highest privileges on a system) and “a
standalone software component that attempts to hide processes, files, registry
data and network connections” typically using a kernel-mode driver [F-Secure
Corporation, 2012b].
Information security “means protecting information and information systems from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction”
[Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 2012, Title 44 § 3542 (b)(1)].
Computer security “deals with the prevention and detection of unauthorized ac-
tions by users of a computer system”, as defined in the Computer Security
book by Gollmann [2011].
Basically, information security deals with data encryption, while computer secu-
rity deals with access control. Cybersecurity is the combination of those two in a
networked environment.
2.2 Cyber Threats and Selected Incidents
Some of the history of cybersecurity is presented in this subsection to see how the
field has evolved. The starting point for the time in history will be the 1980s.
It is obvious that the IS field is too vast to be extensively presented in this thesis.
Thus, only selected, relevant issues are discussed.
62.2.1 Computer Viruses
In the early days of personal computing, viruses propagated by diskettes because
there was no common network interface which most of the personal computers (PCs)
would be connected to. A virus would infect the diskette and after that, as it was
accessed by another computer, the virus would start executing. Then it would reside
in the memory until another, clean diskette was put into the computer and the virus
would infect it also. As long as the virus was active in the computer’s memory, any
diskettes accessed by that computer would get infected. The virus would also infect
executable files, which could get spread by uploading to a bulletin board system
(BBS).
With the Internet era, the spreading of computer viruses has become easier and
faster. Most of the personal computers nowadays are connected to the Internet,
either constantly by a broadband connection or randomly by a dial-up connection.
The virus residing in the memory of an infected computer has access to all of the
billions of computers connected to the Internet in the world through a common
interface and network stack. So a virus can propagate by itself, without the need
for someone actually carrying it around. But for a modern virus to propagate
to a computer without an Internet connection, it has to implement a form of the
traditional “physical” propagation method. That is what Stuxnet did, as will be
described later.
Basically viruses are computer programs designed to “attack” computers. They
are one type of cyber threat, traditionally without a specific target. However, more
serious threats usually have one very specific target. For example, Stuxnet can be
categorized as a “mostly harmless” virus, but taking into account its target and the
possible motivation behind the attackers, it can be considered as the worst kind of
cyber threat (as will be further explained later). Progressing along the increasing
severity axis, another type of cyber threat are hackers, who do targeted attacks,
often without leaving a trace of themselves.
2.2.2 Hackers and Crackers—Case GMail
According to their original meanings, a hacker and a cracker were two different
things. Definitions for them are the following:
Hacker is “an expert or enthusiast of any kind” [Raymond, 2004a] but generally
used by the popular media to refer to anyone who attacks against computer
systems [F-Secure Corporation, 2012b].
Cracker is “one who breaks security on a system” [Raymond, 2004a], contrary to
the original meaning of a hacker. Nowadays not widely used and generally
replaced by the expansion of the meaning of the term hacker.
Hacking is the activity a hacker does, e.g. studying a computer system or breaking
into one.
The Conscience of a Hacker is a text written by Loyd Blankenship [1986], known
by the alias The Mentor in the hacking community during the 1980s. The text
7describes a hacker’s state-of-mind very vividly. It can provide some insight of the
motives of traditional hackers to the automation industry, such as pure curiosity.
In recent years, political and economical motives for hackers have increased. Eco-
nomical motives are behind “cyber criminals”, who seek economical gains with their
“cyber crimes”. Political motives are behind people who can be identified as “hack-
tivists”. And like in everything else, there are parties which are hard to categorize,
such as the now disintegrated group of hackers who called themselves LulzSec. They
attacked multiple government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), defense contractors, and cor-
porations, such as Sony, among others [Winter, 2012].
A couple of years ago, an attack against some Gmail accounts belonging to
Chinese human rights activists was traced (by Google) to have originated from
China. Although this sparked a major suspicion over the Chinese, the result can
not be trusted 100% and there is always some kind of possibility for a cover-up.
Maybe that is the reason that no direct consequences or charges have been placed
against China or Chinese individuals due to those hacking activities. [Drummond,
2010] Their motives were most likely political, possibly supported by a nation state.
A method called social engineering has been proven as a highly effective hacking
technique. Basically, it is an exploit against wetware, i.e. humans (as opposed to
software and hardware). When considering information security, the human element
is a major factor. Even the best technical security measures can be futile if a person
operates against them, e.g. by using a weak password.
Also, the actions of one person can affect the security of another person, as
was the case in the recent hack incident which involved social engineering exploit
against the phone support service of Apple Corporation. It led to the user account
of one person being handed over to the “hacker” by the support personnel. [Honan,
2012] After being disclosed publicly, the incident led to companies changing their
procedures regarding password resets [Baldwin, 2012, Olivarez-Giles, 2012].
Similarly to other exploits, there are tools for social engineering, most notably
Social Engineering Toolkit (SET), developed by David Kennedy of TrustedSec, LLC
[2012], who used to work for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). SET allows
utilization of several attack vectors through email, web, and portable media, all
requiring user interaction to be successful.
2.2.3 Insider Threat—Case Maroochy Shire
An attack is also possible by an insider, which was the case in the cyber attack
against the Australian Maroochy Shire area sewerage system in 2000. According to
the report published by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [Abrams and Weiss, 2008], a disgruntled former employee of a contractor
for the Maroochy Shire council, who had previously installed radio-controlled su-
pervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) equipment for pumping stations,
operated the pumps remotely leading to overflow of 800,000 liters of raw sewage
spilling to local parks, rivers, and hotel grounds. The environmental impacts were
considerable, including deaths of sea animals and unbearable stench. The perpe-
8trator was finally caught after at least 46 unauthorized intrusions to the sewerage
control systems between February and April in 2000. According to the NIST report,
the SCADA systems on the 142 affected sewage pumping stations did not have “cy-
ber security defenses”, which possibly would have helped to mitigate the effects of
the attack and track down the intruder sooner. [Abrams and Weiss, 2008, Smith,
2001]
Regarding the Maroochy Shire case, it is important to note that the attacker
never was directly employed by the organization he attacked. Instead, the attacker
used to work for a contractor, and had the knowledge and the tools to conduct a
successful attack. Due to this, the report by Abrams and Weiss [2008, p. 8] names
the attacker as “the ultimate insider”.
2.2.4 Advanced Persistent Threat—Case RSA
Nation states are usually behind another type of threat, called the advanced per-
sistent threat. As the name implies, it is technologically advanced over traditional
computer viruses, and utilize that to infiltrate, gather information, and stay hidden.
APTs have emerged during the last decade. They have been used in multiple
successful cyber attacks. One of those was the stealing of information related to the
RSA SecurID two-factor authentication system [Coviello, 2012], essentially compro-
mising the access control system used by many major companies and organizations
worldwide. Discovered by Mr. Timo Hirvonen, a researcher with F-Secure, the
RSA compromise started with social engineering using a simple “phishing” email
containing only 13 words asking to open the .xls (Microsoft Excel) file attachment
[Goodin, 2011].
One of the advanced methods used by APTs is exploiting public-key infrastruc-
ture to disguise as a “legitimate program”. Usually, a digital certificate, issued by a
certificate authority (CA), is used to verify the legitimacy of a computer program
or an encrypted connection, for example. However, CAs can be compromised. Also,
certificates issued to a manufacturer can be stolen and used to disguise malicious
applications as legit. [Fisher, 2012a,b] That was done with Stuxnet analyzed in
detail in the next section.
93 Case Stuxnet
For years, industrial control systems were assumed to be safe from hackers and other
cyber threats. That changed with Stuxnet. It was like the 9/11 for ICS security.
This section focuses on analyzing the Stuxnet malware and its impact on the
variable frequency drive (VFD), the AC drive, to gain knowledge of the APT and
cyberwar attack methods, and the centrifuge application weaknesses and vulnera-
bilities. Because, to be able to prepare for something, one needs to know what to
prepare for.
3.1 Overview
This subsection presents an overview of the Stuxnet case, mainly focusing on the
features and mechanics of the Stuxnet malware. For starters, the source material is
introduced.
3.1.1 Source Material
The main source for mechanics of Stuxnet is the public report titled W32.Stuxnet
Dossier by Falliere et al. [2011] of Symantec Corporation. Most articles and publi-
cations about Stuxnet cite the report. That is why it is used as the main source of
information on the details of Stuxnet in this thesis also.
Symantec Corporation [2012b] has been in the software business since 1982. Its
security products for home and office environments are well-known, and the company
has a good reputation among the security industry.
Regarding the effect of Stuxnet to the physical machinery, several reports pub-
licly released by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) are the
main source material. The most essential reports are authored by Albright et al.
[2010, 2011].
The Institute for Science and International Security [2011] describes itself as a
“non-profit, non-partisan institution” focused on nuclear weapons and related issues,
founded in 1993 and located in Washington D.C. One of its funders is the U.S. De-
partment of Energy. It is headed by physicist, M.Sc. David Albright, who formerly
worked for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a nuclear inspector in
Iraq [Institute for Science and International Security, 2010]. The reports published
by ISIS are cited by news agencies and other organizations all over the world. They
are very extensive and rich in details. That is why they are trusted to provide ac-
curate and reliable information about the Iranian gas centrifuge operations also for
this thesis.
3.1.2 Threat Classification
By the definition of an advanced persistent threat, Stuxnet is not an APT, but
a weapon of cyber war instead. Falliere et al. [2011, p. 1] describe Stuxnet as a
“complex threat” and also “a large, complex piece of malware with many different
components and functionalities.” Knapp [2011, p. 37] used the term worm and the
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phrase “the new weapon of cyber war”, but also similarly to Symantec “complex
and intelligent collection of malware”. Also Langner [2011b] describes Stuxnet as
“the first cyberwarfare weapon ever”.
By definition, Stuxnet can be called a worm, because it is able to automatically
propagate in a network without user intervention. It is also able to propagate from
portable media, such as an universal serial bus (USB) flash storage, but naturally
it requires that the portable media is inserted into a Windows computer. On the
other hand, the “worm functionality” was just one part of Stuxnet, and similarly to
a virus it infected files on Windows computers. [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 25–29]
Since Stuxnet, new, similar kind of computer viruses or APTs have been found
in the wild, namely Duqu, and the more recent “sKyWIper” (also known as Flame
or W32.Flamer [Symantec Corporation, 2012c]). According to the initial analysis
and reports, they are believed to be of the same origin as Stuxnet. Duqu is very
similar to Stuxnet, and does not introduce any new ground-breaking technologies.
On the other hand, sKyWIper seems to be even more advanced than Stuxnet in its
malicious techniques, including spreading via fake update through Windows Update
mechanism using spoofed Microsoft certificates, created with a supercomputer by
message digest 5 (MD5) hash collision. But most importantly from this thesis’s
point of view, neither of them are known to target PLCs or AC drives. In contrast
to Stuxnet which was a deliberate sabotage weapon, Duqu and sKyWIper are used
for espionage and information gathering. That is why they are not examined further
in this thesis, and Stuxnet is the main research subject for background information
about the worst kind of threat for an industrial AC drive application. [F-Secure
Corporation, 2012a, sKyWIper Analysis Team, 2012, Symantec Corporation, 2011]
Next, the discovery of Stuxnet is explained.
3.1.3 Discovery
The Belarusian anti-virus vendor VirusBlokAda was first contacted by their Iranian
customer about unexpected computer reboots in June 2010 (the year 1389 in the
Iranian solar Hejr¯ı calendar [Abdollahy, 1990]). VirusBlokAda started investigating
the issue with their customer and concluded that the computers at the customer’s
site were infected by malware. They forwarded the case to Microsoft which started
working on the issue to patch a zero-day vulnerability in Windows exploited by the
malware, and named the malware Stuxnet, as a combination of some of the file
names (.stub and MrxNet.sys) found inside the malware’s code. [Kaspersky, 2011,
Marrs, 2010, Zetter, 2011]
Consequently, the details of Stuxnet were published and it gained a lot of in-
terest from the cybersecurity community and also from the general press, as it was
reported to be a ground-breaking computer “virus” [DFA Media Ltd, 2010]. Many
computer security experts started analyzing the code, and general knowledge of
Stuxnet increased as reports were published. The most thorough public report of
Stuxnet was made by Falliere et al. [2011] of the Symantec Corporation.
The Iranians have never announced any official press releases nor disclosed any
details concerning the incident [Kaspersky, 2011]. Although some short statements
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have been reported [Al Jazeera, 2010, Keizer, 2010], including one in November,
2010, at a press conference where the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, admitted problems with “centrifuges with the software
they had installed in electronic parts.” [Hafezi, 2010] So everything known about
Stuxnet today is thanks to the work and reports by third-party security experts.
The earliest sample of Stuxnet is from June 2009 (according to the compile time).
So it was able to stay hidden for at least a year before it was revealed. Without the
rebooting problem Stuxnet might have never been found.
Stuxnet was configured to stop spreading and operating after June 24, 2012. So
as of this writing, Stuxnet should pose no serious threat in its original form anymore.
[Falliere et al., 2011]
3.1.4 Features
Stuxnet targeted German Siemens PLCs with 6ES7-315-2 (series 300) and 6ES7-
417 central processing units (CPUs), and Finnish Vacon NX and Iranian Fararo
Paya KFC750V3 AC drives connected through Process Field Bus (PROFIBUS)
communications processor modules CP 342-5 (by Siemens). The total amount of
AC drives from any of the two manufacturers (Vacon or Fararo Paya) must be at
least 33, otherwise the (Siemens) PLC will not be infected. Also, exactly the device
models mentioned previously must be found. [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 36–49]
A speculative scenario representing progression of Stuxnet is presented in Fig-
ure 1. The exact details are unknown, but the diverse propagation abilities of
Stuxnet allowed it to update itself from a command and control (C&C) server over
the Internet, cross air-gaps on portable media, and spread within a local area net-
PLC
AC
drive
Gas
centrifugeLANPortable
media
Air-gap
Natanz
FEP
Operator
Contractor
Internet
References
Figure 1: Illustration of progression of Stuxnet from an outside contractor, across the
“air-gap” into the production process at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant (FEP). The
scenario presented here is speculative. Stuxnet had the ability to spread within a LAN
to reach a computer connected to a Siemens PLC [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 25–28]. In the
logical chain of interconnected devices, software modifications by Stuxnet stopped after
the PLC, and from there on modified control references were used to alter the behavior of
AC drives. (Press picture of Simatic S7-300 PLCs courtesy of Siemens AG [2011d]. Photo
of a Vacon NXS AC drive courtesy of Vacon Group [2010]. Illustration of a Zippe-type gas
centrifuge courtesy of Wikimedia Commons [2006]. Other icons courtesy of Cisco Systems,
Inc. [2012].)
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work (LAN) [Falliere et al., 2011]. In addition, several state-of-the-art malicious
techniques against the Microsoft Windows operating system were used, including
– using four zero-day exploits for propagation and injection through privilege
escalation
– digitally signed certificates, which were valid at the time but have been re-
voked since (one of them issued by Realtek Semiconductor Corporation and
the second one by JMicron Technology Corporation, both located near each
other in Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan [Reid, 2012, slide 11])
– Windows rootkit through a digitally signed driver (seemingly legitimate) which
hides (filters) files used by Stuxnet from directory listings
– detecting and evading several widely-used antivirus software suites from major
vendors, including McAfee, F-Secure, Symantec, etc.
– automatic update mechanism even without a network connection. [Falliere
et al., 2011]
What really made Stuxnet revolutionary were the several techniques it utilized
to attack industrial equipment, like never publicly seen before, including
– first ever PLC rootkit via intercepting communication between the PLC and
the Siemens STEP 7 software used to program the PLC, and hiding malicious
code from the operator view
– presenting modified information to monitors to hide its actions
– disabling protection functions of AC drives (running centrifuges)
– adjusting control references with intention to physically damage the equip-
ment. [Falliere et al., 2011]
Among the many network propagation methods used by Stuxnet, one was es-
pecially specific to ICS: infecting remote computers running the Siemens SCADA
software called SIMATIC WinCC using a password which was released to the pub-
lic years earlier. Even though it was in the public, Siemens recommended against
changing the default password as that would cause other problems. The vulnerabil-
ity was fixed with the Siemens advisory released on July 23, 2012, two years after
the discovery of Stuxnet. [Falliere et al., 2011, McMillan, 2010, Siemens AG, 2012e]
Stuxnet replaced a dynamic link library (DLL) file responsible for handling com-
munication between the Siemens STEP 7 programming software and the PLC. This
allowed it to read, write, and modify PLC code “blocks”. The way the blocks were
modified depended on the CPU model of the target PLC and the devices connected
to it. [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 36–38] Those requirements are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: The requirements for the PLC CPU and connected AC drives for each infection
sequence of Stuxnet. Sequence C is incomplete and disabled. [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 7, 38–
39, 45–46]
Infection CPU AC drives
Sequence A 6ES7-315-2 Vacon NX
Sequence B 6ES7-315-2 Fararo Paya KFC750V3
Sequence C 6ES7-417 Unknown
3.1.5 Programmable Logic Controller Infection
To “infect” the PLC, Stuxnet modifies the existing blocks and writes new ones
according to the infection sequence matching the target devices (Table 1). The
original DP RECV block, responsible for receiving PROFIBUS frames, is copied to
function block 1869 (FB1869), and then replaced by Stuxnet for post-processing of
PROFIBUS data. PLC program entry-points, organization blocks 1 and 35 (OB1
and OB35), are modified by inserting code to the beginning of the blocks (“prepend-
ing”), thus ensuring the execution of Stuxnet’s code on the PLC. [Falliere et al., 2011,
p. 39]
The actual operation of a PLC infected by Stuxnet depends on the infection
sequence (Table 1). Although the most complex part of the PLC codes, sequence
C is incomplete and disabled in the three different variants of Stuxnet discovered
among the 3,280 unique samples received by Symantec. Consequently, in reality
Stuxnet infects only Siemens S7-315-2 PLCs by sequences A and B, which differ
from each other practically only in the number and format of PROFIBUS frames
sent to AC drives. [Falliere et al., 2011] (Figure 1 includes a photo of S7-300 family
CPUs for reference.)
Executing inside the PLC, sequences A and B include a complex state machine,
with a total of six states, numbered 0–5. Actual sabotage commences in states 3
and 4 as two network bursts of (PROFIBUS) frames carrying parameter values to
AC drives. The purpose is to change output frequency of AC drives from the normal
1,064 Hz to 1,410 Hz and 2 Hz, i.e. speed up and slow down the motor. Essentially,
that is done by setting the parameter for the maximum frequency to a new value,
changing the speed response for the reference value of 100%. [Falliere et al., 2011,
p. 41–44]
The AC drives were only following the reference from the master controller,
the PLC. Vacon Plc [2010b], the manufacturer of one of the AC drives targeted
by Stuxnet, even issued a press statement in which they said that the equipment
manufactured by them was not infected and was working correctly. (They also
wanted to make clear that they did not sell their equipment “to Iran against the
embargo”.)
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3.1.6 The Target and Damage Inflicted
Stuxnet was a targeted attack against the Natanz fuel enrichment plant (FEP) in
Iran. According to Albright et al. [2011, p. 6], “the strongest evidence that Stuxnet
is aimed at Natanz” is the part of code of Stuxnet which targets Siemens S7-417
PLCs, dubbed sequence C by Falliere et al. [2011]. It includes arrays “identical to
an IR-1 centrifuge cascade” at Natanz. (This was found out by the German security
expert Ralph Langner [2011a].)
The amount of damage caused by Stuxnet in numbers of destroyed gas centrifuges
can only be estimated, as Iran has not released any exact numbers. In an interview
by Der Spiegel in 2011, Mr. Olli Heinonen, former IAEA Deputy Director General
of Safeguards, estimated that Stuxnet “knocked out almost 2,000 centrifuges in
Natanz.” [Follath, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007]
The report by Albright et al. [2010] about the connection between Stuxnet and
the 1,000 replaced IR-1 centrifuges concludes that “Stuxnet is a reasonable expla-
nation for the apparent damage”. This finding is based on the quarterly IAEA safe-
guards reports, which reveal the numbers of operating centrifuge cascades. In the
report that followed, Albright et al. [2011, p. 3–4] added referring to the aluminum-
based IR-1 centrifuges that “the numbers removed were over and above the normal
failure rate, which occurs at a rate of 10 percent per year.”
3.1.7 Consequences and Creators
The attack performed by Stuxnet could also occur against civilian equipment. (The
uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, Iran, is considered a military installation due
to it being administered by the Iranian government.) Stuxnet was like the 9/11 for
computer and ICS security. After the 9/11, airplane security was highly increased.
Now the same thing needs to be done for ICS security. Since Stuxnet, security of
industrial control systems has been under intense public scrutiny. And the media is
eager to make flashy headlines about the subject.
It has recently been reported by The New York Times, that the U.S. government
was behind Stuxnet along with the Israelis. U.S. NSA and Military Intelligence Unit
8200 of Israel Defense Forces [Haglili, 2012] worked together in Operation Olympic
Games, launched by President George W. Bush in 2006 and further accelerated by
President Barack Obama, to delay Iran’s nuclear fuel enrichment as an alternative
to a traditional military strike. [Sanger, 2012] U.S. officials have not denied these
claims to date.
Stuxnet used two modes for maliciously operating the centrifuges: high speed
(1410 Hz) and low speed (2 Hz) [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 43]. It is easy to understand
how high speed can be fatal to centrifuge machinery. But the case for low speed is
not so self-explanatory. To understand the impact of that, the industrial process in
which the centrifuges were involved in must be understood. That shall be described
in the next subsection.
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3.2 Uranium Enrichment Process
The process of enriching uranium is presented in this section, along with the appli-
cation for weapon-grade, highly-enriched uranium (HEU).
3.2.1 Uranium
Natural uranium contains three isotopes. Only one of them is fissile: the U-235.
The rest is mainly U-238 with a trace of U-234. Fissile means fission (split of a
nucleus) after absorption of a zero-energy neutron. U-235 is the only fissile nuclide
found in the nature. [Lamarsh and Baratta, 2001, p. 77, 119]
A single U-235 fission releases roughly about 200 MeV of energy, which is about
a million times more energy per kilogram compared to conventional chemical explo-
sives. Most of the energy released is kinetic energy of the fission fragments. [Harris,
2008, Lamarsh and Baratta, 2001] Amount of 9 to 15 kg of highly-enriched uranium
with 90% of U-235 is needed to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon, depend-
ing on the sophistication of the weapon design. HEU is also called weapon-grade
uranium. [Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004]
Natural uranium has only 0.7% of uranium-235 by weight. Thus, it is required
to enrich the natural uranium to increase the concentration of U-235. [U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 2011] Enriched uranium can be used to fuel nuclear power
plants or as nuclear weapons, depending on the enrichment level. Uranium can be
enriched by isotope separation with different techniques. One way to separate iso-
topes is by gas centrifuges. [Wood et al., 2008] Uranium must be in gaseous form for
the gas centrifuge process. Uranium hexafluoride UF6 is solid at room temperature,
but easily vaporized at an appropriate temperature. [Lamarsh and Baratta, 2001,
p. 207–209] UF6 is produced from yellowcake, which is mostly triuranium octoxide
U3O8 [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011].
3.2.2 Centrifuge Cascades
A single gas centrifuge can not produce satisfactory enrichment levels. That is why
gas centrifuges are “chained” together to formations called cascades, with centrifuges
connected in series and parallelly. Series connection increases the enrichment level,
while parallel connection increases the flow rate of the product (enriched uranium).
[Wood et al., 2008] A typical centrifuge cascade consists of 164 gas centrifuges. It
can produce 7 grams of low-enriched uranium (LEU) enriched to 3.5% from a feed
of 70 grams of natural uranium per hour. [Glaser, 2008, p. 14]
According to the report of U.S. Director of National Intelligence [2012], Iran had
produced about 4,900 kg of low-enriched UF6 at Natanz by November 2010. It has
been indicated that Iran is running out of its imported stockpile of yellowcake.
Regarding the production at the Natanz FEP, Albright et al. [2011, p. 10] con-
cludes as follows: “Stuxnet did not lower the production of LEU during 2010. LEU
quantities could have certainly been greater, and Stuxnet could be an important
part of the reason why they did not increase significantly.” The impact of Stuxnet
to the production was caused by the combination of destroyed centrifuges, and the
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decreased separation performance in those centrifuges which survived overspeeds.
Next, the gas centrifuge is presented in detail.
3.3 Gas Centrifuge
As the link between Stuxnet and the Natanz FEP has been established by the
ISIS reports (described in Section 3.1.6), this subsection concentrates on the target
equipment. That is the gas centrifuge installation in the nuclear facility located
about 30 km northwest from Natanz city towards Kashan city, in Isfahan province
in Iran [GlobalSecurity.org, 2011].
An example of a centrifuge application from the daily life is the spin cycle of
a washing machine: Water with the heavier particles is separated from the clothes
with the lighter particles. [Broad, 2004]
The role of a gas centrifuge in the uranium enrichment process is to separate the
fissile isotope 235U from the slightly heavier isotope 238U in gaseous form. That is
called isotope separation. [Lamarsh and Baratta, 2001, p. 201–210]
3.3.1 Operating Principle
The operation principle of a centrifuge is based on centrifugal acceleration
a =
v2
r
(1)
where v is the radial speed and r is the radius. The direction of centrifugal ac-
celeration is directly away from the center point of rotation. However, usually a
counter-current flow inside the rotor of the gas centrifuge, which carries the lighter
isotopes (U-235) to the top and the heavier (U-238) to the bottom of the rotor,
results in an axial separation factor much larger than the radial separation factor
[Wood et al., 2008].
The performance of a gas centrifuge is described by the theoretical maximum
separative work unit (SWU, expressed here with a symbol better suited for electrical
engineering conventions used in this thesis)
∆W (max) =
pi
2
lρD
(
∆Mv2a
2RT
)2
(2)
where l is the length of the rotor of the centrifuge, ρ is the density, D is the diffusion
coefficient, ∆M is the difference in molecular weights of two species (U-235 and
U-238), va is the peripheral speed of the rotor (inner surface), R is the universal
gas constant, and T is the temperature of the gas. It shows that the performance is
highly dependent on the speed and the length of the rotor. The faster and taller the
rotor is, the better the separation performance. [Kemp, 2009, Wood et al., 2008]
3.3.2 Construction of the Zippe-Type Gas Centrifuge
Stuxnet targeted a system similar to the IR-1 centrifuge cascade at the Natanz
FEP. The IR-1 is the same as the Pakistani P1 centrifuge, which is relatively old
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equipment. During the 1970s, Pakistani engineer A. Q. Khan acquired the design
for the P1 from the Dutch gas centrifuge program. Consequently, the IR-1 is a
gas centrifuge. And more specifically, it is a Zippe-type gas centrifuge, based on
the work of Austrian scientist Gernot Zippe. [Albright and Walrond, 2010, 2011,
Albright et al., 2010, 2011, Kemp, 2009, Khan, 2005, Wood et al., 2008]
The Zippe-type centrifuge (Figure 2) is an advancement over the older Beams-
type centrifuge, with pivot-magnetic bearing combination to reduce friction. The
Figure 2: Illustrative representation of an IR-1 Zippe-type gas centrifuge (not in scale).
The lengths of the one rotor segment completely visible and the molecular pump have been
reduced for illustrative purposes. The rest of the rotor segments along with the bellows
have been omitted. The centrifuge rotor is rotating along with the top and bottom caps,
the baﬄe, bellows, and the pivot. Rest of the components are stationary. (The figure is
adapted from the figures in the separate works by Lamarsh and Baratta [2001, p. 210],
U.S. Department of Energy [1998, p. 3.4–3.9], and Wood et al. [2008, p. 41].)
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rotor of the Zippe-type centrifuge rests on a needle-like bearing, a rotating pivot in
a bearing cup. It is the only physical contact point of the rotor. The top end of
the rotor is hold in place by a magnetic bearing, which centers and dampens the
vertical motion of the rotor. [Broad, 2004, U.S. Department of Energy, 1998, Wood
et al., 2008]
A molecular pump is used to constrain UF6, leaked from the top (magnetic)
bearing, in the upper part inside the outer casing of a gas centrifuge. The outer
casing holds vacuum in which the rotor is spinning. [Albright and Hibbs, 1992,
Bukharin, 2004]
The aluminum rotor of a Zippe-type centrifuge typically has a diameter of 50–
100 mm, a length of 50 cm, and a wall thickness less than one millimeter. The so
called supercritical centrifuge has a total length of more than 50 cm, but consists
of rotor segments each about 50 cm in length, with flexible joints called bellows
between the segments. A supercritical centrifuge means that it is operating above
its lowest natural bending frequency, otherwise it is called subcritical. [Institute for
Science and International Security, 2002, Wood et al., 2008]
According to an interview of an Iranian official in 2006, the rotor length of an
IR-1 centrifuge is 180 cm and the diameter is 10.5 cm, with peripheral velocity of 350
m/s [Glaser, 2008, p. 8]. That corresponds to about 63,662 revolutions per minute
(rpm)!
3.3.3 Hysteresis Motor
The enrichment process is assisted by the heat generated by the electric motor at
the bottom of the centrifuge rotor [Urenco Limited, 2012]. The main components
of the motor are depicted in Figure 3.
The gas centrifuge rotor is rotated by an axial (flux) hysteresis motor. The
structure of it (Figure 3) is similar to an induction motor, except that the rotor, or
the armature, is constructed of stampings of hardened magnet steel (cobalt-steel)
Figure 3: Structure of an axial flux hysteresis motor used in gas centrifuges, without the
stator windings and the rotor ring holder (not in scale). The stator (bottom) has a circular
iron core with winding slots, similarly to an induction machine. The rotor (top) is purely
a ring of permanent magnet material without any windings. (Adapted from the figures by
Modarres et al. [2010, p. 323] and Parviainen [2005, p. 17].)
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with high magnetic retentivity, and smooth, laminated surfaces. The stator of a
hysteresis motor is similar to that of an induction motor, comprised of a circular
laminated iron core with multiphase winding. Unlike the induction motor, hysteresis
motor is a synchronous motor (SM). The magnetic hysteresis is beneficially utilized
in this motor, as the power losses caused by it increase the torque. Because of the
simple construction of the rotor, the hysteresis motor is reliable and requires little
maintenance. Other benefits include noiseless operation and practically constant
torque from standstill up to synchronous speed. A gas centrifuge can run for more
than 10 years without maintenance, with the motor armature plate (also known as
a drive disc) attached to the bottom end cap of the centrifuge (Figure 2). [Albright
and Hibbs, 1992, Beaty and Kirtley, 1998, Gottlieb, 1997, Institute for Science and
International Security, 2003, Modarres et al., 2010, Niasar and Moghbelli, 2012, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1998, 2004, Waters, 2003]
The requirements for the AC drive (or the frequency changer, as called by In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency [2001]) driving the hysteresis motor include a
multiphase output of 600–2000 Hz and 40 W or greater, and frequency control ac-
curacy less than 0.1% [U.S. Department of Energy, 2004]. The NX drives by Vacon
Plc [2010a, 2012] fulfill these requirements with the high-speed application (firmware
ASFIFF12), which has a maximum frequency of 7,200 Hz
According to the application note about high speed applications by Vacon Plc
[2007], rotational speed limits and mounting problems of speed feedback devices
often inhibit their usage in high speed applications (over 320 Hz). That is why open
loop control is required with gas centrifuges.
3.4 Factors Ultimately Contributing to the Physical De-
struction
This subsection attempts to explain how Stuxnet ultimately was able to wreak havoc.
There are multiple points related to that as discussed in the following subsections.
3.4.1 AC Drive Protection Functions Disabled
According to the report by Falliere et al. [2011, p. 59–67], parameters of the AC
drives were altered in such way that all supervisory and limitation functions were
disabled. Stuxnet did it through the fieldbus (PROFIBUS). Among the supervi-
sory functions that were set to 0 included (for Vacon NX drives) limits for output
frequency, reference, and temperature, motor thermal protection, input and output
phase supervisions, earth fault protection, stall protection, overvoltage controller,
and underload protection, resulting in most or all built-in protection functions of the
drive being disabled. In addition, the current limit was set to 440 A, an unreasonably
high value.
Interestingly, the list of the parameters changed includes motor specific values,
which should not be touched under normal conditions, after the initial commissioning
of the drive. Admitting inaccuracy with some values, Falliere et al. [2011, p. 59–67]
list the following motor specific values set by Stuxnet: the nominal input voltage
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UN=380 V, the nominal frequency fN=80 Hz, the nominal speed nN=144 rpm, and
the power factor cosϕ=0.85.
3.4.2 Normal Controller Execution Halted
Organization block 35 (OB35) of the Siemens SIMATIC S7 PLC series functions as
a watchdog, executed cyclically every 100 ms. It can stop the execution of the main
entry-point for a PLC program, OB1, under certain conditions.
However, during the sabotage routine of Stuxnet, the execution of the original
OB1 and OB35 blocks is halted. This effectively prevents operators from gracefully
shutting down the uranium enrichment process, if they manage to detect abnormal
operation despite falsified data sent to monitors by Stuxnet. [Falliere et al., 2011,
p. 38–39, 49]
3.4.3 Response of Other Safety Systems
Regarding operation of other safety systems, Albright et al. [2011, p. 8] speculates
as follows: “Safety systems independent of Stuxnet are unlikely to be effective in
preventing damage to the centrifuges.” Each of the three UF6 pipes (for the feed,
product, and waste) connected to a gas centrifuge (as shown in Figure 2 on page
17) has a fast acting valve, used to stop the gas flow and isolate a malfunctioning
centrifuge.
Also, in case of power loss, the valves are used by the safety system to quickly
shut off the feed, and empty the centrifuge cascade to prevent the centrifuges from
crashing. A sudden deceleration increases pressure inside the center of a rotor,
leading to instability.
3.4.4 Destructive Centrifugal Force
According to Albright et al. [2011, p. 9], the rotor tube of the centrifuge formed
into a bottle shape by the force of the high centrifugal acceleration, likely breaking
the tube. Although, some IR-1 centrifuges might have been saved by vibration
sensors, triggered by the speed-up, causing dumping of the uranium hexafluoride
within milliseconds.
As a conclusion, a gas centrifuge can be damaged not only by high speed, but also
fast deceleration. On the other hand, the separation process requires adequately high
speed as the separation performance depends on it. Another type of a centrifuge,
which will be discussed for the rest of this thesis, is presented in the next section.
21
4 Industrial AC Drive Application
This section describes the decanter application comprising AC drives, induction
motors, and a decanter centrifuge. The decanter is presented with its distinct com-
ponents, starting with the actual centrifuge machinery itself. But first, an overview
of the hardware environment discussed in this thesis is presented in the next sub-
section.
4.1 Hardware Environment
Hardware environment related to the decanter centrifuge, as assumed in this thesis,
is presented in Figure 4. It includes two AC drives in the common direct current
(DC) bus configuration, two induction motors, and the decanter centrifuge (ma-
chine). Any other possible devices, such as PLCs in the Ethernet network, are not
considered. Also, the Internet may or may not be accessible through the Ethernet.
Ethernet
Main drive
Main motor
Decanter machinery
Back motor
Back drive
(common DC)
Figure 4: Hardware environment of the decanter application, as assumed in this thesis.
It includes the decanter centrifuge machinery with the main motor and the back motor.
Both of those induction motors are controlled by AC drives which have a common DC
bus. The decanter is connected to an industrial Ethernet network, but other devices in
the network are out of the scope of this thesis. (Cross-section of the Alfa Laval decanter
model NX 400 courtesy of Alfa Laval Corporate AB [2003] press material. Images of the
ACS880-01 drives and the M3AA motors courtesy of ABB [2012c].)
22
Each of the three distinct components are presented in detail in the following
subsections, in the order of the decanter, the induction motor, and the AC drive.
(Network, security, and safety issues are discussed later, in Section 5.)
4.2 Decanter Centrifuge
The application of choice for this study is the decanter, also known as a decanter
centrifuge, a solid bowl scroll centrifuge, and a solid bowl decanter [Poidl and Steiger,
2008]. A decanter is one type of a centrifuge which is used to separate solids from
liquids, for example in food, water, and mining industries. Slurry (moist mass) is
fed into the decanter bowl, and separated solids and liquids exit. [Yaskawa America,
Inc., 2010]
The decanter was chosen as the application for this thesis, because AC drives used
in some decanters are equipped with Ethernet connectivity and safety features. (The
scope of the thesis was limited to Ethernet connectivity, as described in Section 1.)
The safety features are required by the decanter application itself, and are not added
for security purposes. Also, as a centrifuge, the decanter has similarities with the
gas centrifuge application targeted by Stuxnet. Centrifuges are used as separation
machines in several industries, including but not limited to the nuclear industry
[Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2009, p. 39].
4.2.1 Terminology and Source Material
Some general terms related to decanters as defined in the related European safety
standard EN 12547 are presented below.
Centrifuge is a “separation device which has a rotatable chamber in which a mix-
ture of process materials may be subjected to (radial) acceleration”.
Decanter is a “continuous working sedimentation centrifuge with an internal screw
mechanism for the removal of settled solids from the bowl.”
Sedimentation is “separation occurring when the denser or densest part of a mix-
ture in a container settles due to the local gravitational acceleration to the
lower part of that container (or outermost zone of a rotating part).” [Comite´
Europe´en de Normalisation, 2009, p. 7, 41]
While searching for background material for this thesis, it was discovered that
there is very limited amount of detailed information about decanters and even cen-
trifuges in general publicly available. That might be due to the fact that centrifuges
(or at least gas centrifuges) are related to regulated nuclear technologies. The main
source of information about the details of the decanter application used in this
thesis is Decanter Centrifuge Handbook by Records and Sutherland [2001]—Alan
Records, retired from the Swedish decanter manufacturer Alfa Laval Corporate AB,
and Ken Sutherland, an ex-technical manager for the former American centrifuge
manufacturer Sharples Corporation, which merged with Alfa Laval in 1988 [Alfa
Laval Corporation, 2012]. Alfa Laval is a major decanter supplier world-wide.
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4.2.2 Operating Principle
As expressed by Records and Sutherland [2001, p. xiii], the decanter is one partic-
ular type of a centrifuge: “the solid-bowl, scroll-discharge centrifuge”. Furthermore
describing its operation: “The decanter centrifuge is a device for continuously sep-
arating particulate solids from a suspending liquid or liquids by sedimentation and
decanting.” [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. xiii]
Any sedimenting centrifuge, such as a decanter, relies principally on the centrifu-
gal acceleration, also known as g-force, for separating solids from the liquid. The
amount of centrifugal acceleration varies inside the bowl, depending on the radius
and the depth of the liquid (the pond depth). Expressed as a ratio to the gravity,
the g-level
gc =
ω2r
g
(3)
where ω is the angular velocity of the bowl with radius r, and g is the gravity (≈ 9.81
m/s2). For example, g-level of 2264 (times the gravity) is achieved with a bowl 450
mm in diameter rotating 3000 rpm. [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 149–150]
According to Alfa Laval Corporate AB [2008, p. 7]: “The key to good decanter
performance lies in the efficient, effective scrolling of the sedimented solids. The
design of the screw conveyor is therefore crucial.”
The conveyor differential speed (expressed with symbols conforming to electrical
engineering conventions used in this thesis)
nd =
nbowl − np
mGB
(4)
where nbowl is the speed of the bowl, np is the gearbox pinion speed, and mGB is
the gearbox ratio, is the speed difference between the bowl and the screw conveyor.
With an epicyclic gearbox, the differential speed is positive, i.e. the conveyor rotates
slower than the bowl. [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 150–151]
In conventional dewatering, the differential speed is minimized, to extend the
time the cake is dried on the beach. (Also the pond level is minimized to increase
the length of the dry beach section.) The required scrolling (conveying) capacity
defines the minimum limit for the differential. [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 180]
According to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 151], the conveyor torque
Tc = mGBTp (5)
where Tp is the pinion torque, “is a vital measure in the control of modern decanter
systems.” It results from “moving the separated solids through the bowl, up the
beach and out of the decanter.” Usually, the conveyor torque is not measured
directly, but obtained by Equation (5) with the pinion torque from the braking
system instrumentation, such as an AC drive.
With compressible sludges, such as eﬄuents, dryness of the cake (solids) is pro-
portional to the conveyor torque. However, exceeding the practical torque limit of
the centrifuge will cause “dirty centrate” (liquids) as a result of overspilling solids.
[Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 185]
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The performance of a decanter centrifuge is expressed as the solids recovery (here
with an unconventional symbol)
O = 100
(
1−
Qlxlρl
Qfxfρf
)
(6)
where Ql is the centrate flow rate, xl is the fraction of solids in the centrate, ρl is
the centrate density, Qf is the sludge (process material) feed rate, xf is the fraction
of solids in the feed, and ρf is the density of the feed. The higher the O, the
better the performance, i.e. the more solids are separated from the input feed. If
flocculants (polymers) are used, their dosage also affects performance (the less the
better). [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 151–153]
4.2.3 Construction
A decanter is “a device” for decantation which is a process for the separation of
mixtures. The construction and operating principle of a decanter centrifuge is com-
pletely different from, for example, a basic household wine decanter, which is used
to hold the wine without sediments [Sogg, 2003].
Construction of a decanter centrifuge is depicted in Figure 5. It is similar to the
gas centrifuge (previously presented in Figure 2 on page 17): The feed zone is near
Figure 5: Simplified construction (cross-section) of a decanter centrifuge with counter-
current flow. Not in scale. The length has been reduced for illustrative purposes. (The
figure is adapted from figures in the separate works by Records and Sutherland [2001,
p. 3, 20] and Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation [2009, p. 47].)
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the center of the rotor, separated materials are extracted at the rotor ends (compa-
rable to the scoops inside a gas centrifuge), and the length to diameter ratio (L/D)
is relatively large. The most notable differences to a gas centrifuge are horizontal
alignment and the screw conveyor (the scroll) inside (in the center of Figure 5).
For a decanter according to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 204–205], larger
L/D ratio is better in terms of “overall economy, power consumption and process
performance.” However, critical speeds (discussed more later) are the limiting factor
for the length of a decanter. With design modifications, L/D ratios of over 5 can be
achieved.
According to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 21], the width of the bowl wall
depends on the type of material used, “the maximum speed at which the bowl will
be rotated, and the maximum weight of process material”. The radial clearance
between the bowl and the screw conveyor is less than 2 mm, usually 0.5 to 2 mm
[Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 29, 64].
The part of the bowl which helps to raise solids from the pond (the liquid)
by the screw conveyor is called the beach. According to Records and Sutherland
[2001, p. 26]: “A beach angle of 8 to 10 degrees is a common value chosen for many
processes.”
An actual decanter centrifuge product intended for process industries is presented
in Figure 6 as an example. Also the main and the back motors are visible in the
photo.
Usually, the main motor of a decanter is an AC motor (with four poles). It
rotates the bowl by a set of V-belts. At the opposite end of the bowl, a back drive
Figure 6: The Alfa Laval [2006] decanter model P2-405 for process industries, with maxi-
mum dimensions of 457 x 111 x 160 cm (length x width x height) and a weight of 3,800 kg.
The bowl, hidden inside, has a diameter of 450 mm and rotates at the maximum speed of
3250 rpm. The inlet is visible at the left side, above the main motor. The back motor is
partly visible at the other end of the decanter. Outlets for solids and liquids are hidden
in the bottom, between the stands. (Figure courtesy of Alfa Laval Corporate AB [2012]
press material.)
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system controls the conveyor differential speed through direct connection to the
gearbox pinion. [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 17, 45]
Decanter designs are variable. There are even vertical decanters, which are
more expensive than horizontal designs (depicted in Figures 5 and 6). According
to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 47], vertical decanters are primarily for “high-
temperature and/or pressurised operation.” Similarly, the Zippe-type gas centrifuge
(presented earlier in Section 3.3.2) operates in low pressure, resulting in high vacuum
to reduce drag.
4.2.4 Vulnerabilities
It is extremely important not to overload the gearbox above its rated torque, because
the fatigue life of the gear teeth is proportional to the ninth power of the torque.
The expected life of the gearbox is halved with just 8% increase in torque. [Records
and Sutherland, 2001, p. 206]
The bowl of a decanter is subjected to pressure from the material (slurry) inside,
and the centrifugal force on the bowl shell material. A maximum speed has to be
set for the bowl to ensure safety against failure. [Records and Sutherland, 2001,
p. 200–201]
For a decanter, the first rotor critical speed means the lowest speed with “sig-
nificant flexible deformation of the rotor.” That is important critical speed and
the upper limit for the operating speed. Safe margin is required to ensure that the
operating speed stays below the upper limit under normal conditions. [Records and
Sutherland, 2001, p. 203] The related terms as defined in the European standard EN
12547 by Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation [2009, p. 9, 41] are presented below.
Critical speed is “rotating frequency of the centrifuge at which resonance of the
centrifuge system is excited”.
Ultracentrifuge is a “centrifuge having a circumferential speed exceeding 300
m/s.” [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2009, p. 9, 41]
Consequently, the Zippe-type gas centrifuge is an ultracentrifuge, but the de-
canter is not. For example, the circumferential speed of the decanter in Figure 6 is
about 76 m/s. However, decanters have higher inertias.
Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 200] present a very illustrative example of
the huge amount of energy in a rotating (running) decanter: The rotational energy
of 3.55 MJ of a medium-sized decanter, rotating an inertia of 50 kgm2 at 3600
rpm, “corresponds to the kinetic energy of a vehicle weighing 9.2 tons travelling
at 100 km/h.” There is major damage potential if that amount of energy gets
unleashed uncontrolledly. The safety standard related to this issue is presented
later (in Section 5.4.4 on page 54).
Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 204] identify failure of main bearings as “one
of the most frequent reasons for breakdown of decanters”. Although “a properly
designed decanter” avoids “a dangerous situation” in this failure, other parts of
the decanter can get damaged. Continuous vibration monitoring systems, with
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sensors mounted directly on the bearing housings, are recommended “for critical
installations”, to detect bearing faults in advance.
According to International Atomic Energy Agency [1980, p. 195]: “The most
frequent physical blockage occurs from the collection of sand and other particles in
the decanter bottom control valve. This results in failure of the aqueous stream to
discharge and raises the aqueous-solvent interface.”
4.2.5 Applications
The decanter is mainly an industrial application, as it is pointed out by Records
and Sutherland [2001, p. 121] that the “decanter has no place, however, in do-
mestic, institutional or commercial (business) applications, which are covered by
separation equipment of quite different kinds.” Most of the decanters are sold for
water and waste water treatment applications, which constituted 35.1% of market
share, according to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 337].
Similar to the gas centrifuge, the decanter centrifuge is intended for continuous
operation and can run unattended for several hours, days, and weeks. In fact,
decanters are also used in the production process of uranium yellowcake (which
was briefly mentioned in Section 3.2). The production of uranium belongs to the
bulk inorganic chemicals industry, which along with other decanter applications
related to the minerals industry accounted for 13.4% of the total decanter market
value, according to the figures available in 2001. [Alfa Laval Corporate AB, 2007,
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1980, Records and Sutherland, 2001]
A high speed, solid bowl decanter is used for dewatering in the production of
yellowcake [Merkl and Steiger, 2012]. The Alfa Laval decanter model P2 (Figure 6
on page 25) is an example of a decanter for this kind of process.
4.2.6 Decanter Plant and Remote Control
Modern decanters can be integrated with the automation system of a plant, for
remote control as an example. Demand for that comes due to many decanter plants
operating unattended for many hours daily. It is common to connect the various
controllers of the decanter, such as AC drives, to a PLC, which in turn connects to
other parts of the plant. [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 116–117]
Normally, a fully equipped decanter centrifuge plant has five distinct “modules”,
which are briefly presented next, in the order following the process flow:
1. The flocculant system makes up the polymeric flocculant solution, which is
used to increase the size of the particles for more efficient separation.
2. The process slurry feed system uses a variable speed pump to feed the slurry
to the decanter centrifuge.
3. The decanter itself separates solids (the cake) and liquids (the centrate) from
the slurry.
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4. The centrate off-take system is usually a large pipe leading to a drain or a
receiver vessel. Sometimes a pump is used for a pressurized discharge.
5. The cake discharge system often uses a belt conveyor to carry the cake into
a hopper which is then emptied by a pump. [Records and Sutherland, 2001,
p. 215, 317, 365–366]
An integrated master controller for supervision of separate functions of the de-
canter plant is demanded increasingly. It can be located in a central remote control
room for some large plants. Control algorithms of the master controller can be cost-
based (economical), such as overall cost or revenue costs minimization. [Records
and Sutherland, 2001, p. 328–329] (Negative issues related to remote monitoring
and control are discussed later, in Section 5.)
4.2.7 Instrumentation and Controllers
According to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 321]: “It is particularly necessary to
measure the speed of rotation of the decanter bowl and the gearbox pinion shaft.
Occasionally a tachometer will be built into the braking device.”
There are many controllers involved in the decanter process, for input flow pumps
and the main motor, among others. But, according to Records and Sutherland
[2001, p. 325–326], the brake controller for the gearbox pinion shaft is the most
important one. It can operate in speed mode for the conveyor differential speed, or
in torque mode to produce set output torque, which needs to be reduced for higher
conveyor torque because lower differential speed results to increased torque. Indi-
cations required from a good brake controller include the bowl speed, the conveyor
differential speed, brake or conveyor torque, and high/low alarms for torque and
differential (speed). According to Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 326]: “Access
is needed to the operating parameters, with an encrypted code to prevent unautho-
rised tampering.” As previously presented in Section 4.1, for the purpose of this
thesis it will be assumed that the brake controller will be an AC drive, braking with
an induction motor.
4.3 Induction Motor
This subsection describes construction and operating principle of the motor (the
electrical machine) powering the application machinery, the decanter centrifuge.
Focus is on the induction motor (IM) as it is widely used in the decanter application
selected for the scope of this thesis.
The source material regarding the theories for induction motors (and AC drives)
are mainly course handouts from Aalto University. The most important papers are
titled Control of Variable-Speed Drives by Harnefors [2003] and Sa¨hko¨mekaniikka
ja sa¨hko¨ka¨yto¨t (Finnish for Electromechanics and electric drives) by Luomi and
Niemenmaa [2011].
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4.3.1 Operating Principle
There are many types of AC motors, i.e. motors designed to run when supplied
with AC voltage, usually with three phases. The IM is the most common type
of motor used in industry due to robustness, low maintenance requirements, and
cheap prices compared to DC motors with equal powers [Luomi and Niemenmaa,
2011, p. 103–104].
Currents in the windings of the rotor of an IM are generated by electromagnetic
induction. The induction motor is also known as the asynchronous machine (AM),
meaning that the rotation of the rotor is not synchronous to the frequency of the
stator voltage. [Luomi and Niemenmaa, 2011, p. 103]
The synchronous speed of an electric motor
ns =
ω
2pip
=
2pif
2pip
=
f
p
(7)
where ω is the electric angular velocity of the rotating magnetic field of the stator,
f is the frequency of the voltage supplied to the motor (usually 50 or 60 Hz for a
line-fed motor), and p is the number of pole pairs. For an AM, rotor currents are
not induced during synchronous rotation.
However, the IM is not a SM. Once loaded mechanically, the actual speed of
rotation differs from the synchronous speed by the slip
s =
ns − n
ns
=
ω − ωm
ω
(8)
where n is the actual (asynchronous) speed and ωm is the electrical angular velocity
of the rotor. The amount of slip depends on the mechanical loading of the motor,
thus also the electrical torque because the induced currents force the rotor to follow
the stator flux according to Lenz’s law. [Harnefors, 2003, Luomi and Niemenmaa,
2011] (Methods for controlling the speed of an IM are discussed later.)
4.3.2 Construction
There are two types of induction machines, categorized by different rotor construc-
tions: squirrel cage and slip-ring. Squirrel cage induction motors (SCIMs) are the
most common type, with a share of about two thirds of all electric motors. [Luomi
and Niemenmaa, 2011, p. 103]
A group of those type of motors is presented in Figure 7a. The physical di-
mensions of an induction motor, such as the axis height and the total weight, grow
along the required output power. Illustrated in Figure 7a, a motor with about
twenty times more output power (22 kW with p=2) has doubled axis height (180
mm) and tenfold weight compared (163 kg) to the smallest motor (1.1 kW, 90 mm,
and 16 kg) [ABB, 2011a, p. 71–106].
Different numbers of pole pairs affect the way the stator is wound, while the
rotor construction is unaffected [Harnefors, 2003, p. 83]. According to Luomi and
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: A group of SCIMs (ABB [2011a, p. 71–106] type M3AA made of aluminum)
with output powers ranging from 1.1 kW at front right to 22 kW at back left (a), and a
cutaway view (of ABB type M3BP 315 made of cast iron) revealing the inner construction
(b). (Photos courtesy of ABB [2012c].)
Niemenmaa [2011, p. 120], most of induction motors have four or six poles, corre-
sponding to pole pair values p of 2 and 3, and synchronous speeds of 1500 and 1000
rpm, respectively.
The inner construction of a SCIM is presented in Figure 7b. On the face of it,
the rotor does not look like a traditional “squirrel cage”, but the inner construction
principle is basically similar—mainly regarding the winding, as the rotor has an
iron core. There are conducting aluminum bars in the rotor slots (which are usually
skewed to reduce torque pulsations and acoustic noises). The bars are short-circuited
by rings at both ends. The rings can also have blades functioning as an internal fan
to improve cooling during rotation. [Harnefors, 2003, Luomi and Niemenmaa, 2011]
For an induction motor, which is magnetized from the stator, it is important to
have a narrow air-gap between the stator and the rotor. Otherwise more magnetizing
current is required in the stator for the desired rotor flux, which in turn causes higher
losses in the stator winding and decreases efficiency. According to Harnefors [2003,
p. 83]: “IMs rated 100 kW or below have airgaps less than 1 mm wide.”
4.3.3 Dimensioning an Induction Motor for a Decanter
To select the main motor for a decanter, Records and Sutherland [2001, p. 197–198]
present the following equation for determining the maximum power required at the
motor shaft, PM :
PM · ηFηB = PP + PWF + PS + PB (9)
where ηF and ηB are efficiencies of couplings between the motor and the bowl, and
the rest are separate power components: PP for accelerating “the process material
to the bowl speed at the discharge radius”, PWF for windage and friction, PS for
conveying, and PB for braking. With a regenerative back drive, the braking power
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can be omitted. As manufacturers offer motors in standard increments of power, the
next larger size should be selected, with as little over-rating as possible for economic
reasons.
The torque of the selected main motor needs to be checked to be sufficient to
accelerate the bowl smoothly, without the belts slipping. Otherwise the belts will
quickly wear out, or even break. Therefore, the run-up (acceleration) time of the
motor can not be too short. On the other hand, too long run-up time can result to
motor overheat and burn out. As the acceleration time required can be as high as
several minutes, overload protection using thermistors embedded in the windings of
the motor is the only adequate protection method. If tripped, it must be impossible
to reset and restart the main motor until it has sufficiently cooled. Consequently,
the amount of starts (from zero speed to the full operating speed of the decanter)
must be limited within a certain period of time. However, that is typical for normal
operation of the decanter which is seldom stopped and restarted. [Records and
Sutherland, 2001, p. 44–45, 198–199]
4.3.4 Vulnerabilities in Variable Speed Drive Applications
If an AC drive is coupled to the electric motor, a variable speed (or frequency)
drive (VSD/VFD) is formed. A VSD can be controlled. However, the maximum
mechanical speed of a motor can not be determined from its electrical properties
or values. Usually, AC drives need to know only the electrical properties, such as
nominal power and frequency, to successfully rotate the axis of the machine with the
correct speed (according to the reference). The maximum mechanical speed limit
of the motor is determined by the manufacturing process and the materials used.
(There are also stricter speed limits due to the application machinery, the decanter
centrifuge, as previously discussed in Section 4.2.4.)
For motors, ABB [2011a, p. 10] lists “guideline maximum speed values”, which
depend on the motor frame size and the number of poles for cast iron motors. Gen-
erally, the maximum speed is smaller with a larger pole pair number, as also the
corresponding nominal speed is smaller. For the frame sizes presented in Figure 7a,
which are in the smaller end of the whole size (power) range offered by the manufac-
turer, the maximum speeds are the same for 2-pole (p=1) and 4-pole (p=2) models:
6000 rpm for sizes 90–100, and 4500 rpm for sizes 112–200. (It should be noted
though, that the motors presented in Figure 7a are made of aluminum instead of
cast iron, so their speed limits might be different in reality.)
It is common to have positive temperature coefficient (PTC) thermistors in the
stator windings, which are used to indicate too high temperature of the motor (usu-
ally caused by overloading). That is why many AC drives have inputs for thermistors
to protect the motor from overheating damage by cutting off the power supply. Fur-
thermore, for the safety of the application, ABB [2010a, p. 13] recommends using
“suitable protective features” of an AC drive, including minimum and maximum
speeds, acceleration and deceleration times, maximum current and torque limits,
and stall protection. Next, the AC drive is inspected in detail, as it is used more
and more especially with the smaller decanters [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 45].
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4.4 AC Drive
This section describes the AC drive powering the decanter. Electric drives are
attractive over other drive systems still used today, including steam engines for
aircraft launch assist, hydraulic engines for their extreme power per volume, pneu-
matic drives for their simplicity and softness, and combustion engines in vehicles
[Harnefors, 2003, Veltman et al., 2007].
4.4.1 Terminology and Source Material
First a note about terminology used in this thesis: An AC drive for controlling
an electric AC motor is called with many different names. Relevant international
standards by International Electrotechnical Commission [1998, 2002] use the term
converter as a part of an “a.c. power drive system (PDS)”. The American Un-
derwriters Laboratories Inc. [2010, p. 9] standard 508C is about safety of “power
conversion equipment” which refers to “equipment that supplies power to control a
motor”.
The term inverter is used in the books by Harnefors [2003, p. 59], Records and
Sutherland [2001, p. 45], and Beaty and Kirtley [1998, p. 4]. An inverter converts
DC to AC, for example a separate inverter product commonly found in the consumer
market for cars and boats converts +12 V DC to 230 V AC. (Actually, the inverter
is only one part of an AC drive, as will be explained later.)
Major manufacturers, such as ABB, Siemens, Rockwell, and Vacon, seem to
prefer the term AC drive in their existing sales and marketing materials. According
to ABB Ltd [2011], “drive is an electronic device used to regulate the performance
of an electric motor”. The another popular term “frequency converter” (or changer)
has a dual meaning also as a device between two electrical networks with different
frequencies, used in bulk energy transmission, which has little to do with controlling
a motor. To avoid confusion and use the term which is commonly shared among
manufacturers, the term (AC) drive is used instead of a frequency converter to
describe a device for controlling an electric (AC) motor in this thesis, as summarized
below.
Drive traditionally means an apparatus which transforms energy in some form into
mechanical energy to drive a mechanical load, e.g. electrical drive [Harnefors,
2003, Luomi, 2010, Niiranen, 2000]. Specifically in electrical context, the term
drive (electric drive) usually means an electronic device which controls an
electric motor, also known as an AC or DC drive [ABB Ltd, 2011].
AC drive is an electronic device for controlling an AC motor.
In addition to the handouts by Harnefors [2003] and Luomi [2010] introduced in
Section 4.3, the handout titled Control of Electric Drives Addenda by Luomi [2009]
is used as the main source material about AC drives and their control methods.
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4.4.2 Energy Savings and Applications
According to International Energy Agency (IEA), 42% of all electricity generated
in the world is consumed by industry. 70% of that energy goes to electric motors
used virtually in all sectors. Over 90% of those motors are not speed-adjusted by
AC drives, which offers huge energy saving potential in variable speed applications.
Because AC drives save electric energy by controlling the rotational speed of motors
efficiently, speeding up and slowing down according to the needs of the process,
instead of running at a constant speed all the time. For example, during 2011
all installed drives from ABB saved 310 MWh, which equals to yearly electricity
consumption of about 75 million households in European Union (EU), or yearly
CO2 emissions of over 65 million cars. [ABB, 2012b, p. 3–5]
AC drives are used in numerous different applications, not limited to industry
only but also in residential, military, and automotive applications, to name a few.
More recent AC drive applications (or specifically inverter applications) include
hybrid electric vehicles, for example the Toyota Prius car.
4.4.3 Operating Principle
A common misconception about AC drives (especially when addressed as frequency
converters) is that they are basically like transformers, except that instead of voltage
they transform frequency. However, AC drives are control devices, controlling the
speed of rotation of AC motors.
For an induction machine, the speed of rotation
n = (1− s)
f
p
(10)
is determined by the stator frequency f , the pole pair value p, and the slip s.
Consequently, the speed can be controlled by modifying any of those three quantities.
In terms of losses and accuracy, the most beneficial method is to control the stator
(supply) frequency by an AC drive (hence also known as a frequency converter).
[Luomi and Niemenmaa, 2011, p. 159, 162]
However, frequency control (also known as scalar control) is the most basic type
of control methods used by AC drives. Vector control allows the stator flux and
torque to be independently controlled. Direct torque control (DTC), the motor
control method patented by ABB [Heikkila¨, 2000] used by some of its premium in-
dustrial AC drives such as the ACS880-01 [ABB, 2012d], enables the fastest possible
rate of change for torque. Its main principle is to select always the most suitable
voltage vector. [Luomi, 2009, Tiitinen and Surandra, 1996]
An induction machine can be used as a motor or a generator, depending on
the directions of speed and torque. In a decanter with two AC drives, the back
drive (controlling the speed of the gearbox pinion shaft) is generating energy as it is
braking (slowing down) for the differential speed of the conveyor, rotating slightly
slower than the bowl. The main drive is working as a motor, consuming energy
to rotate the bowl. A common DC bus (shared between the drives) configuration
allows for utilizing the regenerated power from the back drive. The benefit from that
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is smaller total power consumption of the decanter, offering substantial operating
cost savings in the long run. [Records and Sutherland, 2001, p. 17, 37, 115-116]
4.4.4 Construction
Generally, an AC drive consists of two distinct main components: the power unit
(PU) and the control unit (CU), as depicted in Figure 8. According to Niiranen
[2000, p. 50], the most common PU type for AC drives includes the voltage source
inverter (VSI). Usually, the VSI type PU consists of three sections or stages: the
rectifier, the DC intermediate circuit, and the inverter. The inverter part contains
power semiconductors, nowadays commonly insulated gate bipolar transistors (IG-
BTs), used to generate the required voltage form for the motor. The power flows
through the different PU stages according to operation by the CU, as indicated in
Figure 8. (A photo of an actual AC drive is presented later, in Figure 10 on page 36)
AC in
Rectifier
−
+
Intermediate circuit Inverter
AC out
Control unit
Power unit
Figure 8: Generalized diagram of different components inside an AC drive with voltage
intermediate circuit, from left to right: the rectifier (AC→DC), the DC intermediate circuit
(with capacitors for storing energy), and the inverter (DC→AC) with IGBT switches. The
control unit monitors and operates the components inside the power unit according to the
firmware.
Universally, a three-phase power supply is used in industrial applications. That
is beneficial for rectification, as three-phase rectifiers have smaller harmonic compo-
nents in the DC voltage and supply currents. [Kyyra¨, 2009, p. 152]
Considering motor control, the most important electronic components inside an
AC drive are the switches in the inverter bridge at the output. The evolution of
IGBTs, notably their voltage and current ratings, have made them practical in many
AC drive designs.
4.4.5 Performance Challenges in Decanter Applications
According to Yaskawa America, Inc. [2010, p. 1], performance challenges for AC
drives in decanter applications include: high torque near zero speed, “a very high-
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reflected inertia” with the bowl, torque limitation on the scroll (the screw conveyor),
and possibly dynamic or regenerative braking.
Modern motor control methods are efficient for the performance challenges de-
scribed above. With state-of-the-art control like DTC, the decanter can operate
smoothly as the AC drive takes care of the possibly varying process conditions.
Upper control systems need only to provide a reference which the drive will fulfill.
4.4.6 Reference Chain, Limits, and Protections
Most AC drives have some kind of basic protection functions to protect the motor
from too high current, for example. A typical reference chain is presented in Figure 9.
It consists of two controllers for speed and torque, and limiters for their input and
output values. This kind of scheme, with the torque control loop inside the outer
speed control loop, is called cascade control. (For motion control applications, there
is a third controller for position located outermost of the cascaded control loops.)
The reference type depends on the active control mode of the AC drive. Usually,
in speed control mode, the unit for the reference is hertz (Hz) or revolutions per
minute (rpm). Torque control mode commonly uses the reference as a percentage
of the nominal torque of the motor (TN ).
As previously briefly mentioned in Section 4.3.4, induction motors have max-
imum speed limits which are not related to their electrical properties. So, it is
possible that the AC drive tries to run the motor at such speed which is dangerous
to the motor and the decanter, leading to physical damage. That is why it is com-
mon to have configurable maximum (and minimum) speed limits in AC drives. But
usually they can be set to any value the user/operator chooses. And it is also possi-
ble that, due to a flaw in the AC drive’s firmware or some control-loop malfunction
or misconfiguration, the motor is run at speeds exceeding the maximum speed limit
set in the drive. This can be avoided by using an external safety speed monitoring
module which either limits the speed, or stops the motor completely in a safe way.
Speed
Controller
Torque
Controller
Motor
Speed
reference
(rpm)
Torque estimate
Speed estimate or feedback
Limits:
- torque
- current
- power
- etc.
Limits:
- speed
- torque
reference
- etc.
Limits:
- speed
reference
- critical
speeds
- acceleration
- deceleration
- etc.
Torque
reference
(%)
Figure 9: Simplified diagram of the reference chain of a typical AC drive with speed
and torque cascade control, where the speed controller supplies the torque reference to
the torque controller, based on the speed reference from upper control systems. Limit
functions are provided at the inputs and outputs of each controller to protect the motor
and other machinery. (Adapted from the figures by Niiranen [2000, p. 68] and ABB Oy
[2012c, p. 347–363].)
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(This kind of safety functionality is further discussed later.)
Other protection functions required in the decanter application (also commonly
in other applications as well) are motor thermal overload protection using a ther-
mistor in the windings (discussed in Section 4.3.4) and acceleration time limitation
to prevent slippage of the belts (described in Section 4.3.3). For the back drive,
torque limit is important for protection of the gearbox (discussed in Section 4.2.4).
However, those protection functions are of little use against cyber sabotage if they
can be disabled remotely without authentication.
The limits and other configuration options of AC drives can be changed by
software parameters, generally accessible through a human-machine interface (HMI)
and an optional fieldbus. There can be as many as thousand different parameters
in a single AC drive. Usually, some parameters can not be changed while the drive
is running, but in stopped state there are often no restrictions.
4.4.7 Control Interfaces
Generally, the reference to the drive can be supplied from three different locations:
the operating/control panel (hand-held or a PC-tool), the basic analog and digital
input/output (I/O) signals, and the fieldbus. Usually, only one of those control
locations can be active at a time.
The connection environment for operating the drive, as assumed in this thesis,
is presented in Figure 10. For this thesis, the most notable control location is the
Ethernet based fieldbus, along with the safe torque off (STO) control for functional
USB
Ethernet
Safe torque off
Basic I/O
(DIOs/AOs/AIs)
Three-phase power supply
Drive-to-drive link
(proprietary bus)
Figure 10: Some connection interfaces to an AC drive: The USB, the Ethernet based
fieldbus, the basic digital and analog I/O, the STO for functional safety, and a manufac-
turer specific proprietary bus (e.g. drive-to-drive link) [ABB Oy, 2012e] (Images of the
ACS880-01 drive and the motor courtesy of ABB [2012c]. Network related icons courtesy
of Cisco Systems, Inc. [2012].)
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safety. Also, the universal serial bus (USB) or other interface for a PC-tool is
important, because it allows configuration and modification of the drive operation.
In the next section, the control interfaces are discussed thoroughly, because they are
the paths (also called attack vectors) to commit cyber sabotage against the decanter
centrifuge.
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5 System Security and Machinery Safety
This section focuses on safety and security aspects of industrial equipment, taking
a top to bottom approach starting from the network, and going through the field
level to the machine-specific safety. Those subjects are essential for determination
of proper methods for protection of the decanter centrifuge against sabotage by a
Stuxnet-like cyber threat. The selected, applicable methods are presented and their
justification discussed.
5.1 General
This subsection presents general information related to both security and safety
subjects discussed in this Section 5. Firstly, the source materials and terminology
are presented.
5.1.1 Source Material and Terminology
This Section 5 is mainly based on literature review. The source materials are the
following: Regarding network security, the main source is the book Industrial Net-
work Security by Knapp [2011]. It is all about information technology (IT) security
without going into safety and physical machinery. The security guidelines presented
in the book are summarized in Section 5.2.3.
Another main source book is Robust Control System Networks: How to Achieve
Reliable Control After Stuxnet by Langner [2011a]. Some of his ideas about risk
determination are included in Section 5.1.2, while others are scattered throughout
the whole Section 5, including some mentions about safety.
Both of the those books are post-Stuxnet, meaning that they have been published
after the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010. Both works address Stuxnet somehow, even
briefly. Therefore, they are up-to-date on the latest threat posed to industrial control
systems, contrary to most pre-Stuxnet books.
Regarding fieldbus security, the main source is White Paper on Industrial Au-
tomation Security in Fieldbus and Field Device Level by Sundell et al. [2011]. It was
published by Vacon Plc, one of the two AC drive manufacturers specifically targeted
by Stuxnet (as previously described in Section 3.1.4).
Source material for safety is more scattered, without a single distinct main source.
Nevertheless, the book titled Safety Instrumented Systems: Design, Analysis, and
Justification by Gruhn and Cheddie [2006] deserves to be mentioned as an excellent
book on industrial process safety matters, used in this thesis also. Even though
published before Stuxnet, the principles described in it stand the test of time.
It is important to distinguish the differences between the terms security and
safety. They are used in this thesis as follows:
Security means “measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime,
attack, or escape”.
Safety means “the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury,
or loss”. [Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2012a,b]
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Those definitions are shared among the automation and security industries, as de-
scribed by Byres and Cusimano [2010].
5.1.2 Risk Model
According to International Telecommunication Union [2008, p. 8]: “Security is all
about risk management.” Many techniques can be used to manage risks, including
detection, countermeasures, and a recovery strategy.
This subsection discusses risks mainly to the extent Langner [2011a] presents
them in his book. However, diverging from traditional IT security doctrines, risk
concept and the terms confidentiality, integrity, and availability are put aside for
a new perspective based on the realization that improving security actually means
“making fragile systems more robust” [Langner, 2011a, p. x].
According to Langner [2011a, p. 4]: “Security researchers and vendors of security
products (who benefit from perceived high threat levels) tend to exaggerate threats,
whereas asset owners (who benefit from perceived low threat levels) tend to deny
threats. Even where there is evidence of threats and related risks, one may choose
simply not to trust the underlying prediction.”
Out of the three risk models (insurance, logical, and financial) Langner [2011a,
p. 1–7] presents at the beginning of his book, he chooses the financial model as the
best one for his approach to improving the security (or robusting, as he calls it) of
an IACS. In the financial model, risk is seen as volatility, which means variability.
A volatile investment has the potential for bigger profits than a safe investment.
However, contrary to the finance sector, in industrial automation volatility is bad,
and a system showing volatile behavior is not fully controlled. Improving the con-
trollability of a system should be a major motivator to enhance its security. Langner
[2011a, p. 7] points out, that “risk and security are hypothetical”, but control of a
system is “factual”.
Reduction of risk (or volatility) can be achieved by reducing undesired output
variation of the system. That is the same as gaining more control over the system
and being able to predict it more accurately. Reducing uncontrolled factors, of which
the system is dependent on, results to less of volatility, less of risk. [Langner, 2011a,
p. 6]
Following this introduction, Langner [2011a, p. 7] lets go of the term risk and
substitutes the terms fragility for high risk and robustness for low risk. And more
specifically, for the context of his book, the concepts are limited to “cyber fragility
and cyber robustness.” Using those terms, there is less room for arguing that ICS
security issues might be only hypothetical.
According to Langner [2011a, p. 175]: “Robustification is not about defense and
mitigation. It is not primarily against anything.” Instead of focusing on external
factors, robustification leads towards an inherently better system, with minimal
fragility.
Robustification procedure involves many steps. One of them includes “surplus
strategies” which enhance a system or a process by adding something more it, for
example safety and monitoring systems, redundancy, and derating i.e. performance
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margins. They are to be implemented after “reduction strategies” which harden a
system by removing unnecessary services and restricting user access for example.
[Langner, 2011a, p. 48, 89–144] Related steps, strategies, and methods are discussed
later.
5.1.3 Moving Target of Security
Everything can be compromised. Everything can be hacked. It is just a matter
of time. Everything is vulnerable after enough time has passed. That is why a
control system can not be trusted 100% at any time. It must be assumed that
the protections in a control system can be penetrated and bypassed, thus allowing
hazardous references passed into the equipment, the AC drive.
For all sorts of embedded and general purpose software, new exploits are pub-
lished almost every day. New vulnerabilities are found constantly. That means, that
a system which is secure today, most certainly is not secure some time from now,
unless proper patches are applied. A secure system is the target, but as time goes
by, more effort is required to reach that target, the secure system. That is what
the concept of moving target means in computer security. As Gollmann [2011, p. 1]
expressed it: “Security is a journey, not a destination.”
The Debian Project, responsible for the free Linux distribution (distro), states
the following: “Experience has shown that ‘security through obscurity’ does not
work. Public disclosure allows for more rapid and better solutions to security prob-
lems.” [Software in the Public Interest, Inc., 2012a] According to the full disclo-
sure principle, there are many free sources to vulnerabilities and exploits, including
Exploit Database (www.exploit-db.com) by Offensive Security [2012], the Bugtraq
mailing list (www.securityfocus.com) by Symantec Corporation [2012a], The Open
Source Vulnerability Database [2012] (http://osvdb.org/), and National Vulner-
ability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov/) by National Institute of Standards and
Technology [2012], to name a few.
5.1.4 The Threat
It is evident, that industrial applications such as the decanter centrifuge are usu-
ally susceptible to sabotage and physical destruction, in addition to the common
target for traditional hacking, which is “information” theft or leakage. Andress and
Winterfield [2011, p. 29–31] present rankings for different types of cyber threats,
naming “APT/Nation state” as the worst kind of threat in terms of damage caused.
Cyberwar requires resources, like knowledge, tools, and developers.
Mainly free tools available for everyone to download are used in the experimental
part of this thesis (Section 7). In that sense, in relation to the tools (described as
“logical weapons” by Andress andWinterfield [2011, p. 83]) used, this thesis basically
assumes a “script-kiddie” level threat. It is the least damaging type of threat.
On the other hand, the target, a decanter centrifuge used in nuclear fuel produc-
tion, is relatively high profile and possibly rated as critical infrastructure (discussed
more later in Section 5.2.4). Considering the industrial nature of the target, the
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threats are more serious, in the top range between terrorism, insiders, and APTs or
nation states.
The attackers behind Stuxnet obviously had extensive knowledge of the uranium
enrichment process with gas centrifuges. They also had insider knowledge about
PLC configuration, among other things [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 3]. Thus to protect
an industrial application, it must be assumed that a potential attacker attempts to
target the “vulnerabilities” of the application.
Speaking in the language of information security, the maximum speed limit of a
rotating machinery, such as a centrifuge, is a vulnerability which cannot be patched
(i.e. fixed). It is inherent to the design (due to physics). Thus, “a firewall”,
e.g. an external safety module, is needed to prevent access to the vulnerable area
of the system. (Industrial safety implementations are further discussed later in
Section 5.4.)
Usually loss of electric power (blackout) is not a threat to an industrial drive
application, if only the potential physical damage to the equipment is considered.
Most applications withstand an uncontrolled (coast) stop. Although the loss of
power is a major threat to a production process, as no production can proceed if
there is no power to run production lines in a factory or other facility.
With the increased complexity of AC drives and their programming possibilities
it is possible to target them like Stuxnet targeted Siemens S7 PLCs. In the future,
we might see a Stuxnet-like malware which modifies user applications running on
AC drives through the PC programming tool interface, for example.
5.1.5 Defense-in-Depth
Defense-in-depth is an IS “strategy” using multiple layers of different methods, such
as physical protection (door locks, etc.), strong user passwords, and data encryption
[Knapp, 2011, p. 23]. If one layer can be penetrated by an attacker, there is an-
other one waiting and still protecting the target. The more layers, the better. For
example, if security measures in a PLC have been bypassed and the PLC has been
compromised, an AC drive can still protect the application machinery, as long as its
protection functions are working and secured.
Byres and Cusimano [2010] write about the similarities of defense-in-depth of
IS industry and layer-of-protection analysis (LOPA) of automation industry. Ac-
cording to Boyes [2012], that is “a relatively new concept” intertwining security and
safety together. It requires co-operation between IACS and IS vendors. However, a
vendor with a secure product affects only 25% of total security, while 75% is up to
the end-user through policies and training.
Of course, it is easier for a manufacturer of a device with traditional fieldbus
connectivity to throw in the towel and say the fieldbus was never intended to imple-
ment security. Another way to handle the situation is to make everything possible
to improve security. However, [Langner, 2011a, p. 163–164] points out that vendors
have very limited possibilities to charge more for the added cybersecurity. After all,
it is invisible to the user in many aspects.
As previously discussed in Section 4.2.6 (on page 27), decanters can be inte-
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grated into a larger automation system. Remote monitoring and control is truly “a
double-edged sword”. It brings great benefits, but unless security is taken care of, it
bears the potential for a catastrophe. The following subsections discuss security of
networked environments common to many industrial remote control and monitoring
implementations.
5.2 Industrial Network
Figure 11 presents a diagram of a typical industrial network. It is here only as an
example and will not be discussed in detail. Essential points about it to be noted
include different kinds of connection possibilities inside and outside the network,
and the variety of computers and other devices.
In this thesis, the fieldbus is Ethernet-based. Ethernet per se is not the focus, so
it will not be studied in detail. For now, it will only be assumed that the Ethernet
network includes usual devices in industrial environment, including PLC, SCADA,
To the
decanter
HMI
PLC
IEDs
SCADA
WWW
E-mail
WLAN
Internet
3G
RS232
Figure 11: An example case of an Ethernet network for an industrial facility with PLCs,
SCADA devices, “business” applications such as world wide web (WWW) browsers, and
Internet connections. It should be noted, that a smartphone connected to the WLAN can
bypass the Ethernet firewall, possibly linking the industrial network to the Internet, for
example through a third generation (3G) mobile broadband network. Devices can be con-
nected also by other means, such as serial communications according to the recommended
standard 232 (RS-232). (Adapted from the figure by Knapp [2011, p. 8]. Icons courtesy
of Cisco Systems, Inc. [2012]. Photos of the AC500 PLC, the NETA-01 Ethernet module,
and the ACSM1 AC drive courtesy of ABB [2012c].)
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and “business” devices, as depicted in Figure 11.
5.2.1 Ethernet and Internet Protocol
Ethernet is the networking technology standardized in the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 802.3 [Reynders and Wright, 2003, p. 43–44].
The Ethernet packet with the basic media access control (MAC) frame is presented
in Figure 12.
EtherType is “a 2 octet value that indicates the nature of the MAC client proto-
col.” [Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 2010, p. 25, 38, 52] It
is the length/type field of the MAC frame (packet), if the value in the field is greater
than 1535. The field is interpreted as the length instead of the type, if the value is
less than 1501.
A MAC address, intended to uniquely identify each network device, can be
changed. That can be maliciously exploited for MAC spoofing. The address resolu-
tion protocol (ARP) is used to resolve the MAC address from an Internet protocol
(IP) address (IP→MAC). [Sundell et al., 2011, p. 24]
MAC addresses are composed of six 8-bit, hexadecimal values separated by
colons, e.g. “00:21:99:00:2D:A9”. The first three of those can be used to iden-
tify the vendor of the product by the organizationally unique identifier (OUI) list
maintained by IEEE. The last three octets are used to identify individual devices.
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 2013, Sundell et al., 2011]
IP (version 4) addresses are composed of four 8-bit, decimal values separated
by dots, e.g. “192.168.0.1”. Subnet masks (e.g. “255.255.255.0”) are required
to interpret which portions (number of bits) of the address are used to specify
the subnetwork, and which the individual devices. Therefore, network segmenting,
which is impossible with pure MAC addresses, can be accomplished with IP address
filtering (e.g. by firewalls). [Sundell et al., 2011, p. 24]
Preamble
7 bytes
Start Frame
Delimiter
10101011
1 byte
Destination
MACID
6 bytes
Source
MACID
6 bytes
Length/
EtherType
2 bytes
Data
1 – 1,500
bytes
Pad
0 – 46
bytes
Frame Check
Sequence
CRC
4 bytes
MAC frame
Ethernet packet
Figure 12: An Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) packet with a basic MAC frame with maximum
data field size of 1,500 bytes. A byte is an octet, i.e. 8 bits, transferred starting from
the least significant bit. The start frame delimiter (SFD) is always the same sequence of
8 bits. The frame check sequence (FCS) field equals to a 32-bit cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) value of the MAC frame. (Adapted from the figures in the works by Reynders and
Wright [2003, p. 53], Marshall and Rinaldi [2004, p. 43], and Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. [2010, p. 49–54].)
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5.2.2 Internet Protocol Version 6
With the evolving of the Internet protocol from version 4 (IPv4) to version 6 (IPv6),
the IP address space is large enough for every grain of sand on Earth, multiple times
[Hagen, 2006, p. 36]. Instead of the less than 4.3 billion 32-bit IPv4 addresses, the
IPv6 has 128-bit addresses with 2128 ≈ 3.4 ·1038 unique possibilities. IPv6 addresses
are written in hexadecimal notation as eight 16-bit values (fields) separated with
colons, for example “fe80:43e3:9095:02e5:0216:cbff:feb2:7474”. [Frankel et al., 2010,
Reynders and Wright, 2003]
Network address translation (NAT), which basically maps multiple IP addresses
in a LAN to a single wide area network address, will not be needed with IPv6.
Nevertheless, NAT can still be used anyway.
IPv6 brings also other new features such as autoconfiguration, and mandatory
IP security (IPsec) support (although use is voluntary) for sender authentication.
Frankel et al. [2010, p. 2-7] recommend to deploy at least IPv6 security controls for
detecting “unauthorized use” of IPv6, even if there is no intent to replace IPv4.
5.2.3 Industrial Network Security
Knapp [2011] presents several methods for securing networks commonly used in
industrial environment, distinguishing them to three major types: the business net-
work, the SCADA demilitarized zone (DMZ), and the control system. Essential
security recommendations are detailed in this subsection.
The terminology Knapp [2011, p. 25–28] uses in his book derives from ICS re-
lated standards, such as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) by North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and ISA99 by International Society of Au-
tomation (ISA). Some essential terms are presented below.
Asset “is any device used within an industrial network.”
Critical digital asset “is a digitally connected asset that is itself responsible for
performing a critical function, or directly impacts an asset that performs a
critical function.”
Enclave is a “logical grouping of assets, systems and/or services that defines and
contains one (or more) functional groups. Enclaves represent network ‘zones’
that can be used to isolate certain functions in order to more effectively secure
them.”
Electronic security perimeter (ESP) “refers to the demarcation point between
a secured enclave, such as a control system, and a less trusted network, such
as a business network.” [Knapp, 2011, p. 313–315]
Update of web (hypertext transfer protocol, HTTP) servers and other compo-
nents can break functionality of industrial applications. Therefore, quick and simple
update of any ICS related software is not possible, but requires planning and testing
in advance, and also a backup plan, for example the possibility for a rollback in case
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things do not work as expected after the update. Information security is balancing
between a working process (ongoing production) and security. Everything can not
be updated as soon as a patch is available, because it would cause disruptions to
the process. As unpatched assets will be present, compensating measures should be
established. [Knapp, 2011, p. 281]
The two common IS axioms presented by Knapp [2011, p. 310] should be re-
membered: “Security is a Process, not a Product” and “Every door is a back door.”
Knapp [2011, p. 304–305] makes notes about mobile devices plugging into the com-
pany WLAN. For example, nowadays it is common for mobile phones to have built-in
Wi-Fi (IEEE standard 802.11). This annihilates the air-gap, if any, by connecting
the industrial LAN to a wide area network. Another major security threat are mis-
configuration and configuration weaknesses, which account for 16% of exploits in
ICS, according to a study completed in 2010. One common misconfiguration is the
use of default accounts and passwords.
Consequently, Knapp [2011, p. 32] states that “the air gap no longer exists”.
Critical systems can be found and exploited due to this.
Knapp [2011, p. 125] writes that the business network “should be treated as if it
were already compromised.” Securing an industrial network starts with identifying
functional groups of devices and systems. After that, enclaves can be established.
They must be separated from each other with very strict firewall rules, based on
the “deny all” default policy. Only specific connections (with source, target, and
protocol details) absolutely required should be added as exceptions. This results to
strong electronic security perimeters between the enclaves. [Knapp, 2011]
After the enclaves and ESPs have been established, they need to be monitored
internally, i.e. traffic within an enclave, and externally, i.e. traffic across an ESP.
According to Knapp [2011, p. 204], illegal process manipulation can be detected by
an “Application Monitor” or an “Industrial Protocol Monitor”, which has a list of
authorized function codes/commands. Knapp [2011, p. 272] recommends whitelist-
ing with application traffic monitoring to detect “malware operating covertly inside
of other applications” (e.g. Stuxnet).
Application whitelisting (AWL) is a host security approach different from tra-
ditional anti-virus solutions, which are based on a “blacklist” with a list of “bad”
objects. Knapp [2011, p. 185] writes that “AWL is well suited for use in control sys-
tems, where an asset should have explicitly defined ports and services.” Contrary
to blacklisting, AWL does not require constant updating (of malware “fingerprints”
or signatures) and is able to block yet unknown, to be discovered (i.e. zero-day)
attacks or exploits. The downside of AWL is that it adds latency to every function
on a host, which may not be approved for time-sensitive applications.
Log collection and analyzing for getting comprehensive view of network activity,
and especially detecting unusual activity, is important but often overlooked security
feature. Security information and event management (SIEM) systems are recom-
mended for this. The network logs need to be archived, potentially for fulfilling
regulations depending on the type of the facility. The archived logs can require
large amounts of space, for example 2 petabytes for 7 years, according to Knapp
[2011, p. 242–244].
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Finally, Knapp [2011, p. 303] presents “common pitfalls and mistakes”, describ-
ing complacency as “one of the most common and dangerous mistakes”. It can
result from being too confident about existing security solutions, or on the other
hand, not taking threats seriously.
5.2.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical Infrastructure Protection is a “reliability standard” by North American
Electric Reliability Corporation [2012]. It contains nine sections numbered as CIP-
001–CIP-009. The first one is titled Sabotage Reporting, and the rest with the Cyber
Security prefix as follows: Critical Cyber Asset Identification, Security Management
Controls, Personnel & Training, Electronic Security Perimeters, Physical Security
of Critical Cyber Assets, Systems Security Management, Incident Reporting and
Response Planning, and Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets.
North American power generation facilities must comply with the NERC CIP
under penalty of a fine [Knapp, 2011, p. 13]. Although the decanter is not used
in power generation and therefore does not have to comply with the NERC CIP,
it is good to take note of the security procedures in other industries. Described in
Section 5.2.3, the security measures presented by Knapp [2011] are in accordance
with the NERC CIP.
Nevertheless, a decanter plant can be regarded as critical infrastructure, depend-
ing on the process. At least the U.S. definition for critical infrastructure is so loose
that it can be applied to many industrial facilities. Ultimately defined in the U.S.
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 [Office of the Law Revision Counsel,
2012, Title 42 § 5159c (e)], “the term ‘critical infrastructure’ means systems and as-
sets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.”
The previous definition is shared by U.S. Department of Homeland Security
[2003] in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identi-
fication, Prioritization, and Protection, which lists different sectors requiring vulner-
ability assessments and risk management strategies against attacks. Included among
those infrastructure sectors are water treatment systems, and energy production and
refining.
5.2.5 Overview of Cybersecurity
Published by International Telecommunication Union [2008, p. 1] (ITU), the rec-
ommendation ITU-T X.1205 Overview of cybersecurity provides taxonomy of cyber
threats at various network layers. Also, “the most common hacker’s tools of the
trade are presented.” These include techniques and methods such as IP spoofing,
network sniffing, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and eavesdropping among many
others. Due to being a recommendation instead of a standard, compliance with
ITU-T X.1205 is voluntary.
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According to International Telecommunication Union [2008, p. 8]: “Cybersecu-
rity requires risk management.” For benefit of the risk analysis, attacks are grouped
into three categories: service interruption attacks, assets compromise, and compo-
nent hijacking. Attacks in the first category prevent user access either temporarily
or permanently, e.g. DoS or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Assets
compromise involves “theft or misuse of infrastructure”. Component hijacking re-
sults to attacks against other parts of “the cyber environment” through devices
which the attacker has gained control to. Similar issues are further discussed next
in relation to field devices.
5.3 Field Devices and Fieldbus
Electronic devices scattered around a factory floor (a production plant) are usually
called field devices. They communicate with other devices and systems through
a fieldbus. This subsection discusses security aspects related to field devices and
Ethernet-based fieldbus protocols.
5.3.1 Automation Model
AC drives belong inside the “sacred ground” of the control system, as expressed by
Knapp [2011, p. 127]. An AC drive is an intelligent electronic device (IED) after a
PLC, in the network topology of a control system.
Figure 13 presents the Purdue enterprise reference architecture (PERA) model.
According to Macaulay and Singer [2012, p. 89–92], the PERA model “has been
Level 5
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Level 0
Archives/File Servers
ERP/Finance/Messaging
Operations Management/Historians
Supervisory Controls
PLC/RTU IP
Communication
Safety Instru-
mented Systems
I/O from Sensors
Figure 13: The Purdue enterprise reference architecture (PERA) model. Levels 5 and 4
describe IT systems such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), levels 3 and below ICS
systems such as remote terminal units (RTUs). Availability requirement increases from
top to bottom, with level 0 having the highest availability requirement. (Adapted from
the figure in the book by Macaulay and Singer [2012, p. 92].)
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adopted by the ICS community and International Society of Automation (ISA) for
representing and designing the interface between ICS and IT.” It has six levels, from
0 to 5, depicted in Figure 13. Level 0 includes motor controls. So, AC drives can
be assumed belonging to level 0.
An AC drive is the last possible line of defense in the chain of devices controlling
a decanter centrifuge. It is the device that feeds power into the electric motor to
make it rotate. If all fails, all “upper” control systems have failed and cannot be
trusted any more, the AC drive and the safety functions in it are the last resort
(apart from completely isolated safety devices and systems).
5.3.2 Security
Sundell et al. [2011] present security aspects of fieldbuses and related devices. Some
selected points are summarized in this subsection.
According to Sundell et al. [2011, p. 14]: “The word ‘attack’ commonly means
the deliberate realization of a threat against a system, with the purpose of evad-
ing or circumventing security measures and violating security policies.” Fieldbus
communication between devices can be attacked in several ways, including
– man-in-the-middle attack by compromising a gateway, a switch, or a server
– DoS attack by overloading the fieldbus leading to exhaustion of resources
– spoofing by exploiting protocols and systems without source or destination
address authentication
– disrupting the electrical signals on the physical layer. [Sundell et al., 2011,
p. 16–17]
Sundell et al. [2011, p. 16] point out the importance of protecting master devices
to prevent an attacker issuing commands to slaves. Also, if safety related fieldbus
communications are used, the safety of a process might be compromised in an attack.
That especially holds true in systems with functional safety entirely implemented
by the automation system.
Originally, traditional fieldbuses were designed to be closed networks. One of
the key issues with a fieldbus network is physical security. For example, devices
distributed across a plant might not have protective enclosures, which presents a
security risk for an insider attack. Also, unused ports can be an intrusion point into
the network, especially with Ethernet. [Sundell et al., 2011, p. 16, 26, 31]
According to Sundell et al. [2011, p. 32], field devices can be manipulated in two
ways: “through the PC software” or using “integrated user interface such as keypad
and display.” The manipulation can be device parameter changes, or inserting
“spoofed firmware updates” which are usually “encrypted with a symmetric key”.
Potentially, the encryption key can be found from the memory of a field device.
To protect device parameters against modification, user access levels with pass-
words can be defined. Furthermore, the passwords should be securely stored, prefer-
ably with encryption. Also, firmware updating needs to be secure. Illicit firmware
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modifications can be detected by error checking algorithms in a bootloader. It is
not enough that the firmware is encrypted—proper key management is also needed.
[Sundell et al., 2011, p. 37]
Regarding the security of operating systems, Sundell et al. [2011, p. 34] state
that by experience “all kinds of operating systems have vulnerabilities regardless of
open source or closed source.”
5.3.3 EtherNet/Industrial Protocol
EtherNet/IP is developed by Open DeviceNet Vendor Association (ODVA). Intro-
duced in 2001, it implements the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) over standard
Ethernet. The “IP” in EtherNet/IP does not stand for “Internet Protocol”, but
for “Industrial Protocol” instead. Nevertheless, EtherNet/IP employs the transmis-
sion control protocol with the Internet protocol (TCP/IP). [Open DeviceNet Vendor
Association, Inc., 2008, p. 5]
Two types of communication modes are supported by EtherNet/IP, which uses
standard Ethernet frames (with EtherType 0x80E1): client/server, and real-time
“implicit” mode, which uses connectionless transport by the user datagram protocol
(UDP) and multicast transmissions. Objects standardized by CIP define qualities
of devices: Required Objects include device identifiers, like the manufacturer and the
serial number, while Application Objects define input and output profiles. There are
also Vendor-specific Objects. [Knapp, 2011, p. 78–79]
According to Knapp [2011, p. 79], there are multiple security concerns specific
to EtherNet/IP, mostly introduced by CIP, including: no security mechanisms are
defined, devices can be easily identified through the common Required Objects, and
real-time UDP and multicast traffic can be spoofed. Due to those security issues, it
is recommended to use intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS) suited for SCADA applications (SCADA-IDS/IPS) capable of detecting
and interpreting the real-time EtherNet/IP protocol. Also, the general industrial
network security measures (presented in Section 5.2.3), e.g. strong perimeter secu-
rity controls, should be implemented. [Knapp, 2011, p. 79]
According to the ICS-CERT [2012b] alert on February 15, 2012, there is an ex-
ploit for the EtherNet/IP protocol, which makes it possible to crash devices. The
alert followed publication by Project Basecamp of Digital Bond, Inc. [2012a], includ-
ing a Metasploit module with four payloads. Two of those payloads are targeting
protocol stack errors in the ControlLogix PLC by Rockwell Automation / Allen-
Bradley (AB), but they will also affect any device using the same protocol stack.
More importantly, according to Digital Bond, the other two payloads are effective
against any EtherNet/IP device from approximately 300 vendors of ODVA, includ-
ing 3S-Smart Software Solutions GmbH and ABB, Inc. [Open DeviceNet Vendor
Association, Inc., 2012].
According to Digital Bond, Inc. [2012a], the EtherNet/IP protocol is “insecure
by design”, as request commands are not authenticated, allowing operations such
as “Stop CPU” and “Reboot Ethernet Controller”. Digital Bond has verified that
a device from ABB (model unspecified) is vulnerable to this, as the ex
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Figure 14: A PROFIBUS frame (data unit part of the PROFIBUS SD2 telegram) with
the two main sections: the parameter identification and the process data. Parameters of
AC drives can be changed by the PROFIBUS master (usually a PLC) using the parameter
identification section. The meaning of the fixed fields of the process data differs depending
on the sender of the frame: The master sends control words and references, while slaves
respond with status words and actual values. The number of process data (PD) fields
in the freely mappable area (0–10) depends on the parameter/process data object (PPO)
type. The SM field for the request signal is not used (value of 0). [ABB Oy, 2011a, Falliere
et al., 2011]
step of authentication is not required. [Roberts, 2012]
5.3.4 Process Field Network—PROFINET
Process field network (PROFINET) is the modular communication standard de-
veloped by PROFIBUS & PROFINET International. It is basically integration of
the process field bus (PROFIBUS) with the full-duplex Ethernet at 100 megabits
per second (Mbit/s). The number of PROFINET devices has been increasing since
2002, currently being over four million. The PROFINET IO protocol, with the
distributed I/O data perspective, was standardized (standard 61158) by Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 2004. [A˚kerberg and Bjo¨rkman, 2009,
PROFIBUS Nutzerorganisation e.V., 2011, 2012]
PROFINET is a real-time Ethernet protocol (with EtherType 0x8892) with mas-
ter/slave communication. Multiple masters are supported by token sharing, while
each slave can respond to a single master. [Knapp, 2011, p. 80]
The structure of the PROFIBUS frame used in master/slave communication
is depicted in Figure 14. Parameters of AC drives can be changed through the
PROFINET fieldbus by “requesting” change of a parameter value, to which the
slave (the AC drive) responses with an acknowledgment. The drive can be started
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and stopped through the control word field, and the speed (reference) is set through
the REF field. [ABB Oy, 2011a, p. 116]
PROFINET IO cyclic data messages are addressed by MAC addresses. UDP is
used for acyclic communication with IP addressing. [Sundell et al., 2011, p. 29]
To address the numerous security concerns of PROFINET, such as inherent lack
of authentication, Knapp [2011, p. 80] recommends strong isolation using firewalls
and IPS devices, in accordance with the other network security recommendations
(described in earlier Section 5.2.3).
Siemens SIMATIC S7 range of PLCs with PROFINET connectivity use the In-
ternational Standards Organization transport service access point (ISO-TSAP) pro-
tocol for communication and programming with the related “engineering software”.
According to Langner Communications GmbH [2011], on top of the ISO-TSAP pro-
tocol, Siemens uses an application layer proprietary protocol called the S7 protocol.
Due to security flaws in the implementations of these protocols, SIMATIC S7 PLCs
can be compromised with root shell (command prompt) access to their (x86) Linux
OS, among other malicious things. [Beresford, 2011, p. 5, 19]
5.4 Machinery and Process Safety
This subsection focuses on machinery and process safety systems, generally known
as safety instrumented systems (SIS).
5.4.1 About Safety Instrumented Systems in General
Knapp [2011, p. 35] recommends to consider safety and security independently of
each other. But in this thesis, safety is considered to be a security enhancing fea-
ture. Also Langner [2011a, p. 134] points out that “safety systems are one more
way to increase the robustness of a process”. Actually, functional safety features are
intended for the protection of human beings [International Electrotechnical Com-
mission, 2005, p. 7].
Traditionally, safety systems have been isolated from any remote control systems.
Nowadays, it is common that safety devices can be remotely monitored, along with
the rest of the field devices. [U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 17, 20]
Integrated safety solution, such as functional safety of an AC drive (presented in the
next subsection), utilizing a single (Ethernet) fieldbus wiring offers advantages over
traditional hardwired and separate safety systems: “reduced design, installation, and
maintenance costs, as well as expanded diagnostic capabilities.” [Cisco Systems, Inc.
and Rockwell Automation, Inc, 2011, p. 2–3]
Industrial standards and other related documents recommend separating process
control and safety/protection systems (Figure 15). (Safety systems are also called
“interlock systems”.) For an AC drive application, that means that there should
be separate safety devices, whether or not safety functions of the AC drive are
used. Exception to this is to design the whole system as “a safety-related system”.
Justifying non-conformity with standards on economical grounds might not look
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Process/Equipment
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Figure 15: Principle of separated control and safety systems. (Adapted from the figure in
the book by Gruhn and Cheddie [2006, p. 38].)
good in a court of law, if it ever comes down to that. [Gruhn and Cheddie, 2006,
p. 37–45]
Safety instrumented systems are a part of industrial control systems (ICS).
Macaulay and Singer [2012, p. 14] state the following: “Understanding the pur-
poses and function of SIS is critical to managing the security of ICS.” Furthermore,
a common fallacy is to assume that ICS does not need additional security measures
due to SIS. However, SIS often share the technology platform with ICS, for example
using the same Windows application to configure both systems, and they need to
be connected somehow for proper monitoring and invoking. Therefore, there is no
such thing as a “disconnected safety system”. Because of these issues, an attacker
can compromise, bypass, or suspend a safety logic. [Macaulay and Singer, 2012,
p. 14–15]
According to Macaulay and Singer [2012, p. 15]: “There are currently a number
of private and closed source studies being conducted on the security of SIS, and it
is likely that more information will be available publicly in the coming months and
years.” This thesis can be regarded as a study on the security of SIS implemented
with the functional safety features of AC drives.
Stuxnet has demonstrated that protection functions, which can be disabled di-
rectly through the fieldbus, can not be trusted. (Section 3.4.1 describes the protec-
tion functions of AC drives disabled by Stuxnet through PROFIBUS.) Therefore, a
safety system, which is more secure, is required for protection against a Stuxnet-like
threat. One kind of safety system, which can be implemented with AC drives, is
presented in the next subsection.
5.4.2 Functional Safety
Applicable to AC drives, the international standard IEC 61800-5-2 Adjustable speed
electrical power drive systems—Part 5-2: Safety requirements—Functional by In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission [2007] shares the definition for functional
safety from the IEC 61508-4 standard as follows:
Functional safety is “part of the overall safety relating to the EUC (equipment
under control) and the EUC control system which depends on the correct func-
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tioning of the E/E/PE (electrical/electronic/programmable electronic) safety-
related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk re-
duction facilities” [International Electrotechnical Commission, 2007, p. 12].
Functional safety features are usually implemented in a PLC or in an AC drive.
In this thesis, PLC equipment are not studied and therefore all safety functions
presented later are internal to the AC drive itself. International Electrotechnical
Commission [2007, p. 13] refers to this kind of equipment as “adjustable speed elec-
trical power drive system suitable for use in safety-related applications” (PDS(SR)).
The safety functions standardized by International Electrotechnical Commission
[2007, p. 16–18] are described in Appendix A (on page 115). Comparing them to
the vulnerabilities of decanters, previously discussed in Section 4, many of them
seem useful, especially the following functions: safe acceleration range (SAR) to
prevent slippage of the belts (discussed in Section 4.3.3), safe speed range (SSR) to
protect the bowl against excessive speeds and also to keep the separation/dewatering
process (production) running by preventing the speed dropping too much (discussed
in Section 4.2.4), safely-limited torque (SLT) to protect the gearbox (discussed in
Section 4.2.4), and safe motor temperature (SMT) to protect the main motor against
overheating during long accelerations (discussed in Section 4.3.3).
However, not all of those applicable safety functions are actually implemented
in real AC drive products. Therefore, the amount of available safety functions is
considerably limited in real life, as will be presented later.
Safe torque off (STO) is central to many functional safety implementations. It
is used to prevent electromagnetic torque in a motor. Generally it is achieved by di-
rectly cutting off the gate signals to IGBTs. Gate signals control IGBTs and without
them an IGBT can not switch on. [ABB Oy, 2012e, International Electrotechnical
Commission, 2007, Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012k, Siemens AG, 2011b]
According to ABB Oy [2012e, p. 169, 175]: “The Safe torque off function is
ineffective against deliberate sabotage or misuse.” However, in this thesis the STO
function will be harnessed against cyber sabotage as an additional layer of defense-
in-depth security strategy.
With the defense-in-depth concept (presented Section 5.1.5) in mind, it is easy to
see how a functional safety system of an AC drive could be the last defensive method
against cyber sabotage. For traditional sabotage, the target is always some physical
equipment. A decanter centrifuge needs multiple layers of protection to prevent
physical damage to it, in case of a serious cyber sabotage attempt (cyber-physical
attack).
5.4.3 Speed Feedback for Safety Functions
Some implementations of the safety functions require speed feedback from the (rotat-
ing) axis of the motor. Feedback devices are usually called tachometers or (rotary)
encoders, as they “encode” the speed and/or position information to a machine
readable form. There are many types of encoders or feedback devices.
Roughly speaking, encoders can be divided into two categories: incremental and
absolute. The incremental encoder does not know the exact position of the rotor,
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only the amount it has been rotated, unlike the absolute encoder. Rotation is
indicated by digital pulse signals, typically with transistor-transistor logic (TTL) or
high threshold logic (HTL) voltage levels (nominally +5 V or +24 V, respectively),
or analog sine/cosine (Sin/Cos) signals. Absolute encoders keep track of the actual
position of the rotor, and can return that information generally at any time through
a digital interface, such as synchronous serial interface (SSI), encoder data (EnDat),
or Hiperface.
The price for a tachometer can be substantial, even a four figured number in U.S.
dollars [Alibaba.com Hong Kong Limited, 2012]. Several encoders might be required,
depending on the application. To reduce costs, a machine builder might prefer a
solution without an encoder, if speed feedback is not an application requirement
otherwise. The feedback types supported by actual AC drives are discussed later
(in Section 7.3.1).
Unlike Europe, the United States of America (USA) does not have machinery
safety legislation applicable to the whole region [Siemens AG, 2011b, p. 338]. Some
European safety standards related to decanter centrifuges and AC drives are dis-
cussed in the following subsections.
5.4.4 Common Safety Requirements for Centrifuges
The European standard EN 12547:1999+A1 Centrifuges—Common safety require-
ments is a class C standard “dealing with detailed safety requirements for a partic-
ular machine or group of machines”, as defined in the European standard EN ISO
12100:2010 by Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation [2010, p. vi] and International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). It applies to decanters which are a certain
type of centrifuges. EN 12547 provides “a means of conforming to Essential Re-
quirements” of the Machinery Directive (EU 2006/42/EC). [Comite´ Europe´en de
Normalisation, 2009]
The European standard about safety of centrifuges lists hazards “normally as-
sociated” with the usage of centrifuges, including maintenance and cleaning, and
safety measures to cope with those hazards. The list of hazards “is the result of
a risk assessment carried out in accordance with” the standard EN 1050 Safety of
machinery—Principles for risk assessment. From the perspective of this thesis, the
most essential hazardous events are “Failure/disorder of the control system” and
“Break-up during operation”. [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2009, p. 9, 28]
The standard EN 12547 requires “a speed control and an overspeed prevention
device” to protect against mechanical hazards, such as rotor rupture, if an AC drive
is used to drive a centrifuge. Such “overspeed protection system” is defined as “a
safety related part.” Those safety parts of the control system “shall be designed in
accordance” with the standard EN 954-1 Safety of machinery—Safety related parts
of control systems—Part 1: General principles for design, which has been superseded
by the European Standard EN ISO 13849-1 (described in the next subsection). The
“fault resistant category of safety related parts” should “preferably” be 1 or 2,
depending on the part. For example, speed control should be category 2, and safety
related stop 1 or 2. [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2009, p. 11, 17–18]
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5.4.5 Safety-Related Parts of Control Systems
The European standard EN ISO 13849-1 Safety of machinery—Safety-related parts
of control systems—Part 1: General principles for design (ISO 13849-1:2006) by
Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation [2008, p. v] is a type-B1 standard dealing with
particular safety aspects, for all kinds of machinery. It is intended to provide guid-
ance for design and assessment of control systems to fulfill the “Essential Safety
Requirements” of theMachinery Directive (European Council Directive 98/37/EC).
In addition to design considerations, the EN ISO 13849-1 standard mainly discusses
safety functions, which can be provided by the safety-related parts of control systems
(SRP/CS), and categories (B, 1, . . . , 4) used to achieve a specific performance level
(PL, a–e) which corresponds to the ability to perform a safety function. [Comite´
Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008]
As either a separate system or integrated into the machine control system,
SRP/CS provide safety functions and possibly operational functions also. They
consist of hardware and software. [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008, p. v]
The EN ISO 13849-1 standard borrows the following definition from the ISO 12100-
1:2003 standard:
Safety function is a “function of the machine whose failure can result in an im-
mediate increase of the risk(s)”. [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008,
p. 5]
The functions described in IEC 61800-5-2 (previously discussed in Section 5.4.2)
facilitate implementation of the principles of EN ISO 13849-1 [International Elec-
trotechnical Commission, 2007, p. 8].
The standard lists PLCs and “motor control units”, among others, as examples
of devices “which are parts of SRP/CS” [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008,
p. 1]. Specific requirements for those kinds of programmable electronic systems are
provided, however, EN ISO 13849 applies also to SRP/CS utilizing other forms of
energy than electricity, e.g. hydraulic, pneumatic, or mechanical energy. [Comite´
Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008, p. 1]
According to Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation [2008, p. 11], performance levels
(PLs) correspond to value ranges of “average probability of dangerous failure per
hour” in decreasing order from PL a with values less than 10−4 to PL e with values
less than 10−7. Performance levels b–e can be related to safety integrity levels (SILs)
1–3 [Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008, p. 16].
EN ISO 13849-1 also manifests requirements for software used to configure safety-
related parameters. The parameterization tool needs to be dedicated software with
identification information, such as a name and a version, and prevention of unau-
thorized modification, for example a password. Furthermore, Comite´ Europe´en de
Normalisation [2008, p. 26] states the explicit requirement for “verification that
unauthorized modification of safety-related parameters is prevented”. However, fur-
ther security requirements, such as password complexity, are not given. [Comite´
Europe´en de Normalisation, 2008, p. 25–26] In the next section, parameterization
tools for safety-related parameters from selected vendors are introduced, among
other things.
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6 Selected AC Drives and Software Tools
This section describes the AC drives selected for comparison, and the software tools
used with them. Essentially, they constitute the materials for this thesis, apart
from the literature introduced earlier. Firstly, the physical AC drives are presented
along with reasons for their selection, followed by the PC software tools used to
commission and configure them. Finally, the tools for vulnerability assessment are
described.
6.1 AC Drives
The AC drives selected for the comparison are presented in this subsection. First, the
selection process and criteria are explained, then the individual drives are introduced
to the reader.
6.1.1 Drive Selection
Different AC drives were chosen for comparison based on the decanter/centrifuge
application requirements. Drive offerings from different manufacturers were studied,
and the drive model with suitable power, connectivity, and safety features was chosen
Table 2: Technical details of the selected AC drives including the option modules. IN and
Imax are the nominal and the maximum output currents, respectively. PN is the nominal
output power and PN(max) the maximum offered for the same “frame type” (i.e. size
named by the manufacturer). Dimensions are presented as height x width x depth in mm.
S110 is a modular drive comprised of the PM340 power module (1.2 kg) and the CU305 PN
control unit (1.0 kg), supplied separately. [ABB, 2011b, 2012d, ABB Oy, 2012e, Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 2009, 2011, 2012b, Siemens AG, 2008, 2011a,c, 2012a,h]
Manufacturer ABB Rockwell Siemens
Model ACS880-01-02A4-3 AB PowerFlex 755 SINAMICS S110
UN (V) 400 400 400
PN (kW) 0.75 0.75 0.75
IN / Imax (A) 2.4 / 3.1 2.1 / 3.2 2.2 / 4.4
Frame type R1 2 FSA
PN(max) (kW) 5.5 11 1.5
Dimensions 405 x 155 x 226 424 x 134 x 212 195 x 73 x 216
Weight (kg) 6 8 ∼2.2 (1.2+1)
Fieldbus con-
nectivity
EtherNet/IP, Modbus
TCP, PROFINET IO
EtherNet/IP PROFINET
Option mod-
ules included
FENA-11 Ethernet,
FEN-11 Encoder,
FSO-11 Safety
20-HIM-A6 Panel,
20-750-UFB-1 Feed-
back, 20-750-S1 Safe
Speed Monitor
BOP20 Panel, Safety
Integrated Extended
Functions
Introduced April 2011 November 2009 November 2008
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from each selected manufacturer. Two manufacturers in addition to ABB were
first chosen based on the safety features presented in their marketing materials
(catalogs, web sites, etc.). The two manufacturers with the most extensive safety
feature offering were selected. Biggest AC drive manufacturers by market share were
compared for this.
An AC drive for a decanter or a centrifuge application was preferred if offered by
a manufacturer. Unfortunately, the offerings often lacked other required features,
like Ethernet for fieldbus connectivity and safety features. That is why the selected
drives, excluding the ACS880-01 from ABB, are generally for motion control appli-
cations with position control, which is not needed for a decanter. From an AC drive’s
perspective, the decanter centrifuge is rather easily controlled with traditional speed
and torque control (as previously described in Section 4.4).
Technical details of the chosen AC drives are presented in Table 2. All drives
represent the lowest power offered in the product line, which is 0.75 kW for all
drives. An actual decanter machinery was not available for the experimental part of
this thesis, so the power of the drives does not matter, as they will not be driving
real machinery. (For example, the P2 decanter product range by Alfa Laval [2006]
is available in powers between 15 to 250 kW.)
6.1.2 Hardware Test Setup
The drives can be seen mounted to the test setup in Figure 16. The Siemens drive
has much smaller physical dimensions compared to the other two drives, which can
be explained by the maximum power for the frame type offered by the manufacturer
(in Table 2). The power range available for the frame type of the Siemens drive is
much smaller when compared to the frame types of the other two manufacturers.
The kind of power range optimization used in the Siemens drive is typical for servo
drives, along with built-in feedback device support which is also included in the
SINAMICS S110 model.
All three AC drives were coupled to small induction motors. The Ethernet in-
terfaces, configured with static IP addresses (10.0.0.1), were cabled (one at a time)
directly to a standard laptop PC (configured as 10.0.0.2). No hubs, switches, nor
anything else were used in between. This is a drastic difference compared to usual
network configuration, where crossover cabling is never used in practice and multiple
switches between devices is the norm. However, thanks to automatic medium de-
pendent interface crossover (Auto-MDIX) support, standard Ethernet cables could
be and were used.
Also, the distinct PC tool interfaces were used: USB on the ABB ACS880-
01 control panel, drive peripheral interface (DPI) through the Rockwell 1203-USB
converter adapter, and RS-232 on the Siemens S110 control unit through the Moxa
UPort 1450l USB-to-serial converter and a null modem cable. More specific details,
such as version numbers and types of different hardware components, are presented
in Appendix B.
ACS880-01 was the only AC drive supporting multiple different fieldbus protocols
(in the specified configuration). It was configured for EtherNet/IP during the tests.
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Figure 16: The three AC drives mounted on the wall, in order from left to right (with
dimensions height x width x depth in mm): SINAMICS S110 (195 x 73 x 216) by Siemens
AG [2011c], ACS880-01 (405 x 155 x 226) by ABB [2012d], and PowerFlex 755 (424 x 134
x 212) by Rockwell Automation, Inc. [2011]. Only supply cables are wired to the drives.
6.1.3 ABB ACS880-01
The ACS880 is the successor to the ABB’s ACS800 AC drive series released in 2002
[DFA Media Ltd, 2002]. The ACS880 series includes different types of drives with
different constructions, such as the ACS880-01 wall-mounted and the ACS880-07
cabinet-built single drives. In accordance with the ABB’s new low voltage AC drive
portfolio introduced in 2011, all of them have common features, such as STO func-
tionality built-in as standard, DTCmotor control, a removable memory unit, a drive-
to-drive (D2D) link, and optional speed feedback modules and fieldbus adapters.
Dubbed as “all-compatible” industrial drives by ABB [2012d, p. 5], the ACS880
series is intended for several “industries such as oil and gas, mining, metals, chem-
icals, cement, power plants, material handling, pulp and paper, sawmills and ma-
rine.” Applications can be, for example, “cranes, extruders, winches, winders, con-
veyors, mixers, compressors, pumps and fans.” [ABB, 2011b, 2012d]
By the optional FENA-11 Ethernet adapter, supported fieldbuses include Eth-
erNet/IP, Modbus TCP, and PROFINET IO. The standard HMI control panel has
a mini-B type USB connector for PC tools [ABB Oy, 2012b, p. 20].
ACS880-01 has two built-in registered jack 45 (RJ-45) connectors, but they are
not used for any Ethernet based fieldbus communication. Instead, they are used for
daisy-chaining the drives together using standard Ethernet cables, to be controlled
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by one control panel. ACS880 has ABB’s own D2D link built-in. D2D employs
RS-485 for inter-drive communication with one master drive and multiple follower
drives. [ABB Oy, 2012e, p. 99, 104]
6.1.4 Rockwell Allen-Bradley PowerFlex 755
The Allen-Bradley PowerFlex 750-series AC drives from Rockwell Automation, Inc.
[2011] are for general purpose and high performance industrial applications. They
are available for 400 - 690 V supplies with powers ranging from 0.75 to 1,000 kW.
Standard features include integration with the Rockwell Logix PLC environment,
predictive diagnostics, and slot-based architecture for add-ons, such as communica-
tions, I/O, and safety options. [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2011]
The PowerFlex 755 model has an embedded Ethernet port as standard, and
allows control of permanent magnet motors in addition to induction motors. It is
suited for applications with advanced positioning, offering features like electronic
gearing and position/speed profiling, among other positioning features. [Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 2011]
In addition to the embedded EtherNet/IP adapter on the main control board,
PowerFlex 755 offers Allen-Bradley’s DPI which can be used to connect the optional
1203-USB converter for PC tools. As a functional enhancement to AB’s SCANport
interface, the DPI port in the drive is provided through a (8-pin) mini-Deutsches In-
stitut fu¨r Normung (DIN, German Institute for Standardization) connector. [Rock-
well Automation, Inc., 2012g,h]
6.1.5 Siemens SINAMICS S110
The SINAMICS S110 AC drive from Siemens is a compact servo drive with inte-
grated safety function for basic single-axis positioning applications. According to
Siemens AG [2012h], typical applications are the following: “Pick & place tasks,
high-bay racking units, simple handling tasks, positioning rotary tables, positioning
adjuster and actuator axes in all machinery construction sectors”. [Siemens AG,
2012h]
SINAMICS is the name of the “drive family” by Siemens AG [2012h], which
includes AC and DC drives for low and medium voltages. As a low voltage AC
drive, S110 features servo, speed, and position control for synchronous and induction
(servo-) motors. Siemens AG [2011b, p. 129] defines servo control as closed-loop
control “with a high dynamic response and precision for a motor with a motor
encoder.” Basically it is high performance, closed loop speed and torque control.
According to Siemens AG [2012h], the following positioning functions are in-
cluded: “Point-to-point positioning; absolute/relative; linear/rotary axis; flying po-
sitioning; traversing blocks (max. 16)”. The position control performance is stated
as “4 ms”. [Siemens AG, 2012h]
As a standard feature, the CU305 PN control unit has two RJ-45 connectors
for PROFINET. There is also a third RJ-45 socket for the Drive Component Link
with IQ (DRIVE-CLiQ) interface, used to connect an encoder. In addition, all
CU305 units have a RS-232 serial interface for PC tools, and a memory card slot.
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The memory card itself is optional, but required for the license for safety functions.
[Siemens AG, 2011a,b]
6.2 Software for Drives
In the AC drive industry, the term PC tools usually refers to software running on
Microsoft Windows OS used to commission, program, and monitor the operation of
one or multiple AC drives. This subsection presents the PC tools used with the AC
drives in this thesis, starting with the motivation for their study.
6.2.1 Vulnerabilities
PC tools of AC drives are similar to the Siemens WinCC software targeted by
Stuxnet [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 26–27]. In the last couple of years, many vulnerabil-
ities have been reported in these kind of software used to program PLCs from many
different manufacturers (Table 3), as well as in PLCs (firmware) themselves [Digital
Bond, Inc., 2012b]. Evidently, the manufacturers of the AC drives compared in this
thesis have had security issues in the past. Thus, it is important to study also the
vulnerabilities of the PC software of an AC drive. Similarly to the Stuxnet case,
an APT or a cyber weapon might target PC tools to configure and program an AC
drive directly to its needs for malicious purposes. Although AC drive PC tools are
usually needed only once during commissioning, the interfaces and protocols used
are available during other times of operation, and can be accessed also by others
(unauthorized personnel) unless proper precautions are taken.
ICS Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) works in collaboration with
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which is a part of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). ICS-CERT publishes advisories and alerts about vul-
nerabilities in industrial control systems to the public. [ICS-CERT, 2010]
Generally, it takes relatively long time from the discovery of a vulnerability to
publishing of an advisory or an alert by ICS-CERT. Thus, it can be assumed that
Table 3: Selected alerts and advisories from ICS-CERT [2012c] related to PC tools for
PLCs and AC drives, sorted by date (YYYY-MM-DD) in ascending order
Date ID Vendor Title
2010-10-28 ICSA-10-
301-01A
Moxa “MOXA Device Manager Buffer Over-
flow (UPDATE)”
2011-10-06 ICSA-11-
273-03A
Rockwell “Rockwell RSLogix Denial-of-Service
Vulnerability (UPDATE)”
2012-04-06 ICS-ALERT-
12-097-02
3S “3S-Software CoDeSys Improper Ac-
cess Control”
2012-04-10 ICSA-12-
095-01A
ABB “ABB Multiple Components Buffer
Overflow (UPDATE)”
2012-04-18 ICSA-12-
030-01A
Siemens “Siemens SIMATIC WinCC Multiple
Vulnerabilities (UPDATE)”
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vulnerabilities published by ICS-CERT are widely known, sometimes even before
the publication by ICS-CERT, at least in the security community.
However, no publications about possible vulnerabilities in the PC tools presented
in the next subsections were found. It does not mean there are none, they just may
not have been published yet.
6.2.2 Drive Composer
Drive Composer (Figure 17) is the commissioning tool for ABB’s common architec-
ture drives, such as the ACS880-01. As a 32-bit application running on Windows,
it allows controlling and monitoring a drive, and changing parameters among other
things. More features are available in the Pro version, including control diagrams
and safety configuration options, as compared to the limited Entry version. [ABB
Oy, 2012b, p. 17]
Figure 17: A screenshot of an ABB Drive Composer Pro session, with the parameter
browser active, running on Windows 7.
Drive Composer Entry is free, but requires registration with personal information
for the download link. At the time of writing, the latest Pro version is 1.2 released
on October 30, 2012. [ABB, 2012a]
6.2.3 DriveExplorer
DriveExplorer (Figure 18) is the online configuration and monitoring tool for Rock-
well Automation drives, including the PowerFlex 7-Class series. Before becoming
obsolete, it was available as the freeware Lite and the chargeable Full versions.
Ethernet connectivity was available only in the Full version, in addition to serial
connectivity. At the time of writing, the latest version is 6.04.99 released in April,
2012, and runs on Windows XP, Vista, and 7. [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012d,f]
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Figure 18: A screenshot of a Rockwell DriveExplorer Full session with the main drive view
active.
Originally released in 1998, DriveExplorer has recently been discontinued and
replaced by Connected Components Workbench (CCW) released in September 2012.
In addition to PowerFlex drives, CCW works as programming and configuration
software with variety of devices from Rockwell Automation, including PLCs and
HMIs. The supported programming languages are common to any PLC environment
(defined in the standard IEC 61131-3): ladder logic, function block diagram, and
structured text. CCW is free software available in exchange for registration. Also
the latest DriveExplorer Full version (6.04.99) has been released as freeware as a
result of becoming obsolete, and can be installed using any serial number. [Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 2012d,e]
6.2.4 STARTER
STARTER (Figure 19) is a tool for commissioning, optimization, and diagnostics for
Siemens SINAMICS drives. It can be used as a standalone Windows application,
or integrated into the other Siemens software: SIMATIC STEP 7 and SCOUT.
[Siemens AG, 2011c, p. 14/5]
Advertised as user-friendly by Siemens, STARTER includes project wizards, con-
troller self-optimization, and diagnostics about control/status words and parame-
ters. Additional “SINAMICS Support Packages” are provided for different different
AC drive models and features. [Siemens AG, 2011c, 2012f]
At the time of writing, the latest version of STARTER is V4.3 SP1 HF2 released
on June 19, 2012. It can be used free of charge without a license key, but ownership
of a STARTER license certificate is required for “legal licensing reasons”. [Siemens
AG, 2012f]
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Figure 19: A screenshot of a Siemens (Drive ES) STARTER session with the control unit
configuration screen active.
6.3 Vulnerability Assessment Tools
This thesis includes vulnerability assessments of the AC drives. The tools used for
that are introduced in this subsection, starting with explanation of motivation for
the assessment.
One might question what does vulnerability assessment, traditionally associated
with IT equipment, have to do with an AC drive application. If there are vulner-
abilities in the firmware of an AC drive, such as a buffer overflow which allows an
attacker to perform arbitrary (unrestrained) actions remotely with the AC drive,
protection methods can be bypassed and safety functions disabled altogether. Then
it does not matter what kind of safety features are implemented. The Stuxnet case
has proved that if a safety system (e.g a speed limiter) is integrated into the control
system, security affects safety. (Stuxnet disabled the frequency (speed) limitation
functions of AC drives, as previously explained in Section 3.4 on page 19.)
6.3.1 VirtualBox
VirtualBox by Oracle Corporation [2012a] is x86 and AMD64/Intel64 virtualization
software suite for enterprise and home use. Despite being freely available and open
source software, VirtualBox has features and performance comparable to commercial
virtualization software.
Offered by Oracle Corporation [2012c] solely through www.virtualbox.org, Vir-
tualBox base package (platform) is licensed under the general public license (GPL),
but a separate Oracle VM VirtualBox Extension Pack, which offers USB 2.0 support
for example, is licensed under VirtualBox Personal Use and Evaluation License. It
allows personal, academic, and product evaluation use free of charge. According to
Oracle Corporation [2012b], it is considered personal use even if a person installs
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VirtualBox on his/hers work PC for himself/herself only. For multiple user enter-
prise deployments, Kawalek [2012] offers commercial VirtualBox Enterprise licenses
for $50 per named user, or $1,000 per processor socket.
At the time of writing, the latest version 4.2.4, released on October 26, 2012,
is available for Windows, Linux, Macintosh, and Oracle Solaris hosts. VirtualBox
supports most major operating systems and their versions as guests (virtualized).
In this thesis, VirtualBox is used to run BackTrack Linux, and also Windows 7 for
the PC tools of AC drives, on a Windows 7 host.
6.3.2 BackTrack Linux
BackTrack is a community-developed Linux distribution for penetration testing and
vulnerability assessment. Funded by Offensive Security Ltd., the project is coordi-
nated by Mr. Mati Aharoni (going by the alias “muts”), Offensive Security’s lead
trainer and developer, with developers mainly from Offensive Security and Tiger Se-
curity companies. [BackTrack Linux, 2011a, 2012b, Offensive Security Ltd., 2012c,
Tiger Security S.r.l., 2012]
At the time of writing, the latest version of BackTrack Linux is 5 R3 released on
August 13, 2012. It is available as 32-bit and 64-bit versions with KDE or GNOME
(Figure 20a) graphical desktop environments. BackTrack complies to the GPL by
Free Software Foundation. [BackTrack Linux, 2012a, Free Software Foundation,
Inc., 2007, Offensive Security Ltd., 2012a]
BackTrack is based on the popular Linux distro Ubuntu, which in turn is based
on Debian used by many high-profile organizations including Siemens, University
of Zu¨rich, State of Vermont, and Harvard University. [BackTrack Linux, 2011b,
Canonical Ltd., 2013, Software in the Public Interest, Inc., 2012b]
(a) (b)
Figure 20: Screenshots of a BackTrack Linux GNOME GUI session (a), showing the
desktop and the console interface (msfconsole) to Metasploit Framework (with the
multi cip command auxiliary module in use), and an Armitage session (b) with one AC
drive as target.
65
The next subsections focus on the tools included in the latest BackTrack release
(at the time of writing), used in this thesis. Traditionally, exploit tools have been
open source and free of charge, but in recent years commercial versions have been
developed, as computer security industry has become big business.
6.3.3 Metasploit
Metasploit is software for security assessments. It started as the Metasploit Project
in 2003, which resulted in the open source exploit development platform called
Metasploit Framework. In 2009, the Metasploit Project was acquired by the Rapid7
company. Nowadays, Metasploit is available in three editions: Community, Express,
and Pro. They are all based on the same open source MSF platform, but only the
Community Edition is free of charge. The Express and Pro editions are commercial,
offering more advanced interfaces and features for penetration testing. Price for
Metasploit Express is $5,000, while Pro is individually quoted through a contact
with Rapid7. At the time of writing, the latest version of all three Metasploit
editions is 4.5.1 released on January 16, 2013. [Andress and Winterfield, 2011,
Offensive Security Ltd., 2012b, Rapid7, 2012a,b, 2013]
Metasploit is composed of modules, categorized as exploits and payloads. Ex-
ploits use payloads, otherwise they are called auxiliary modules. Payloads are the
code to be run remotely. [Offensive Security Ltd., 2012b]
Meta-Interpreter (Meterpreter) is one of the many different types of payloads in-
cluded in Metasploit. Meterpreter uses a technique called “reflective DLL injection”
to load itself into a compromised process running in memory, without using any
disk operations or creating any new processes on the host, thus evading detection
by conventional methods. [Offensive Security Ltd., 2012b] Examples of typical pro-
cesses used for the injection are the Windows Service Host, svchost.exe, and the
Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, lsass.exe, which was used by Stuxnet
also for DLL injection [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 14].
6.3.4 Armitage
Armitage (Figure 20b) is a cross-platform, scriptable tool for Metasploit, with a
graphical user interface (GUI) that visualizes scanned network targets and recom-
mends exploits against them. It is developed by Raphael Mudge of Strategic Cyber
LLC [2013a].
At the time of writing, the latest version of Armitage was released on November
26, 2012, as open source under the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) 3-Clause
license [Strategic Cyber LLC, 2012]. There is also a commercial version called Cobalt
Strike available from Strategic Cyber LLC [2013b] for a yearly fee of $2,500 per user
after a trial period of 21 days. Designed to emulate APT attacks, Cobalt Strike
includes additional features for social engineering and covert command and control
(C&C).
Armitage includes an attack called “Hail Mary” for “automatic exploitation”. It
launches multiple exploits relevant to the target in optimal order. [Strategic Cyber
LLC, 2013a]
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6.3.5 Nmap—Network Mapper
Nmap (“Network mapper”) is a free, cross-platform, and open source tool for net-
work scanning and security auditing. It uses raw IP packets to determine character-
istics of large networks or single hosts. First released in 1997 by Gordon “Fyodor”
Lyon, Nmap has since become the “de facto standard” tool for network and device
scanning. Its latest version (at the time of writing) is 6.01, released in June 22,
2012. [Andress and Winterfield, 2011, Knapp, 2011, Lyon, 2011]
Nmap is able to determine hosts available on the network and their services
(ports), operating systems (OS fingerprinting), firewalls, and dozens of other things.
Essentially, Nmap is a command-line tool, but there is also a GUI called Zenmap
available. It is free, open source, and cross-platform, just like Nmap itself. [Lyon,
2011]
6.3.6 Wireshark
Wireshark is a cross-platform network protocol analyzer supporting hundreds of
protocols. It is capable for live capture as well as off-line analysis. [Wireshark
Foundation, 2008]
Originally released under GPL as Ethereal by Gerald Combs in 1998, the latest
version of Wireshark (at the time of writing) is 1.8.4 released on November 28, 2012,
under GNU’s Not Unix (GNU) GPL version 2 by a team of developers. Under Win-
dows, WinPcap packet capture library is required for live packet capture. [Riverbed
Technology, 2012, Sanders, 2007, Wireshark Foundation, 2008, 2012a,b]
6.3.7 The Hacker’s Choice-Hydra
THC-Hydra is a very fast on-line password cracker supporting multiple different
services, for example file transfer protocol (FTP), HTTP, and Telnet. It supports
multiple parallel threads and dictionary files (wordlists) for usernames (logins) and
passwords for efficient brute forcing. It is essentially a command line tool, but there is
also GNU Image Manipulation Program (GIMP) Toolkit (GTK) based GUI available
(HydraGTK ). Distributed as cross-platform open source, the latest version of THC-
Hydra (at the time of writing) is 7.4.1 released on December 24, 2012. [Andress and
Winterfield, 2011, The Hacker’s Choice, 2012a]
First released in August 2000, THC-Hydra is currently maintained by the alias
“van Hauser” of The Hacker’s Choice (THC), a “non-commercial security group”
founded in 1995, and David Maciejak. It is one of the most common password attack
tools. [Andress and Winterfield, 2011, The Hacker’s Choice, 2008, 2012a,b]
This concludes introduction of the materials used in this thesis. The actual
software versions used are listed in Appendix B. Next, the results are presented,
starting with the comparison of security related features of the AC drives.
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7 Comparison of Security Features of Different
AC Drives
The results of the comparison between the AC drives from different manufacturers
are presented in this section. They are based on empirical studies and also review
of the user manuals. In line with the goal of this thesis, the focus is on security and
safety features. Previously, the supporting methods were introduced in Section 5
and the materials in Section 6.
7.1 Commissioning
The AC drives are compared from the application design point-of-view, which basi-
cally means configuring the AC drive in such a way that the highest possible security
level for that specific device is achieved. The commissioning of an AC drive is of
utmost importance for the correct operation of the drive. Usually commissioning
includes usage of a PC tool to set the parameters correctly.
The drives from ABB and Rockwell had a “startup wizard” or similar function-
ality in their control panels for configuring basic parameters such as motor values.
That helped the initial commissioning a lot. Consequently, it was possible to run a
motor within minutes.
On the other hand, Siemens S110 had a simple control panel compared to the
other two drives (visible in Figure 16 on page 58). Probably due to this, it did not
offer similar “assistant” functionality. [Siemens AG, 2010]
7.2 Parameter Interfaces
Siemens SINAMICS S110 seems to have two parameter sets: one for the control
unit and one for the power module. At first, it was a bit confusing to configure
the drive because parameters had to be searched from two different places. Luckily,
the STARTER software had wizard-like functionality with dialogs asking values for
relevant parameters.
According to Siemens AG [2011b, p. 674], random access memory (RAM) is
used to hold modified parameter values until they are manually saved or the drive is
powered off. Contents of the RAM are lost without power. The changed parameters
can be saved with the “Copy RAM to ROM” function of the STARTER software,
or by enabling the parameter p0977 Save all parameters.
According to ABB Oy [2012c, p. 24]: “All parameter settings are stored auto-
matically to the permanent memory of the drive.” However, it is also possible to
manually “force a save” by using the parameter 96.07 Parameter save.
ACS880-01 has the parameter 96.02 Pass code, but it is described only as “Re-
served” in the firmware manual by ABB Oy [2012c, p. 264]. The allowed values are
from 0 to 99,999,999.
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7.2.1 Access Levels
Rockwell PowerFlex 755 has the parameter 301 Access Level with three possible
values: Basic, Advanced, and Expert. It defines the amount of parameters visible
to the user while browsing them with the PC tool.
Similarly to Rockwell, the Siemens AC drive has different access levels, which
are 0 User-defined, 1 Standard, 2 Extended, 3 Expert, and 4 Service. The highest
access level (Service) requires a separate password to be entered into the parameter
p3905 Service parameter (unsigned 16-bit integer [Siemens AG, 2012b, p. 436]).
The current access level is changed by the parameter p0003 BOP access level of
“the drive object Control Unit”. [Siemens AG, 2011b, p. 675]
7.2.2 Reset of Parameters to Factory Defaults
It is possible to restore the default values (“factory defaults”) for parameters with
all drives. With the Siemens drive, that can be accomplished by the parameter
p0970 Reset drive parameters, which can also be used to reset specifically the safety
parameters if the (Safety Integrated) password is set [Siemens AG, 2012b, p. 181].
Otherwise safety parameters are not reset. Similarly to the Siemens drive, ABB
ACS880-01 has the parameter 96.06 Parameter restore, but it does not reset safety
parameters.
Rockwell Automation, Inc. [2012j, p. 66–67] requires the PC tool or the control
panel for parameter reset. With the DriveExplorer software, the parameter reset is
initiated via: Actions—Non-Volatile Memory. . .—Load defaults. . . However, it did
not work for the safety module. (The attempt resulted in the mysterious message:
“An error occurred during NVS command.”) Also attempt to reset the safety pa-
rameters with the control panel was unsuccessful (due to “DPI Error: Object State
Conflict”). Parameter P7 Reset Defaults of the safety module must be used to reset
the safety parameters [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012a, p. 123]. Which was pos-
sible only after the safety configuration was unlocked and P6 Operating Mode set to
“Program”. (More about safety password reset later.)
7.3 Functional Safety
As defined in the relevant standards, functional safety was previously introduced in
Section 5.4.2. This subsection focuses on safety features and issues included in the
AC drives.
7.3.1 Speed Feedback
The feedback types supported by the AC drives compared in this thesis are presented
in Table 4. The drives from ABB and Rockwell did not have any encoder inputs
as built-in, unlike the Siemens drive. With the additional feedback option modules,
the AC drives from ABB and Rockwell support larger amount of different types of
encoders than the Siemens drive as standard.
69
Table 4: Feedback device types supported by the AC drives in their specified configuration,
with the specific feedback option modules: ABB FEN-11 Absolute Encoder Interface,
Rockwell 20-750-UFB-1 Universal Feedback Module, and Siemens without any additional
encoder options. (Although, Siemens offers “sensor modules” for cabinets supporting
Sin/Cos, EnDat, etc.) [ABB Oy, 2007, Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2011, 2012l, Siemens
AG, 2011a, 2012h]
Feedback type ABB Rockwell Siemens
Incremental TTL x x x
Incremental HTL - - x
Incremental Sin/Cos x x -
Absolute SSI x x x
Absolute Endat x x -
Absolute Hiperface x x -
Interestingly, the requirement for external speed feedback for safety functions
differs between the manufacturers compared. Rockwell Automation, Inc. [2012b,
p. 163] requires an encoder for any safety functions with the safe speed monitor
option module (20-750-S1). ABB Oy [2012a, p. 23–24] has totally different approach
with the FSO-11 safety functions module, which uses estimated speed for all safety
functions and does not use encoders at all. Siemens AG [2011b, p. 346], with its
safety integrated extended functions, is in the middle of those two extremes and
allows some safety functions to be used without an encoder, while others require it.
Furthermore, there were limitations to which kind of encoders could be used
with the safety functions, at least depending on the type of the speed feedback
option module selected. For example, the Universal Feedback Module for Rockwell
AB PowerFlex 755 supports two types of incremental encoders (signals): TTL and
Sin/Cos. But as it turned out, only the Sin/Cos type can be used with the safety
option (20-750-S1). This observation was confirmed by the Installation Instructions
manual. However, also the Dual Incremental Encoder module (20-750-DENC-1) can
be used with the Safe Speed Monitor option, suggesting it should be selected when
TTL signals are used for feedback with functional safety. [Rockwell Automation,
Inc., 2012b, p. 163]
Measuring the actual speed on the shaft with a tachometer seems like a bet-
ter solution than using estimated speed, which depends on some kind of software
algorithm. Of course, also tachometers have software inside them and they can
malfunction. Nevertheless, speed feedback (actual or estimated) is essential for the
safety functions described in the next subsection.
7.3.2 Safety Functions
Safety functions implemented in each AC drive are listed in Table 5. According to
comparison, it seems that not all of the safety functions advertised by manufactur-
ers are based on the relevant IEC 61800-5-2 standard. At least the names of some
functions can not be found from the standard, even though the actual functionality
70
Table 5: Safety functions with names matching the IEC 61800-5-2 standard implemented
in each AC drive: ABB ACS880-01, Rockwell AB PowerFlex 755, and Siemens SINAMICS
S110 [ABB Oy, 2012a, Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2011, 2012a, Siemens AG, 2011b]. The
names of the safety functions have been conformed according to International Electrotech-
nical Commission [2007, p. 16–18].
Safety Function ABB Rockwell Siemens
Safe torque off (STO) x x x
Safe stop 1 (SS1) x x x
Safe stop 2 (SS2) - x x
Safe operating stop (SOS) - - x
Safely-limited speed (SLS) x x x
Safe direction (SDI) - x x
Safe brake control (SBC) x - x
Safe speed monitor (SSM) - - x
might be similar. The names of the advertised safety functions without a match in
the standard were: safe stop emergency (SSE), safe maximum speed (SMS), safe
acceleration monitor (SAM), safe brake ramp (SBR), safe maximum acceleration,
and zero speed monitoring. [ABB Oy, 2012a, International Electrotechnical Com-
mission, 2007, Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2011, Siemens AG, 2011b]
Only the safety functions which can be found from the IEC 61800-5-2 standard
are listed in Table 5. Otherwise, comparing and interpreting them might be difficult.
Although, the standard includes safety functions (covered in Appendix A) which are
not implemented at all by the three manufacturers, and those have also been omitted
from Table 5.
None of the safety functions applicable for protecting the decanter centrifuge
previously listed in Section 5.4.2 are actually implemented in the AC drives. How-
ever, substituting safe speed range (SSR) with SLS results to at least the maximum
speed being limited, which is more important than limiting the minimum speed. All
of the AC drives supported SLS.
7.3.3 Safety Licenses
Two out of the three compared functional safety SLS implementations required an
additional hardware module to the drive. Exception was the Siemens S110 which
required only a license key.
The safety functions of the SINAMICS S110 drive listed in Table 5 are based
on the extended functions offered by Siemens, which require a license. (The basic
functions, which can be used without a license, are STO, SS1, and SBC [Siemens
AG, 2011b, p. 343].) For example, SLS is among the extended functions. Before it
can be used, a separate license key need to be supplied to the drive. The license key
can be first acquired from the Siemens website using the purchased safety license
number.
Consisting of a maximum of 20 characters, the license key can be supplied to
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the drive using the STARTER software. Apparently, the license key is stored on
the memory card, which also is a requirement for the extended safety functions.
However, according to Siemens AG [2011b, p. 345]: “The associated license key is
entered in parameter p9920 in ASCII code.” The parameter p9920 (Licensing, enter
license key) is an array of 100 bytes (octets), each representing one character in the
American standard code for information interchange (ASCII) [Siemens AG, 2012b,
p. 615]. After the license key is entered to the parameter, it remains visible there
and can be read from it at a later time.
Presented by Siemens AG [2011b, p. 706], an example license key is “E1MQ-
4BEA”. The SiemensWEB License Manager (http://www.siemens.com/automation/
license) is used to generate the license key using the following information: the
memory card serial number (“MMC Serial No”), the safety license number (“Li-
cense No”), and the delivery note (“Dispatch note No”). Thus, the safety license is
assigned to the memory card and can not be used elsewhere. [Siemens AG, 2011b,
p. 705]
7.3.4 Safely-Limited Speed Configuration
For protection of the decanter, based on its vulnerabilities (described in Section 4),
safely-limited speed (SLS) seems to be the most essential safety function of the
implementations by the AC drives (Table 5). The descriptions of operation of the
SLS safety function by different manufacturers indicate that all implementations
stop the drive in overspeed situation [ABB Oy, 2012a, Rockwell Automation, Inc.,
2012a, Siemens AG, 2011b]. However, stopping is not required by the IEC 61800-5-2
standard [International Electrotechnical Commission, 2007, p. 17]. An alternative
method to stopping would be to limit the speed with the speed controller of the AC
drive.
However, while testing the SLS implementation of ACS880-01 it was found out
that the drive actually limits the speed. Even though a speed reference higher than
the limit was supplied, the drive was running at the limited speed. If the speed
exceeded the limit for whatever reasons, the drive tripped (faulted). (The fault was
“7A8B FSO FAULTS GEN” according to Drive Composer.)
The safety parameters (group 200 Safety) of the ACS880-01 are visible in the
PC tool and the control panel, but cannot be modified. Only Drive Composer Pro
includes the (separate) functionality to set/modify safety configuration.
ACS880-01 has two different, configurable limits for SLS: the speed limit and the
trip limit. The speed limit is the value the actual speed will be limited to, despite
a speed reference of a higher value is given. The trip limit is the speed which will
stop the drive (“safely”). The limits will be enforced after a configurable delay from
the time of activation by a digital safety input signal. [ABB Oy, 2012d, p. 124–126]
Configuration of the Siemens safety integrated for the S110 AC drive required
adjusting settings titled Monitoring clock cycle and Actual value acquisition clock.
It was not a trivial task to set them to correct values, and required many attempts
to get them right. Otherwise the drive faulted.
Furthermore, the safety configuration of the S110 drive had to be “copied” be-
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tween the control unit and the power module. Like it was possible to configure them
both separately.
Grouping of safety parameters of PowerFlex 755 (displayed by DriveExplorer)
was very intuitive for commissioning. P21 Safety Mode was to be set to one of the
many “Lim Speed” options. Then, under the Limited Speed group, P52 Lim Speed
Input set the speed feedback input to be monitored after delay configurable with P53
LimSpd Mon Delay. (PowerFlex 755 requires external speed feedback as previously
discussed in Section 7.3.1.) The actual limit was configurable by P55 Safe Speed
Limit. There was no separate trip limit like in ACS880-01. [Rockwell Automation,
Inc., 2012a, p. 78]
7.3.5 Password Protection
As previously discussed in Section 5.4.5, the EN ISO 13849-1 standard requires that
safety-related parameters are protected from unauthorized modification. However,
it leaves a lot of room for interpretation for the actual implementation.
All drives support a safety password. However, the ABB ACS880-01 does not
require the password to be changed from the default value when safety functions are
configured, contrary to the Siemens S110 drive. Regarding this, ABB Oy [2012d,
p. 75] states the following: “If necessary, change the password to protect the set-
tings”.
For the FSO-11 safety option module by ABB Oy [2012d, p. 73], the default
password is 12345678. It can be changed to any number with 4–8 digits. So, the
password can consist of only numbers with maximum length of 8. The reason for such
a small maximum length limit remained unknown, because a parameter for the safety
password was not found in the drive parameter lists, nor mentioned in the manual.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to change the password from the default due to
ABB’s Drive Composer Pro crashing each time the “Change password” button was
pressed.
Rockwell has a whole subgroup of parameters under the title “Security” for
the Safe Speed Monitor option. It implies that they are taking safety seriously, by
dedicating security options for protection of safety configuration. However, Rockwell
does not require a safety password to be set. It is optional and up to the user to
decide whether he/she wants to “lock” the safety configuration.
The default safety password for the Siemens S110 is 0 (zero). The parameter for
the password has a data type of 32-bit unsigned integer (corresponding to possible
values from 0 to 4,294,967,295). However, STARTER did not allow passwords with
more than 8 numbers. [Siemens AG, 2011b, 2012b]
According to Siemens AG [2011b, p. 350]: “The Safety password is retained
on the memory card and in the STARTER project.” The password is required to
restore safety settings to the factory defaults. However, it is possible to download
a new project into the drive without any password after restoring all settings to
factory defaults and recommissioning the drive with a new drive data set (DDS).
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7.3.6 Safety Password Reset
All three manufacturers offer the user possibility to reset a forgotten password. For
this, Rockwell Automation, Inc. [2012a, p. 122] requires contact to their technical
support with “the Security Code value and the serial number of the safety option.”
The Security Code can be read from the parameter 18 (P18) of the safety module.
The 8-digit serial number is also available remotely with DriveExplorer and on the
web interface (if enabled). Then, Rockwell’s technical support provides a “Vendor
Password” (parameter 19) which initiates reset for the safety password. The data
type of the vendor password parameter is unsigned 16-bit integer (0–65,535).
ABB and Siemens allow reset of the safety password without contacting them.
A “factory reset” will clear the password for both drives. Factory settings can be
restored with a physical button on the FSO-11 safety module by ABB Oy [2012a,
p. 143] or remotely for the whole S110 drive by Siemens AG [2011b, p. 350].
A bit alarming from the security point of view is that Siemens expresses that
they are able to determine the safety password forgotten by the user. For this,
Siemens AG [2011b, p. 350] requires the “complete drive project” which refers to
the configuration created and downloaded to the drive with the STARTER tool for
example. (By default installation of the STARTER software on Windows 7, the
project files are located in the folder C:\Program Files\SIEMENS\Step7\s7proj
indicating they are similar with the Siemens SIMATIC STEP 7 software used to
program PLCs [Siemens AG, 2012d].)
Even more alarming is the fact that Siemens AG [2011b, p. 350] provides instruc-
tions how to change safety settings without knowing the password. The three-step
procedure starts with resetting the whole drive to factory defaults, after which it is
possible to recommission first the drive and finally the safety parameters.
7.4 PC Tools
Generally, the PC tools for the three AC drives tested allow total configuration
remotely. For Rockwell and Siemens, remotely means by Ethernet—For ABB, by
USB, even though Ethernet access should be available according to ABB Oy [2012b,
p. 14–16], possibly in the future. However, not one of the PC tools tested provided
user access control and authentication. Which makes sense if the features are not
supported by the network devices, the AC drives.
In the Siemens STARTER software, there is a functionality called Know-how
manager which allows a login (a username) and a password to be used with the
project. The minimum length for the password is five characters. According to
Siemens AG [2012c], know-how protection is used protect “intellectual property”
against “unauthorized use or reproduction”. When activated for a “drive unit”, the
parameters can not “be read or written”. Optional “copy protection” feature links
the project with the serial number of the memory card, preventing the project from
being used with other memory cards. Additionally, the know-how protection can be
made permanent (“absolute know-how protection”) so that it can not be removed.
It is also possible to allow certain parameters to be read-only while the rest are
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protected from reads and writes. Know-how protection requires “SINAMICS V4.5
or higher”.
The DriveExplorer software from Rockwell offers multiple “wizards” to ease drive
configuration. Unfortunately, all of them did not work. One of the working ones was
DPI/DSI Tech Support Wizard (revision 3.3.7) which gets all relevant parameter
values and version details from the AC drive into a single text file with ASCII
encoding.
7.4.1 Communication Protocols
According to a Wireshark capture, the Siemens STARTER software communicates
with the S110 AC drive using T.125 (Multipoint communication service by Inter-
national Telecommunication Union [1998]) and ISO-TSAP (defined in request for
comments (RFC) 1006 by Rose and Cass [1987]) [Langner Communications GmbH,
2011] protocols. According to Siemens AG [2011b, p. 593], the “S7 protocol” is used
with STARTER in on-line mode for acyclic parameter reads and writes.
Rockwell’s DriveExplorer communicated with the PowerFlex 755 drive using
EtherNet/IP objects. According to Rockwell Automation, Inc. [2012g, p. 123–124],
PowerFlex 750-Series AC drives have (limited) compatibility with the following Eth-
erNet/IP explicit messaging class codes for parameter reads/writes: “DPI Parameter
Object 0x93” and “Host DPI Parameter Object 0x9F”.
ABB’s Drive Composer Pro could not communicate over Ethernet, but used USB
instead. Thus, it was not possible to monitor the traffic and the used protocols with
Wireshark, which does not support USB capture under Windows OS [Wireshark
Wiki, 2011].
7.4.2 Communication Libraries
The Siemens software package included many separate programs in addition to the
actual STARTER tool, including Automation License Manager, and SIMATIC In-
dustrial Ethernet (ISO) and PROFINET IO RT-Protocol V2.0 network “drivers”
automatically attached to the Windows LAN connection. An alarming discovery was
the file s7otbxdx.dll under C:\Windows\System32 (on 32-bit Windows 7). That is
exactly the same filename which Stuxnet reportedly replaced to attack the Siemens
PLC (described in Section 3.1.4) [Falliere et al., 2011, p. 36]. Digging through the
properties of the file with Windows (file) Explorer, it described itself as “STEP 7
Block Administration” for “SIMATIC Device Operating System R©” by “SIEMENS
AG 2006-2011”. The date of last modification was November 4, 2011. It is signed by
“SIEMENS AG” with the MD5 “digest algorithm” and the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) “digest encryption algorithm” issued by VeriSign. However, the signature is
missing information about e-mail address and signing time, hence its validity period
could not be verified by Windows.
The PC tools from the other two manufacturers had similar files related to com-
munication between the PC and the AC drive: CComm.dll (“Generic Communica-
tion layer for DriveExplorer”) and EnetComm.dll from Rockwell, and PhloemComm.dll
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from ABB. Contrary to the Siemens DLL, the ABB file has signature with the sign-
ing time (May 31, 2012), thus Windows reports it as “OK”. The digital signature is
issued to “ABB Oy” by “VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA”. The files from
Rockwell were not signed at all.
7.5 Ethernet
This subsection concentrates on the security features specific to the Ethernet com-
munication bus. Ethernet was previously discussed in general in Section 5.2.
The AC drive models from Siemens and Rockwell have Ethernet-based fieldbus
built-in. ABB’s ACS880-01 has it only as an additional option module.
7.5.1 Internet Protocol Address Configuration
The ABB FENA-11 Ethernet fieldbus adapter (FBA) supports static and dynamic
IP address configurations. If the drive is previously configured to use a static IP
address, setting it to dynamically assigned through a dynamic host configuration
protocol (DHCP) server clears the static IP address. This makes it hard to figure
the once assigned IP address for the drive, in case the configuration is changed from
static to dynamic by accident or maliciously.
To complicate things even further, the parameters responsible for the IP address
are named generically as “FBA Par4”, “FBA Par5”, etc. Unless the user has mem-
orized the meaning of the parameters, the user’s manual for the FENA adapter is
required to configure the drive properly.
An IP address for the SINAMICS S110 drive is assigned by Primary Setup Tool
by Siemens AG [2012g] available directly on their website free of charge. Without
it, the drive was not available to be connected by the STARTER software through
Ethernet (PROFINET) for further configuration.
PowerFlex 755 supports three sources for the IP address configuration (parameter
37 Net Addr Src): Physical switches, parameters (38–41 IP Addr Cfg 1–4 ), and the
bootstrap protocol (BOOTP). It was possible to “hide” the Rockwell PowerFlex 755
AC drive from the network by configuring the IP address to 0.0.0.0 and rebooting
the drive. To restore Ethernet communications, it was required to use direct serial
connection (through the USB-DPI adapter) or the control panel (locally) to revert
the IP address to a valid one. Both ways require physical access (unless the USB-DPI
adapter (or similar) is used over a remote connection).
7.5.2 Web Interfaces
ABB and Rockwell have web interfaces, i.e. port 80 for hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP), open by default, but Siemens did not. The front web pages are presented
in Figure 21. No authentication was required to access the web interfaces.
For Rockwell PowerFlex 755, the web interface can be enabled with the parame-
ter 52Web Enable of EtherNet/IP Embedded and by rebooting the drive. However,
even though it was not enabled (the default mode), the drive responded to a basic
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(a) (b)
Figure 21: Front pages of the web interfaces for the ABB ACS880-01 (a) and Rockwell
AB PowerFlex 755 (b) AC drives.
HTTP request (GET method) with the 404 (Not Found) error message. Evidently,
there must be a HTTP daemon (a server) running, although totally unnecessarily.
Through the web interface of PowerFlex 755, it is possible to modify safety
configuration, although it requires the safety password if one is set (which is optional
for the Rockwell drive as previously described in Section 7.3.5). ACS880-01 allows
configuration modifications only to the Ethernet-based fieldbus settings through the
web interface.
For ABB ACS880-01, it was not possible to disable the web interface separately.
However, it was possible to disable the fieldbus adapter (by the parameter 50.01
FBA enable), which prevents all Ethernet communications.
7.5.3 Parameter Writes and Memory Wear
A warning about potential “equipment damage” related to parameter writes is given
by Rockwell Automation, Inc. [2012g, p. 123]: Frequent “Explicit Messages” with
parameter writes to “Non-Volatile Storage (NVS)” will cause the NVS to “quickly
exceed its life cycle and cause the drive to malfunction.” The warning is repeated
on many occurrences throughout the user manual for the embedded EtherNet/IP
adapter. A mechanism called Datalink, which writes to volatile memory, should
be used for frequent parameter value changes [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012g,
p. 109–110].
It is also explicitly expressed that the NVS is electronically erasable programmable
read-only memory (EEPROM) [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012g, p. 132]. In prac-
tice, it is most likely cheaper Flash memory.
However, a similar kind of warning about premature failure of memory is not
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presented in the user’s manual for the FENA Ethernet adapter by ABB Oy [2011b,
p. 141, 215], even though it supports explicit messaging through EtherNet/IP. It is
noted though, that updates to parameters specific to the fieldbus configuration are
taken into effect only after a certain refresh procedure is made.
According to Siemens AG [2011b, p. 596], parameter writes using the PROFIdrive
profile and PROFIBUS (DPV1) requests are done to RAM. The changes can be
saved to non-volatile memory using the parameter p0977. Notes or warnings about
premature memory wear are not given in the manual.
7.5.4 Vulnerability to Common Exploits
The Hail Mary attack of Armitage was executed on each of the three AC drives.
Despite trying 21 exploits on Siemens and 124 exploits on ABB and Rockwell, the
attacks did not succeed. The result was “No active sessions” with all three attempts.
In addition, exploit against the common industrial protocol of EtherNet/IP (de-
scribed in Section 5.3.3) was unsuccessful against the AC drives using the proto-
col: ACS880-01 and PowerFlex 755. All attacks offered by the Metasploit module
multi cip command did not affect the drives in any noticeable way. Especially com-
munication was not disconnected. That is particularly interesting for PowerFlex 755
by Rockwell, which was the vendor affected in the original disclosure.
The Siemens S110 drive has FTP and Telnet ports (23 and 22, respectively)
open. Both of them required a correct username and a password. Brief attempt
with THC-Hydra (introduced in Section 6.3.7) and some wordlists found from the
Internet was not successful for gaining access to those services.
7.6 Firmware Updates
Siemens did not offer firmware updates for the SINAMICS S110 directly through In-
ternet. Instead, they are offering multimedia cards (MMCs) including the firmware
[Siemens AG, 2013]. This efficiently prevents contents and protection of the firmware
to be analyzed, at least by random hackers, unless social engineering attack against
wetware (Siemens support personnel) is conducted successfully to achieve the firmware.
Firmware images, which are freely available on-line for download, can be analyzed
and detailed information gained with relatively ease, as has been demonstrated by
Gervais [2012, p. 61–62] among others.
While the S110 firmware image was not freely available for download, once ac-
quired it was extremely easy to load it to the drive using the MMC. First, the
previous contents on the MMC were erased, then the files from the compressed
firmware image package were copied to the root folder of the MMC. Siemens S110
drive automatically starts update process if it detects that there is a new firmware
on the MMC. However, this offers possibility for a malware to replace the contents
of a MMC connected to an infected computer to propagate to and infect the AC
drive also.
Rockwell offers firmware updates for their AB PowerFlex drives freely for down-
load without registration [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012c]. According to Rock-
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well Automation, Inc. [2012i, p. 4], firmware “flashing” can be performed using the
1203-USB converter or the 1203-SSS smart self-powered serial converter. However,
the PowerFlex 755 Drive Embedded EtherNet/IP Adapter user manual states that
the adapter firmware, contained in the drive firmware, can be updated also “over
the network” [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012g, p. 42]. Indeed, DriveExplorer was
successfully used to update the firmware using the function “Flash Upgrade” over
the Ethernet. Alas, without any authentication, so anyone in the same network as
the PowerFlex 755 drive can change how the drive functions by reprogramming the
firmware.
ABB’s approach to ACS880-01 firmware updates is similar to Siemens in the
sense that they are offering memory units instead of loading packages to customers
[ABB Ltd, 2010]. However, ABB’s memory units are not compatible with conven-
tional PC memory card readers, making firmware reverse engineering a bit harder.
7.7 Miscellaneous Features
This subsection presents miscellaneous features related to security discovered during
the comparison of the AC drives, but not discussed in the earlier subsections.
7.7.1 Factory Seal
Even though security in the supply chain for AC drives is not in the scope of this
thesis (as expressed in Section 1), it was noted that Rockwell supplied their compo-
nents in packages with stickers saying “FACTORY SEAL” on them. Also Siemens
had placed a sticker stating “ORIGINAL PACKING” to a strategical location on
the package for the control unit.
These kinds of “factory seals” provide some sort of “proof” that devices have
not been tampered in the supply chain after departing the manufacturer. Of course,
basic stickers, which do not have features such as holograms, can be easily counter-
feited and replaced.
7.7.2 Critical Speeds
Critical speeds, meaning rotating frequencies resulting to resonance of decanter cen-
trifuges, were previously discussed in Section 4.2.4. AC drives have built-in features
to combat them.
ACS880-01 has a function called critical speeds (or frequencies) for avoiding
specific motor speed ranges due to mechanical resonance problems. It works for
both rpm and Hz type speed references. Three speed ranges can be set up through
the parameters (with values limited to ±30,000 rpm), causing the drive to “jump
over” them. [ABB Oy, 2012c, p. 36–37, 153]
S110 has a similar function called suppression bandwidths which can be used to
avoid resonance frequencies. A total of four “skip” speeds can be set (each between 0
and 210,000 rpm) where steady-state operation is not allowed. [Siemens AG, 2011b,
p. 291–292]
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PowerFlex 755 did not have a corresponding function. However, similarly to the
other two drives, it also had limits for maximum and minimum speeds, acceleration,
and deceleration. [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012j]
7.7.3 Write Masks
The Rockwell PowerFlex 755 AC drive has masks, which can be used to prevent
“commands” reaching the drive. In the “parameter tree” displayed by the DriveEx-
plorer software, the masks can be found under PowerFlex 755—Communication—
Security. Parameter 888 Write Mask Cfg is used to disable parameter write access
for “DPI ports”. Those ports are used for different “devices” inside or connected
to the PowerFlex 755 drive, including the control panel (HIM), EtherNet/IP Em-
bedded, and Safe Speed Monitor. [Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2012j, p. 59–61]
Consequently, the write mask can be used to disable parameter modifications from
the fieldbus while allowing parameter reads for remote monitoring purposes.
Bit 13 of P888 was unset to disable writes from Embedded EtherNet/IP, and
the drive was powered off and back on to make the change effective. Connected
through Ethernet network, DriveExplorer could read parameters but not modify
their values. Evidently, the PC tool detects the write mask because the views for
individual parameters were different than without the protection enabled. (They
were missing the “OK” and “Apply” buttons.)
The control panel could be used to set the bit 13 back, restoring write access to
fieldbus after power cycling the drive. DriveExplorer required also reconnection.
This concludes the description of the comparison and the observations made
during it. In the next section, overall results of the thesis are presented, starting
with summary of the results of this comparison.
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8 Results
In this section, the results of the thesis are presented to the reader. Also the research
questions introduced in Section 1 are answered.
8.1 AC Drive Security Related Feature Comparison Sum-
mary
Comparison of different AC drives was described in the previous section. A summary
of the comparison of the security features of the AC drives is presented in Table 6.
It must be noted that these devices are not intended for public networks, and
never have been. It’s been up to the upper controllers (e.g. PLCs) to handle network
security. The traditional job of an IED, such as an AC drive, is to respond to the
master’s requests as fast as possible, without questioning the authenticity of the
request.
Table 6: Overall summary of the comparison of security related features of the three AC
drives: ABB ACS880-01, Rockwell AB PowerFlex (PF) 755, and Siemens SINAMICS
S110. All port numbers are for TCP unless stated otherwise.
Security feature ABB ACS880-01 Rockwell PF 755 Siemens S110
Safety password (PW)
strength
8-digit integer 32-bit unsigned
integer
8-digit integer
Default safety PW 12345678 - (no password) 0
Safety password reset
by . . .
Physical button Vendor pass-
word
PC tool or pa-
rameter p0970
Web server enabled by
default (port 80 open)
Yes Yes - (no web inter-
face at all)
Other open ports 44818 Ether-
Net/IP
44818 Ether-
Net/IP
21 FTP, 23 Telnet,
102 ISO-TSAP,
161/UDP SNMP,
3841, 3843
PC tool over Ethernet No Yes Yes
Protocols used by the
PC tool
Unknown (USB) 44818 Ether-
Net/IP
102 ISO-
TSAP/T.125
Communication
libraries signed
Yes No Yes, but signa-
ture invalid
Distribution of
firmware updates
Customer ser-
vice
Freely down-
loadable
Customer ser-
vice
Firmware update pro-
cess by a . . .
Memory unit
(ZMU)
PC tool Memory card
(MMC)
Parameter writes au-
tomatically saved
Unknown Yes/no, depends
on the method
No
Other features Critical speeds Write masks Know-how pro-
tection
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8.2 Recommendations for Securing the Decanter Applica-
tion
This subsection presents recommendations for securing the decanter centrifuge, con-
nected to an industrial Ethernet network, against cyber sabotage by an advanced,
Stuxnet-like threat. Essentially, the recommendations can be seen as mitigation
strategies for vulnerabilities of AC drives. However, many security defects are related
to the fieldbus architecture, and the recommendations are not specific to certain AC
drives, but apply to similar automation installations in general.
Assuming a PLC is included with the decanter, it can not function as an adequate
“firewall”. Therefore, the following recommendations are applicable as compensat-
ing measures for the inherently poor security status of ICS, based on the current
situation.
8.2.1 Protecting Decanter Centrifuge Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities related to decanter centrifuges were previously discussed in Section 4.
AC drives offer many functions to protect the equipment so that it can operate
safely. The most obvious vulnerability related to critical speeds can be protected by
methods discussed later in Section 8.3. This subsection concentrates on the other
vulnerabilities.
The back drive should be configured with strict torque limits to prevent the
delicate gearbox wearing out too quickly. The main drive should monitor the tem-
perature of the main motor to inhibit start if the motor is not cool enough, and also
stop the motor if it gets too hot during acceleration of the bowl.
Maximum current limitation and stall protection are also important for each
motor. Acceleration and deceleration times should be set for the main drive so that
the belts will not slip.
8.2.2 Air-gap
Stuxnet was able to cross air-gaps on portable media, demonstrating that cyberwar
does not require Internet for a successful attack. However, disconnecting from the
Internet greatly complicates the effort needed by an attacker.
The decanter centrifuge should not be directly accessible on the Internet (with
a public IP address). If remote monitoring through public Internet is needed, at
minimum, it should be routed through an encrypted virtual private network (VPN)
connection to a server/router at the decanter site.
Even if an AC drive supported IPv6, it should have a private IP address only.
This is important especially in the future.
8.2.3 Indications
Stuxnet supplied false data to monitors. Consequently, the operators were not aware
that the gas centrifuges were not running correctly, as previously described Section 3.
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Therefore, if an AC drive is limiting the speed for whatever reasons, indication
about that might not reach the control room, the appropriate systems or persons.
With this in mind, the value for the speed limit should be set so that the decanter
centrifuge can withstand it without being damaged for extended periods of time.
Change in speed affects quality of materials (the cake and the centrate) output
by a decanter centrifuge. Ultimately, production quality control can reveal a com-
promised control system. Extreme form of this is production halt, for example in
case of totally isolated SIS which automatically shutdowns the decanter centrifuge
in overspeed situation.
As previously discussed in Section 5.2.3, network/fieldbus traffic should be mon-
itored with an application monitor or an industrial protocol monitor. For example,
an attempt to disable maximum speed limits of an AC drive by writing to relevant
parameters through fieldbus (similarly to Stuxnet discussed in Section 3.4.1) can be
detected this way.
8.2.4 The Human Factor
Decanter plant operators and other technical staff with access to confidential in-
formation such as passwords should be trained against social engineering attacks
(introduced in Section 2.2.2). Also, the staff should be trained to use strong per-
sonal passwords efficiently, for example by using certain patterns. There are free and
commercial solutions (applications) for efficient personal password management.
It is also important to protect a session from trespassers, by locking the console
when “away from keyboard” (e.g. on a break). Otherwise, someone could act with
the operator’s credentials, making tracing more difficult or impossible depending
on physical security measures such as surveillance cameras. There are applications
which utilize basic “web cameras” (webcams) for facial recognition and motion de-
tection, automatically locking the workstation while the user is away.
8.2.5 Application Whitelisting
Previous incidents have proven that digital certificates can not be trusted because
they can be stolen or the issuing authorities can be compromised (as previously de-
scribed in Section 2.2.4). Thus, even digitally signed programs should be prevented
from being executed unless specifically allowed.
Application whitelisting introduced in Section 5.2.3 is well suited for ICS and
SCADA environments. It should be used, preferably, on all devices within the net-
work, but most importantly, on computers used to communicate with the decanter
centrifuge.
During the making of this thesis, the PC tools for the AC drives were run inside
a Windows 7 virtual machine (VM). Software and related USB devices from all
three manufacturers worked well under VirtualBox. Even though in this case also
the VirtualBox host was Windows 7, it should not make a difference if the host is
Linux, for example. This means that the computer used to configure the decanter
centrifuge can have Linux as main OS for security purposes, and the software for
AC drives and other devices can be run inside VirtualBox VMs.
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However, depending on the technical solution, an AWL product might be inef-
fective against malware which “injects” itself into the memory used by legitimate
programs. Stuxnet did it and also the Meterpreter shell of Metasploit does it.
Therefore, it is imperative that the AWL solution is comprehensive and not limited
to filenames for example (like the “Run only allowed Windows applications” policy
by Microsoft [2013b]).
Nevertheless, the “whitelisted” (allowed) applications might be exploitable. There
are free tools available to strengthen the execution environment security for a single
application, for example the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit by Microsoft
[2013a].
8.3 Overspeed Protection
Analysis of the Stuxnet case (Section 3) revealed that overspeed protection is cru-
cial for protecting centrifuges against cyber sabotage. Different ways to implement
overspeed protection with decanter centrifuges are discussed next.
8.3.1 Speed Limit Parameters of AC Drives
Firstly, all AC drives have some sort of speed limits, which are configurable through
their parameter interfaces. The problem with those in fieldbus environments is
that the parameter interface is open to modifications without authentication (user-
names, passwords, logging, etc.). Some drives incorporate parameter write masks
(previously detailed in Section 7.7.3) which can be used to prevent parameter modi-
fications from the fieldbus, thus offering protection for the speed limits from remote
tampering.
However, parameter write masks do not protect in case the actual speed of
rotation of the centrifuge somehow exceeds the safe operating range for whatever
reason (for example due to misconfiguration, software malfunction, sensor defect,
etc.). Functional safety provides additional protection, regardless of the root cause
for the overspeed situation.
Furthermore, a safety system for centrifuge overspeed protection is mandatory
with AC drives according to European standards (as previously described in Sec-
tion 5.4.4). The SLS safety function fulfills the requirement.
8.3.2 Functional Safety and Safely-Limited Speed
The standardized safely-limited speed safety function is well-suited for preventing
the decanter centrifuge from running too fast to be safe. An AC drive equipped
with the SLS functionality limits the speed according to the safety configuration
despite a higher speed is requested (through the speed reference from the fieldbus,
for example). And if the speed exceeds the safety limit for whatever reasons, the
drive engages a safe stop procedure which transitions the decanter centrifuge to a
torque free state, ultimately coasting to standstill.
Usually, decanters operate at speeds which do not prohibit the use of speed
feedback devices. Therefore, whether or not the AC drive requires feedback for the
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SLS safety function is not relevant. However, it could be argued that measuring the
actual speed of rotation directly from the shaft is better than calculating (estimating)
it with some algorithms. On the other hand, an encoder is one additional component
which can break. However, AC drives have monitoring and protection features also
for encoder fault situations.
Functional safety is configured with the AC drive commissioning tools and pro-
tected with a password. Therefore, it is not a totally independent and isolated safety
system. Also, the safety passwords are generally weak due to limitations placed by
AC drives themselves (as presented in Section 7.3.5). For better protection against
remote tampering, traditional, completely isolated safety instrumented systems offer
safety without monitoring possibilities for SCADA applications for example.
8.3.3 Completely Isolated Safety Instrumented System
A SIS for decanter overspeed protection should be able to monitor the speed of
rotation and stop the machinery if safe operating range is exceeded. With induction
motors and basic scalar control for example, the speed can be calculated from the
frequency supplied to the motor. There are electrical devices available for that
purpose. Furthermore, in case the frequency exceeds some specified value, the main
contactor of the decanter should be opened (de-energized), shutting down the AC
drives and stopping the centrifuge. The control units can be powered by a separate
+24 V supply so that they can still communicate with rest of the plant, and indicate
that the decanter centrifuge has been shutdown.
Being totally isolated in principle, the safety system could not indicate the rea-
son for the shutdown through fieldbus. However, some digital outputs could be
connected to the basic I/O inputs of AC drives or a PLC, which could forward the
status to monitors.
8.3.4 Cybersecurity Checklist for AC Drives in Decanters
A checklist for achieving AC drive configuration with maximum security using SLS
is presented in Appendix C (on page 118). It can also serve as a template for
vendor-specific guidelines.
The checklist consists of multiple steps designed to be followed in the order from
top to bottom. By all means, the individual steps are not trivial. Each step on the
checklist is practically a mini-project in itself, with multiple internal steps.
Unfortunately, the detailed contents and actions related to each step on the
checklist can not be presented in the context of this thesis, because of the extent of
the related issues. Further information can be found, for example, from the source
materials of this thesis (the listing of references starting from page 93).
Not specific to any real AC drive product on the market, the checklist gives
guidelines for an imagined, generalized industrial AC drive. Some of the features
may or may not be available in the AC drive actually being commissioned and
configured. Thus, it is a good idea for real implementations to modify the checklist
according to the specific components (AC drives, motors, option modules, etc.) used.
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The checklist can also serve as an addendum for a larger security program cov-
ering a wider range of equipment, possibly the control system of a whole industrial
plant. Recommendations and templates for ICS security programs have previously
been presented for example by ABB [2010b], Stouffer et al. [2011], Huhtinen [2011],
and European Network and Information Security Agency [2011].
8.4 Recommendations for Improvement of Security of AC
Drives
This subsection describes how security of AC drives could be improved by product
development and engineering. Therefore, the discussion in this subsection is aimed
towards manufacturers, not customers of AC drives. During the making of this
thesis, it became evident that AC drives have a lot of potential for improving their
security features. Therefore, these recommendations are for better future. Some of
them are the same as previously described for field devices in general in Section 5.3.2.
8.4.1 Ethernet Vulnerabilities of AC Drives
The drives were not vulnerable to some common exploits as previously described in
Section 7.5.4. However, there were several issues which can be seen as vulnerabilities.
The web servers in the AC drives which had them could not be disabled. Thus,
the TCP port 80 was constantly open even though it was not used. An attacker
might find a way to exploit the web server to gain unlimited access to the drive. On
the other hand, it was possible to modify only a handful of parameters by default
through the web interface.
More serious consequences can result from the unlimited, anonymous access to all
parameters through the Ethernet in the AC drives which supported it. A person with
the software for the drive can generally change everything. The software might use
some internal, secret passwords to prevent third party applications using the same
communication protocols, but it can be regarded as a very weak protection as the
official programs are easily available. It is also possible to analyze the communication
protocols for any “secret” codes.
The issues presented above are probably the result of conscious choices made
by the manufacturers. As such, they are not flaws in implementation or design,
but in specification instead. However, specifications are usually based on customer
demands, so in the end customers decide which issues need to change. The author’s
personal opinion is presented next.
8.4.2 Safety Password Complexity
Safety passwords should be as complex as possible (maximum entropy). If the safety
password is supplied through a parameter, the data type should allow characters in
addition to numbers.
This can be accomplished with the solution Siemens is using for supplying a
safety license key to the drive: a parameter array with 100 bytes (8 bits in each
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cell), allowing 255 different values for each byte, so the full extended ASCII set
can be used for the key, or the string. Extended ASCII includes all alphabets,
numbers, accent characters (e.g. a˚, a¨, and o¨), and special characters such as !, /,
#, etc. A password with that complexity and a maximum length of 100 characters
can be considered very strong, at least if password policy for the minimum length
is adequate. This makes brute force attacks practically futile.
Recommendation: Implement an alphanumeric safety password policy with min-
imum length of 8.
8.4.3 Parameter Modification Protection
It should be possible to protect parameters from modification (writes) and perhaps
from reads also, at least in some case with some particular parameters which can
reveal sensitive information such as version numbers, which could be exploited in an
attack. This could be implemented by making just one parameter always writable:
some kind of a password parameter, which could be used to disable the write pro-
tection of other parameters temporarily. The parameter for the write protection
password should be equally strong as the safety password described in the previous
subsection. It should be encrypted during transmission due to potential “sniffing”.
With advanced AC drives capable of running custom user applications (for ex-
ample by ABB Ltd [2012]), extending a similar kind of modification protection for
application programming should be considered. Example could be taken from some
PLCs with a physical switch for preventing modifications to the PLC program while
allowing certain variables to be used. Also some memory cards have a switch to
protect the contents from modification. [ICS-CERT, 2012a] However, it is evident
that requiring physical access and presence for each update is not feasible in all
industrial facilities.
Recommendation: Implement protection against unauthorized parameter modi-
fications (at least from the fieldbus).
8.4.4 Access Control for Tools
All AC drives offer some kinds of service interfaces which are utilized by PC tools
used for commissioning and configuring the drives. Being normal Windows applica-
tions, there is no reason why they could not have a login/password prompts before
allowing total access to an AC drive. Other protocols such as Telnet and FTP offer
this kind of minimum access control method.
Recommendation: Implement login/password access control to the PC tool in-
terface.
8.4.5 Configuration of Network Services
AC drives should offer the customer and end-users possibility to disable network
services such as HTTP servers. Every running network service can be a security
risk. They are not required in all applications.
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According to reduction strategies presented by Langner [2011a, p. 48], everything
that is not needed should be removed or disabled. The less complexity the better.
Recommendation: Make all network services configurable so that they can be
disabled by the user.
8.4.6 Access Control for Web Services
Web (HTTP) services are the most accessible of network services, because prac-
tically all computers (and nowadays also phones) have a web browser. It is very
inconvenient if just some random “web surfer” can change configuration settings of
an AC drive connected to the same network. For this reason, even devices such
as webcams and WLAN access points intended for home networks and private use
have login/password protection in their web interfaces. There is no reason why an
industrial device would not have the same minimum protection.
For example, most modern network devices have a requirement for both the
username and the password. But even just the password is better than nothing.
Recommendation: Implement login/password access control for the web service.
8.4.7 Firmware Updates
It needs to be seriously considered, how to organize distribution of firmware updates
through the Internet. At stake, there is the knowledge of the internal structure of
the firmware, on the other hand user support.
If the firmware updates are to be distributed freely over the Internet, very strong
encryption algorithms should be used to prevent reverse-engineering. However, the
resulting need for decryption performance at the AC drive end might be too much
for the relatively low-performance processors used in AC drives.
From the security point of view, a better strategy for firmware update distri-
bution is through customer service or something similar, so that the recipients can
be tracked and the packages be restricted only to certain hardware, using serial
numbers for example.
Also, the way in which the firmware update can be performed should be secure.
For example, leaving the AC drive open to any remote firmware uploads without
authentication is dangerous. (According to Langner [2011a, p. 129], the related
vulnerability was dubbed Boreas by DHS in 2007.)
Recommendation: Restrict firmware updates to only certain reliably identifiable
and traceable transmissions from authorized users/stations.
8.4.8 Logging of Security Related Events
Current AC drives collect logs for faults and other events generated during operation.
Security related information, such as failed password attempts, could be included in
the logs also. Logging is important part of detecting cyber attacks.
Recommendation: Include security related events in the logs.
88
8.5 Conclusion
It is possible to protect decanter centrifuges against cyber sabotage using special
features of AC drives. However, being remotely accessible devices, AC drives can
never offer the same level of security as compared to totally isolated safety sys-
tems. For ultimate protection of critical applications, isolated, single-function SIS
for overspeed protection should be implemented.
However, multiple layers of defense need to be penetrated by the attacker/malware
before reaching the AC drive, including possible physical security measures, network
security such as firewalls, possibly compromising a PLC or other “master” control
device, and finally modifying the fieldbus traffic to alter operation of the AC drive.
Consequently, protection against cyber sabotage is never solely up to the AC drive.
8.5.1 Significance of the Results
The meaning of these results is that a decanter centrifuge can operate in critical
facilities and applications, such as uranium ore dewatering, without a significant
concern for it being physically damaged by a cyber threat. Thus, the risk level
related to cybersecurity is reduced.
However, it does not mean that networked decanters can be left totally without
attention from cybersecurity point of view. As discussed earlier, there is always need
and even demand to constantly monitor the network for unauthorized actions and
potential malware.
8.5.2 Reliability of the Results
The results of this thesis are mainly based on publicly available literature and em-
pirical studies made with three different AC drives. IT security is well-established
discipline evolved over the period of the last couple of decades. However, it is con-
stantly evolving. ICS security has been under scrutiny for a relatively short period
of time. Furthermore, methods combining safety with security seem to be only
emerging.
The security and safety guidelines presented as the results of this thesis are based
on current theories and principles. The main source literature regarding security is
post-Stuxnet, meaning it has been published after the year 2010. All other literature
is also mainly from the 21st century.
However, the Decanter Centrifuge Handbook is over 10 years old. Technology
has advanced since then, especially related to remote control and monitoring (PLCs,
fieldbuses, etc.). And has probably become more widespread. Therefore, the solu-
tions used today might be different from the ones described in the book.
There are tens of different manufacturers of AC drives, each offering many dif-
ferent models. The selection of the three AC drives for comparison in this thesis
was highly subjective, and the range of candidates was narrow. On the AC drive
market, there may very well be models with a whole lot more security and safety
related features as in the three products compared in this thesis. Therefore, the
results of this study do not represent offerings of the whole AC drive market.
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Furthermore, findings during the empirical studies with the AC drives are only
applicable with the exact system specifications detailed in Appendix B. Important to
this are the option modules, hardware revisions, and firmware and software versions.
Due to constant product engineering, exactly the same configurations of the AC
drives may not be available from the manufacturers anymore.
Due to existence of newer software versions available regarding some of the tools,
it is possible that some of the older versions of the software used in this thesis
had bugs, i.e. programming flaws, which might even be so significant that they
could have an effect on the results. For example, some tools for remote exploits
(such as Metasploit modules) could only work properly with the latest versions.
Also, there are newer firmware versions available for the AC drives studied in this
thesis. However, older versions are usually more susceptible to exploits than updated
versions, so in that sense the AC drives used express a worser case for cybersecurity.
The test setup used with the AC drives did not correspond to normal use case,
because the usual upper control systems such as PLCs were not used. Furthermore,
fieldbus communication was not set up according to normal standards with cyclic
communication between the IED and the PLC. Therefore, all related aspects were
not covered.
8.5.3 Further Studies
This thesis focused on one industrial AC drive application: the decanter centrifuge.
The results can be applied at least to other centrifuges controlled by AC drives.
However, there are many other applications also. Further studies with other AC
drive applications could point out similarities in respect to the decanter and/or
centrifuge vulnerabilities, but also differences requiring other kinds of protection
methods.
One important and widely used AC drive application is used in sewerage systems:
the sewage pump. There has been at least one publicly known attack against those
pumps (the Maroochy Shire case presented in Section 2.2.3). Advanced AC drives
offer features such as process variable (proportional–integrative–derivative, PID)
control, which could be utilized to monitor and protect against sewage overflow.
Naturally, in respect to any business, customer demands are an important issue.
Unfortunately, no actual customers for AC drive manufacturers were interviewed for
this thesis. It would be very beneficial for both parties (customers and suppliers) to
study customer opinions, views, and wishes regarding security features of AC drives.
Furthermore, it could be even more important to focus on the customers for
decanter centrifuges. After all, they are the end-users connecting decanters to a
network of a plant. Nevertheless, many parties are involved in industrial automation
including vendors, operators, and contractors, who all should be taken into account
for a comprehensive approach.
Standards related to security of industrial control systems were not thoroughly
analyzed in this thesis. However, they can be very important in the future, espe-
cially if they are to be enforced similarly to NERC CIP (discussed in Section 5.2.4).
Therefore, it is recommended to further study the requirements and recommenda-
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tions of different standards and similar articles in respect to AC drives and decanter
centrifuges.
The vulnerability assessment of AC drives in this thesis was barely a scratch of
the surface. Therefore, more extensive vulnerability assessments and evaluations of
AC drives, similar to those done to PLCs by security experts recently (e.g. by Beres-
ford [2011]), could bring important issues to daylight. Instead of assessing multiple
AC drives for comparison at once, like was done in this thesis, more extensive results
could be achieved by focusing on a single AC drive at a time. Better results can
also be achieved with commercial tools for vulnerability assessments, which were
not used in this thesis.
Then, there is also the issue affecting the whole network industry: IPv6. None of
the AC drives studied in this thesis supported IPv6 (128-bit) addressing. Following
the evolution of other network devices, it is possible (and even probable) that IPv6
implementations will be seen in AC drives, sooner or later. However, despite IPv6
bringing security features, it also bears many risks such as the potentially increased
Internet exposure with direct, public IP addressing, and problems with IPv6 network
stacks as seen with other systems (even in the security-focused OS called OpenBSD
[Hartmeier, 2007]). Therefore, it is recommended to start studying the effects of IPv6
to AC drives as soon as possible. Of course, this also applies to other embedded
devices which will be networked.
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9 Summary
In essence, this thesis had two main research points: Firstly, to protect the decanter
centrifuge from physical destruction despite any possible references supplied to AC
drives. “Hazardous” references can reach the drive by whatever means which do not
matter in the end. Secondly, to conduct informal vulnerability assessment of AC
drives, to find potential “holes” which could be exploited to circumvent protection
(safety) functions.
The driver for this thesis was the increased threat against industrial control
systems, namely due to evolution of malware peaking to Stuxnet in 2010. For
starters in this thesis, the Stuxnet case was analyzed. As a result of that, it was
discovered that Stuxnet disabled standard protection functions of AC drives by
parameter modifications through fieldbus. Then, it was possible to run the gas
centrifuges at such high speeds that they were damaged due to centrifugal forces.
Next, the main industrial AC drive application subject, the decanter centrifuge,
was analyzed, focusing on vulnerabilities in its distinct components: the solid-bowl,
scroll-discharge centrifuge, the induction motor, and the AC drive. Consequently, it
was found out that the decanter must be protected at least from overspeeds.
Stuxnet has shown that parameter modifications over fieldbus can result to criti-
cal situations in terms of machine condition. Centrifuges are required to have strong
casing to hold fragments after rotor rupture, at least according to European stan-
dards. If the parameter writes can not be disabled, the only way to prevent overspeed
in Stuxnet-like attack is to have safe speed monitoring device, which prevents entry
into critical speeds. The safety system is also mandatory according to standards.
Security and safety issues were discussed. Even though being two different things,
security and safety are linked together in industrial automation and control systems,
because often they share the same technology.
Functional safety was presented according to standards. The safely-limited speed
(SLS) function was selected as suitable solution for protection of the decanter cen-
trifuge.
Even the standards require that safety functions are protected from unauthorized
modification. Three selected AC drives from different manufacturers, with functional
safety features and Ethernet-based fieldbus connectivity, were compared and their
security and safety features evaluated. Features specific to security were few in
the AC drives. Although all of them provided the possibility to protect safety
configuration by a password, complexity requirements for the password were low.
No major vulnerabilities were found in any of the three AC drives during the
brief study in this thesis, apart from the most obvious one which is related to the
unfortunate legacy of traditional fieldbuses: total configuration, including modify-
ing most settings and restoring the device to factory defaults, is possible through
fieldbus without any form of authentication. Fieldbuses were originally designed for
closed networks. This insecure-by-design issue still plagues even the modern field
devices such as AC drives. Positively, driven by the requirement for compliance with
standards, functional safety settings can be protected by simple passwords, however,
even that does not protect from restoring factory defaults in all cases.
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Nevertheless, by using defense-in-depth strategy with multiple layers of different
security and safety measures, it is possible to protect the decanter centrifuge from
cyber sabotage. Unfortunately, it may not be possible to remotely monitor the safety
devices in all cases. Like a double-edged sword, remote monitoring brings good and
bad things along with it. Therefore, totally isolated safety instrumented systems
are still justifiable, at least in the most critical applications and environments.
For most decanter centrifuge applications using AC drives, the security checklist
(Appendix C) provides a good starting point and a basis for which OEMs and other
parties can build their own security procedures. In addition to documentation and
procedures, proper training of personnel is of utmost importance in dealing with
security issues. Many recent, advanced cyber attacks have begun by a simple social
engineering method with an email attachment, which, when opened, compromises
the whole network.
News about industrial cybersecurity incidents are published, at least seemingly,
at increasing rate. It may very well be, that right after this thesis has been published,
a “2nd generation Stuxnet” (or 3rd, or 4th, etc.) is discovered, probably revealing
even more elaborate techniques for sabotage. Hopefully properly secured safety
systems are in place when that happens, and casualties can be avoided.
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A Safety Functions
This appendix describes the standardized safety functions applicable to AC drives
(Table A1). However, not all of them are implemented in real AC drive products.
They are presented here to provide information regarding what options are available
for power drive systems suitable for safety-related applications (PDS(SR)) by the
standards.
Table A1: Safety functions described by International Electrotechnical Commission [2007,
p. 16–18] (IEC) in the international standard IEC 61800-5-2 Adjustable speed electrical
power drive systems—Part 5–2: Safety requirements—Functional
Safety Function Description
Stopping functions
Safe torque off
(STO)
Energy capable of generating torque is not provided to the motor by
the PDS(SR). STO corresponds to “an controlled stop in accordance
with stop category 0 of IEC 60204-1.”
Safe stop 1 (SS1) Motor is decelerated, possibly with a limited rate, and after reaching
a specified speed limit or time delay the STO function is initiated.
Safe stop 2 (SS2) Same as the SS1 above, except that safe operating stop (SOS) is
initiated instead of STO.
Other safety functions
Safe operating stop
(SOS)
The motor is prevented from deviating from the stopped position
more than a specified amount, by providing energy to the motor for
resisting imposing forces without external (e.g. mechanical) brakes.
Safely-limited
acceleration (SLA)
The motor is prevented from exceeding the specified acceleration
limit.
Safe acceleration
range (SAR)
Acceleration and/or deceleration of the motor is kept within specified
limits.
Safely-limited
speed (SLS)
The motor is prevented from exceeding the specified speed limit.
Safe speed range
(SSR)
The motor speed is kept within specified limits.
Safely-limited
torque (SLT)
The motor is prevented from exceeding the specified torque.
Safe torque range
(STR)
The motor torque is kept within the specified limits.
Safely-limited posi-
tion (SLP)
The motor shaft is prevented from exceeding the specified position
limit(s).
Safely-limited
increment (SLI)
The motor shaft is prevented from exceeding the specified limit of
“position increment”, by stopping the motor after the traveling re-
quired for the increment.
Safe direction
(SDI)
The motor shaft is prevented from moving in the specified direction.
Safe motor temper-
ature (SMT)
The motor temperature is prevented from exceeding a specified upper
limit.
Safe brake control
(SBC)
A safe output signal is provided for controlling an external brake.
Safe cam (SCA) A safe output signal is provided to indicate that the motor shaft
position is within a specified range.
Safe speed monitor
(SSM)
A safe output signal is provided to indicate that the motor speed is
below a specified limit.
116
B Version Information of the Compared AC Drives
This appendix contains relevant hardware type and software version information of
the AC drives compared in this thesis. The data (Table B1) is presented as stated
on stickers on the drives or as reported by the PC software by the manufacturers.
Table B1: Version information of the different components of the AC drives compared in
this thesis, presented as stated by the manufacturers
ABB ACS880-01
Whole drive ACS880-01-02A4-3+K473+L517+R700, Frame R1, Assem-
bled in Finland, Firmware version: AINF0 v1.30
Power unit SBU-A1
Control unit ZCU-11
Memory unit ZMU-01
Control panel ACS-AP-I, SW V3.10
PC tool Drive Composer Pro v. 1.2.1.0 c© ABB Oy Drives 2012
Safety option FSO-11 Safety functions module, Type: R6030, Rev: F
Ethernet option FENA-11 Ethernet adapter, 51.32 FBA comm SW ver:
0x0072, 51.33 FBA appl SW ver: 0x0255
Encoder option FEN-11 Absolute encoder interface
Rockwell Allen-Bradley PowerFlex 755
Whole drive Cat No: 20G11 NC 2P1 JA0NNNNN, Series: A, Product
Revision: 5.001, Product of USA FAC 1100
Control panel 20-HIM-A6, Series A, Enhanced HIM, Firmware: V 2.002,
Product of Mexico 1150
PC tool DriveExplorer, Version: 6.04.99 — Full, Copyright c© 2012
Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc.
Main Control Firmware Revision 5.001, Hardware Change Number 02
Power Board Firmware Revision 1.001, Hardware Change Number 01
Encoder option 20-750-USB-1 Universal Fdbk *UFB-1, Firmware Revision:
1.015, Series: A
Safety option 20-750-S1 Safe Speed Montr *S1, Firmware Revision: 1.007,
Series: A
EtherNet/IP Revision: 1.001
DeviceLogix Revision: 2.004
USB to DPI 1203-USB, Revision: 1.004
Siemens SINAMICS S110
Power Module PM340, 6SL3210-1SE12-2UA0, Version: C02, Made in
United Kingdom
Control Unit CU305 PN, SINAMICS Control Unit, (1P)6SL3040-0JA01-
0AA0, Version: B, Made in Germany
Memory Card 6SL3054-4EB00-0AA0, SINAMICS S110
Operator Panel B0P20, Basic Operator Panel, 6SL3055-0AA00-4BA0, Ver-
sion: A D
PC tool Drive ES — Starter V4.3.1.2, Copyright c© 1999-2012,
Siemens AG
Firmware version 4.4.0.12
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In addition to the AC drives, the test setup included other equipment also.
Details regarding them are listed in Table B2.
Table B2: Technical details of the other equipment used in the test setup
USB to RS-232/-
485 adapter
Moxa UPort 1450l, Rev.: 1.2 , Moxa Technologies Co., Ltd.,
Made in Taiwan
Motor used with
ACS880
ABB Motor 3 CI.F IP55 IEC34, M2AA080B 3GAA082002-
ASA, 380-420 Y, 50 Hz, 1420 min−1, 0.75 kW, 2.0 A, cosϕ
0.74
Motor used with
PowerFlex 755
ABB QAL56M4B, IN=0.6 A, UN=230 V, fN=50 Hz, nN=1330
rpm, PN=0.1 kW, cosϕ=0.5 kW
Motor used with
S110
ABB M2VA63B4 3GVA062142-ASC, IN=1.2 A, UN=230 V,
fN=50 Hz, nN=1360 rpm, PN=0.18 kW, cosϕ=0.71 kW,
TN=0.82 Nm
All of the software tools used in this thesis are summarized in Table B3 along
with the exact versions used. Also operating systems are listed, thus specifying the
whole (virtual) software environment used.
Table B3: Summary of the PC software and their versions used in this thesis
Software Version(s)
Host OS: Windows 7 Enterprise 6.1, build 7601, service pack 1 (SP1) 32-
bit
VirtualBox 4.1.10, 4.1.18, 4.1.20, and 4.2.6
Guest OS: Windows 7 Enterprise 6.1, build 7601, SP1 32-bit
VM network settings Bridged Adapter, Intel(R) 82579LM Gi-
gabit Network Connection, Adapter Type:
Intel PRO/100 MT Desktop (82540EM),
Promiscuous Mode: Allow All
ABB Drive Composer Pro 1.2.1.0
Rockwell DriveExplorer Full 6.04.99
Siemens STARTER 4.3.1.2
Wireshark 1.8.3 with WinPcap version 4.1.2
Guest OS: BackTrack Linux 5 R3 32-bit with GNOME (ISO-image)
VM network settings Same as above (for Windows 7)
Nmap 6.01
Zenmap 6.01
Metasploit 4.5.0-dev [core: 4.5 api:1.0]
Armitage 1.44
THC-Hydra 7.3
Wireshark 1.8.1 with libpcap 1.0.0
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C Security Checklist for AC Drives for Decanters
This appendix contains the security checklist (Table C1) which can be used as a
guide when configuring AC drives for decanter centrifuge applications with Ethernet-
based fieldbus connectivity. The security checklist consists of separate actions in the
order of execution from top to bottom, according to the defense-in-depth strategy.
Following the checklist, the configuration of AC drives should be optimal from the
cybersecurity point of view.
Table C1: Checklist. Note! To be completed before connecting the decanter centrifuge to
a plant-wide network/fieldbus.
Action X
Initial Preparations
Make sure the AC drives are physically inaccessible for unauthorized
persons (e.g. locked cabinets, etc.)
Confirm that the engineering workstation is free from malware and has
proper security solutions in place, updated, and working, preferably
based on application whitelisting for maximum security
AC Drive Commissioning/Configuration
Configure private IP addresses (for example 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2) for the
AC drives according to site network policy
Configure motor data and possible encoders
Configure limit parameters for speed, torque, acceleration, etc.
With safety option: Configure safely-limited speed (SLS) as constantly
enabled with the speed limit below the first rotor critical speed
With safety option: Verify that the SLS function actually works
With safety option: Change the safety password from the (factory) de-
fault using as complicated password as possible with maximum length
Configure fieldbus communication
Enable write masks or similar function (if available) for remote connec-
tions (fieldbus) if remote parameter writes are not required
Disable web and other interfaces of AC drives if not required
Network Configuration
Make sure network segmentation is in order by strict firewall rules de-
faulting to “deny all” rule
Enforce strict policies on computers allowed within the control network,
preferably requiring application whitelisting
Filter (deny) all IPv6 traffic to/from the AC drives
Configure industrial protocol monitor at least for the control (fieldbus)
network
Configure security information and event management (SIEM) system
for the whole network
